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Abstract 
This thesis examines three important issues in the financial literature strand of M&As. The first 
analysis regards the field of acquisition target prediction (ATP) and the construction of profitable 
investment strategies based on identifying prospective targets and investing in their stock. The study 
introduces novel predictors, which connect market conditions to individual firm targetiveness, but the 
prediction accuracy does not seem to materially improve when compared to the literature. However, 
the investment performance of predicted targets is firmly positive, resembling the performance 
magnitude of actual targets. In a novel construct of rolling estimation, the model seems to have low 
intertemporality, suggesting opportunistic performance in both prediction accuracy and importance of 
predicting factors.  
The second analysis regards the effect of CEO deal experience on deal performance. Based on 
manually collected data, the CEO experience at the time of the appointment in the firm seems to be 
insignificant for the returns around the announcement, but long-run returns form an inverse U-shaped 
relationship with experience, suggesting positive effects from modest experience and exponentially 
decreasing effects for more experienced CEOs. The significance only for long-run returns suggests 
that investors have yet to account for the effects of experience on deal performance. As for the 
relationship pattern, the shift is attributed to the different behaviour expected by CEOs with different 
levels of experience. Inexperienced CEOs are alert and cautious, deliberating on the appropriate 
course of action, while more experienced CEOs may rely on their past experience, ignoring the 
special circumstances of each deal and applying their intuition indiscriminately. The latter behaviour 
can be classified as overconfident and hubristic.  
The third analysis focuses on the value creation of large deals (> $500 mil) in the aftermath of the 
2008 crisis. For the first time in academic literature, the general population of deals creates positive 
and significant wealth for acquirer shareholders. This outcome stands contrary to the status quo of the 
several decades leading up to the crisis, when the average deal was value-destroying for the acquirer. 
The improvement in returns holds for any type of deal that has been reported to lead to adverse stock 
performance. This market-wide shift connects to the recent financial crisis of 2008. The economic 
meltdown brought a stream of regulations in the U.S. market in an attempt to prevent the re-enactment 
of a similar crisis. The Dodd-Frank act improved several aspects of reporting and accountability for 
listed firms. The stunning improvement in corporate governance metrics and the ample testing for the 
effect of different factors suggest that superior corporate governance is the main factor for the new 
deal-performance standard. 
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1. Overview and Contribution 
Corporations have long been at the epicentre of most societies and economies. They are responsible 
for the production and distribution of products, the provision of services, as well as the discovery of 
more effective and efficient solutions to existing or new problems. Citizens benefit from their output 
as consumers, but they also rely on them for their personal income by assuming the roles of 
employees, collaborators, or investors. The institution of corporation has facilitated inter-social 
cooperation, technological innovation, and redistribution of resources. The increasingly globalised 
environment places corporation at the intersection of international exchange of products, services, and 
money. The intercontinental environment hosting firms is subject to incessant changes and, more 
frequently than not, the shifts are abrupt, steering companies along with the whole economy violently 
in a new, eternally temporary equilibrium. 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have been a useful tool in the executives’ relentless struggle for 
adjustment and prominence. In a typical organisation, the leading managerial team deliberates and 
agrees on the course of action for the foreseeable and distant future, allowing for contingencies in the 
niece economic environments. An implicit agreement among executives and directors postulates that 
the chartered route is continuously re-evaluated and compared to alternatives, all in order to identify 
the set of collective actions that will serve the company’s aim better: maximisation of shareholder 
wealth. Executives are primarily responsible for interpreting and acting on information provided by 
the market’s feedback mechanism, and when the time comes to amend their plans in a direction 
necessitating spending, they are given a binary option: make or buy. The decision of “making” 
regards the allocation of capital expenditure in order to grow a new technology, department, an 
independent entity, or even a joint venture, and it takes into consideration the alternatives in the 
market, the specialisation and discretion advised for the project, as well as the time available until the 
endeavour is expected to become fruitful. The decision of “buying” entails identifying an existing 
entity in the market, which can help the firm accelerate its strategic adjustment, and gaining control of 
it.  
The trade-off between organic (CAPEX) and inorganic (M&A) growth is beyond the simple 
substitution of time with cost; the caveats pertaining to the relatively quicker solution of M&As have 
been documented to be numerous and, frequently, sizeable enough to overcome the corresponding 
benefits. Public status for target firms, stock consideration, highly competitive bidding, executive 
behavioural biases such as envy, narcissism, and overconfidence have all been argued to adversely 
impact bidder stock prices around the deal-announcement date. The nature of M&As as distinct events 
with presumably measurable effects on shareholder wealth have repeatedly led CEOs to be held in 
contempt, usually displacing them from the company, as well as exposing them to lawsuits for 
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misconduct. The solution of a company acquiring its path towards survival and dominance is risky for 
both shareholders and executives, and this reiterated fact has fuelled both the fascination and the 
dreaded awe of practitioners and academics over M&As. 
The notoriety of acquisitions has not discouraged executives from undergoing a binge of deal-making, 
while the market concentrates its gluttony for combinations within industries and time periods, 
bearing the phenomena labelled as “Merger Waves”. In the last two decades, the economy has 
witnessed two officially acknowledged waves in the U.S., the Fifth wave in late 1990s which ended 
with the collapse of the stock market in the advent of the millennia, and the Sixth wave, starting in 
2003 and suddenly stopping due to the meltdown of the financial system. The few years following the 
crisis initially displayed a trough in deal activity, since the combined effect of liquidity scarcity and 
unprecedented uncertainty in the economy stalled plans for M&As. However, the market recovery 
after the crisis has born a rejuvenated attitude towards acquisitions, resulting in global record-
spending levels $3.8 trillion for the year 2015 (Bloomberg, 2016).1 While the eventful years after the 
crisis have yet to be classified as the Seventh U.S. merger wave, their passing has left us with 
voluminous activity, and a revitalised testing ground for existing and new M&A theories. The second 
chapter offers a detailed account on the general, prominent M&A theories and empirical evidence 
published in the course of the last century. Separate sections of literature review accompany the 
empirical chapters.  
This thesis has been an elaborative and painstaking exercise on revisiting three well-studied ideas in 
the M&A academic literature. The first idea places the target firm in the spotlight in an attempt to 
identify the attributes transforming a regular company into a target. The studies that initiated the 
literature strand in the 1970s (Sevens, 1973; Simkowitz and Monroe, 1971) advised for a set of 
characteristics inviting acquirers to place bids for the company. Their initial motivation, which still 
stimulates activity in this strand, is dual. First, successful target identification would allow investors to 
achieve overwhelming performance, as long as they were able to receive the sizeable premia paid to 
target shareholders. A model capable of predicting accurately and timely prospective targets would 
allow them to allocate funds in securities which usually appreciate in value more intensely than the 
market. The second part of the motivation regards company managers, who aim at attaining target 
status for their firm, so that their shareholders will benefit from the hefty premium. The identification 
of the specific characteristics could direct managerial efforts towards increasing their own firm’s 
targetiveness. Over time, studies have refined the methodological tools employed, and they have also 
enriched the list of factors predicting company targetiveness. The development of new theories in the 
general finance literature has consistently preceded the studies on company targetiveness, and it has 
frequently provided inspiration to targetiveness researchers. 
                                                          
1 “2015 was Best-Ever Year for M&A; This Year Looks Good Too.”, January 2016, Bloomberg. 
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Chapter 3 provides a new framework for measuring company targetiveness, balancing between 
reliance on existing frameworks and innovation in several aspects of the research structure. This 
chapter adds to the list of targetiveness factors by extending the focus beyond the unit of the 
prospective target. Existing theories, as well as newly devised conjectures, provide the basis for a new 
cohort of predictors attributing individual firm targetiveness to market-wide factors. The fundamental 
argument supporting all these environmental factors poses that firms are interacting constituents of 
complex economic systems, which display ever-changing configurations that usually overshadow the 
importance individual-firm attributes. A successful endeavour in deciphering the influence of 
concurrent trends on firm targetiveness will advance target prediction by several orders of magnitude. 
An additional motivation for Chapter 3 has been the static approach of previous studies on 
targetiveness. The literature has relied on single-period models for both understanding targetiveness 
and devising investment strategies. However, this approach disregards the dynamic component of 
market factors and, consequently, their effect on the acquisition decision process. To the best of my 
knowledge, this study is the first to address rolling model estimation and investment performance in 
the framework of target prediction. The results are suggestive of the circumstantial importance of 
targetiveness factors, indicating that acquirer management acts on different sets of factors through 
time. This outcome raises questions on the intertemporality of the results provided by previous studies 
on the field, as well as on the actual ability of outsiders such as academic researchers or analysts to 
demystify and decode the opaque process of acquisition target selection. 
The second idea empirically examined in this thesis regards the relationship of experience and 
performance in the setting of acquisitions. The literature has produced a few seminal works 
suggesting the adverse effect of experience, due to either the inappropriate generalisation of 
knowledge gained via deal-making (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999) or the gradual abasement of 
managers towards complacency and overconfidence (Billet and Qian, 2008). Despite the recency and 
popularity of the latter two studies, the literature has occasionally offered outcomes of positive or 
non-existent effects, indicating that consensus has yet to be reached. The majority of studies has 
mostly focused on organisational experience, and the few studies adopting CEOs as points of 
reference register the experience gained by the executive in the few years before the deal under 
investigation. 
An inefficiency in the research structure has been the main reason in investigating experience and 
performance in the current thesis. Specifically, the definition of executive experience as the 
experience accumulated over the last few years before the acquisition at hand neglects the 
confounding component of organisational experience. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the construction of 
purer measures and a more efficient framework on studying the effect of executive experience. The 
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consideration of the experience assumed before the appointment in the positions, as well as the 
inclusion of general and related experience measures has contributed to the spectrum of experience 
dimensions explored in the literature.  
The novel research structure instructed for manual data collection on CEO position and experience 
information for the years before the executive’s appointment in the acquirer. The analysis revealed an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between experience and performance, highlighting the standard, 
complex, non-monotonic relationships present abundantly in the intricate system of corporations. In 
the context of Chapter 4, modest acquisition experience appears to have a beneficial effect on 
shareholder wealth, arguably due to the ability of the seasoned CEOs to apply past lessons 
appropriately and still remain vigilant towards unanticipated complications. However, as the level of 
experience increases, the effect on performance diminishes and, after a substantial number of deals 
have been consummated, experience becomes toxic and value-destroying. The latter pattern reversal 
can be attributed to a rise in confidence, implanting the vice of negligence and, in extreme, hubris in 
CEO behaviour. 
An additional noteworthy outcome in Chapter 4 is the unexpected horizon over which CEO 
experience proves to be impactful. Announcement returns remain unaffected by such experience, 
while long-run returns reveal the aforementioned inverse U-shaped relationship. This discrepancy 
indicates the potential lack of adequate insight in the investor reaction surrounding the deal 
announcement, in contrast to the better educated and composed behaviour of investors over a longer 
period of time. If the recent trend of hiring seasoned CEOs persists in the future, investors may accept 
the lasting effects of experience and factor them in their attitude towards deal valuations earlier than 
they have done so far. 
The effect of experience on acquisition performance can be categorised in the broad literature strand 
of value creation through M&As. The academic consensus has been bleak for acquirers in the 
aggregate, suggesting adverse market reaction around the deal announcement or, depending on the 
sample period, negligent performance at best. This stylised fact has been re-examined in a voluminous 
number of studies, but its resilience has not been tested against the most fierce paradigm shift in the 
recent economic history. The financial collapse of 2008 has been labelled as the “Great Depression”, 
as it was characterised by market shocks, uncertainty, and misery that could be comparable only to the 
U.S. crisis in the 1930s. The financial sector, the fundamental pillar of capital-based societies and the 
main culprit for the crisis in 2008, crashed after a steep fall in the market’s trust for its capacity to 
function rationally. The U.S. government and the respective regulatory authorities undertook the task 
of upgrading the extant legal framework in order to prevent similar instances in the future. The most 
highlighted legislative product has been the Dodd-Frank Act, named after its main instigators, and it 
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imposed stricter rules on administration, compensation, transparency, and accountability in U.S. 
firms. 
The new legislation has laid the grounds for new formats of corporate governance, although even in 
the absence of regulatory intervention, executives and directors were bound to change their modus 
operandi. The aftermath of the crisis saw an overwhelming rate of CEO turnovers, which has been a 
draconian shareholder reaction to poor CEO performance in risk management and contingency 
planning. The market-wide overhaul of C-class executives has arguably set a memorable precedent: 
inadequate performance will not be left unpunished; similar treatment should be expected in cases of 
suboptimal acquisition performance.  
The expected shift in acquisition performance is the third idea investigated in this thesis. Chapter 5 
shows stunning improvement in the performance of mega acquisitions (deal value > $500 mil) during 
the years after the financial crisis, displaying positive average acquirer returns for the first time in 
academic literature. The focus on mega deals is deemed appropriate, as they comprise more than 80% 
of the total annual deal value at any point in time, and they have been held responsible for the value-
destroying quality of deal-making. The improvement is further attributed to the stunning turnaround 
of public mega deals, which display positive gains in the short run, despite their notoriously negative 
performance in the past. The superior performance of acquirers persists for measures of various 
horizons and construction, showing positive returns in the long-run as well. After an extensive set of 
tests, the unprecedented improvement in acquisition returns can be attributed to the regime shift 
imposed by the financial crisis, which led to regulatory and unofficial changes in the fashion firms are 
run and the Board of Director’s sincerity in monitoring and guiding CEOs. Furthermore, the agency 
costs, which have been a renowned suspect in driving deals or value destroying investments in 
general, are expected to have a decreasing effect after the crisis: firms display similar cash flows and 
even greater capital liquidity than in the past due to the low lending costs, but the deals pursued create 
value in the aggregate. Management seems to have grown less prone to self-servicing. Whether the 
positive performance persists through time remains to be seen.  
The structure for the remaining of this thesis is as follows: in the next chapter, I provide a general 
literature review, elaborating on central and specialised aspects of M&As in the academic literature; 
then, I provide three empirical chapters as they have been described in the introduction; finally, I 
conclude the thesis with summarising remarks, as well as suggestions and insights on future research 
projects. 
Chapter 2 General Literature Review 
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2. General Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) constitute a vital area of corporate finance, since investors, 
practitioners, and academics are fascinated by the concept of M&As for a multitude of reasons. First, 
M&A representation in the economy is material. In 2015, the total value of deals globally amounted 
to a record figure of $4.28 tril, while more than 46% of those deals occurred in U.S., at a national total 
M&A value of $1.97 tril (IBT, 2016).2 In order to conceive the magnitude of the latter figure, 2015 
U.S. M&As valued as much as 11% of the respective year’s GDP (Trading Economics, 2016). The 
frequency and worth of such deals are indicative of their significance to the normal function of 
corporations. Strategic shifts are performed swiftly owing to the relatively faster restructuring 
capacity of acquisitions, when compared to building or discontinuing a segment organically. In detail, 
managers who have decided to enter or exit a business segment, are not necessarily obliged to 
gradually grow the business function organically or de-escalate the investment, respectively. If they 
find it appropriate, they can acquire another firm or divest the unwanted business section as an 
independent entity. The flexibility added by the quick restructuring via M&As allows firms to adjust 
to the dynamic market environment in a timely fashion. Without the option of swift strategic shifts, 
companies would be less motivated to undertake risky, costly projects, as they would have to bias 
their investment decisions towards project with more probable high future relevance. 
The following review offers a general insight on M&A literature, and it is by no means exhaustive, as 
the vastness of M&A work would require the full extent of a Ph.D. thesis. The selection of reviewed 
topics are seemingly unrelated to the niche areas investigated in the empirical chapters, as each 
empirical chapter is accompanied by a relevant section. The purpose of this literature review is to 
offer a contextual insight regarding M&As, which will allow for a more pleasant reading to the 
erudite reader.  
 
                                                          
2 “Global M&A Activity in 2015 Worth $4.28 Trillion, Highest Ever”, International Business Times, 8 January 2016). 
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2.2. Merger Activity 
Theoretical and empirical research has identified several reasons for the observed M&A activity. The 
Neoclassical Theory (see e.g. Gort, 1969; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade and Stafford, 2004) 
postulates that merger waves, i.e. bursts of M&A activity clustered in time, are the market response to 
inefficiencies emerging due to industry-wide shocks in e.g. technology, regulation, input costs. 
Several independent, industry-specific merger waves may cluster in time and form an aggregate 
market merger wave, as long as there is enough liquidity to finance the deals (Harford, 2005). 
Investors can rely on Leveraged-Buyouts (LBOs) in order to foresee surges in the activity for 
corporate control, as LBOs provide strong signal about changes or shocks in the respective industries 
(Harford et al., 2016).  
The second and more recent set of theories explaining M&A activity focuses on firm valuation. 
Overvalued acquirers place bids on firms in order to take advantage of their relatively cheap equity 
capital, before the market realises the inflated valuation and corrects the share price (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003). A more general version of this theory considers the relative valuation between the 
prospective pair of acquirer-target and suggests that acquisitions will happen between firms when the 
relative mispricing favours the acquirer. Even if both firms are over- or under-valued, a bid is 
plausible, and valuable, as long as the acquirer has relatively overvalued stock against the target 
(Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). 
The Neoclassical and the mispricing theories view the firm as an entity striving for efficiency 
maximisation, assuming the management is a perfect agent of the principals, i.e. the shareholders. 
There are theories bearing either homogeneous or contradictory views on the reasons behind merger 
activity. Q theory provides a framework supporting efficiency in the market for corporate control, 
suggesting that firms with more capable management teams will acquire their inferiorly performing 
peers, discipline the management as deemed appropriate, and, eventually, unlock the hidden value of 
target company’s assets (Dong et al., 2006; Brainard and Tobin, 1968). This theory could be indirectly 
related to a behavioural explanation, i.e. managerial hubris. The main argument of this theory 
pertinent to M&As is that overconfident managers will resort to the acquisition of firms they believe 
they can administrate far better than the incumbent management (Roll, 1986). Hubris, or 
overconfidence, has been recognised as an international phenomenon that leads the number of deals 
CEOs perform (Ferris et al., 2013), and although it has been connected to value-destroying ventures 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008), there have been theoretical frameworks where hubris serves as a 
catalyst for market efficiency in company pricing (Ko and Huang, 2007). 
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CEO overconfidence is not the only explanation based on behavioural characteristics. Top managers 
have reportedly pursued acquisitions due to feelings of envy of the benefits enjoyed by acquiring peer 
CEOs (Goel and Thakor, 2009). According to this reasoning, CEOs enjoy private benefits by 
conducting acquisitions, such as higher compensation throughout their career (Yim, 2013), as well as 
a materially larger area of influence, since they reign over bigger organisations after each deal. These 
benefits tempt other CEOs in the market, who thus become more likely to imitate the acquiring CEOs’ 
behaviour in order to enjoy similar perks. Goel and Thakor (2009) claim that this socially-inspired 
incentive for deal-making could result in aggregate merger waves of acquisitions, as envy is spreading 
across and beyond industries, encouraging inactive CEOs to become acquirers. 
The aforementioned theories of overconfidence and envy are only few examples of CEOs initiating 
acquisitions for their own personal benefit, a predicament that has been documented in the literature 
before (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). Another theory explaining the reason behind M&A 
activity and waves has been provided by Gorton et al. (2009). They suggest managers perform 
acquisitions in order to prevent acquirers from attempting a bid on their own firm. In detail, CEOs 
consider the size distribution of firms in the broader business segment they belong, and, if most firms 
are of similar size and only few are significantly larger, CEOs resort to acquisitions that will enlarge 
their own firm and, consequently, render it a less feasible target to acquirers. These “defensive” 
acquisitions serve the management’s incumbency and not the shareholders, as the underlying deals are 
not performed in contingence to the existence of profitable opportunities, but only with respect to the 
probability of the firm receiving an unsolicited offer. Gorton et al. (2009) suggest that defensive 
acquisitions can provoke market responses of more such acquisitions, clustering deal activity within a 
specific time period in the form of a merger wave (see also Phalippou et al., 2014). 
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2.3. Merger Waves 
It is a common knowledge in M&A literature that deals occasionally cluster in time, resulting in the 
phenomenon of merger waves (see e.g. Nelson, 1959; Golbe and White, 1993). As it can be inferred 
by the review so far, academics have not reached a unifying theory explaining the causes of merger 
waves, which is unsurprising, as reasons stimulating waves span from rational reactions (Neoclassical 
theory) and mispricing to CEO overconfidence and self-servicing (Behavioural theories). In recent 
history, the U.S. market has been familiar with six merger waves, each one of which was triggered on 
different premises. In this section, I describe the general characteristics of the prominent merger 
waves. 
2.3.1. First Wave 
A surge in the market for corporate control was observed during the period 1898 – 1902 (Lamoreaux, 
1980). The First U.S. merger wave was led by innovation in technology, economic growth, increased 
efficiency in industrial procedures, the establishment of new regulation, and the price appreciation of 
industrial securities on NYSE (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Most of the activity involved 
horizontal acquisitions leading to large companies and establishing market structures that resembled 
monopolies (Stigler, 1950). The end of this wave came with the collapse of the stock market in 1902, 
which deprived prospective acquirers of the necessary capital funds to continue their consolidation 
plans. The stock market collapse also introduced additional regulation, i.e. Sherman Act, which 
commanded against the formulation of monopolistic market structures, restricting the activities of 
high-market-power acquirers (Stigler, 1950).  
2.3.2. Second Wave 
The Second U.S. merger wave was triggered by the nationwide need for higher operational 
efficiencies after the First World War. It lasted for approximately a decade, from the late 1910s until 
the economic crisis of 1930s (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). During that time, small firms that 
have not been acquired in the First wave were targeted and consolidated in larger entities. The 
increasing size of firms led to advantages such as economies of scale and scope, placing the combined 
firms in better position against competition (Stigler, 1950). The Second wave was also put to a halt 
due to a stock market crash, this time the famous market collapse in 1929, which was the starting 
point of the Great Depression (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). 
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2.3.3. Third Wave 
After almost three decades of stagnation in the market for corporate control, the Third U.S. merger 
wave started during the late 1950s and ended with the oil crisis in 1973 (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008). This Third wave was characterized by predominant market consolidation and conglomeration 
(Edwards and Kaplan, 1955). Top management of prospective acquirers observed that companies in 
other industries are affected differently by market conditions. Due to the abundance of capital and the 
fear for another industry shock that could evaporate profits in their main industry, capital-rich firms 
started acquiring smaller firms in other industries in order to diversify the risk of operational cash 
flows (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). The oil crisis in 1973 had a market-wide impact on stock 
valuation and capital liquidity; once again, the merger wave was stopped abruptly due to the lack of 
fund liquidity. 
2.3.4. Fourth Wave 
The Fourth U.S. merger wave started in 1981, after the global markets have recovered from the oil 
crisis, and lasted up to 1987, when the collapse of the stock market reduced capital liquidity and 
growth prospects. This wave was characterized by the attempt of fragmentation of the previously 
created conglomerates, in an attempt to correct the inefficiencies induced by misguided diversification 
during the Fourth wave (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). The adverse effect of diversification was 
apparent in the relatively low valuation ratios of conglomerates. Firms with higher valuation metrics 
acquired them, selling the unrelated business segments in order to release the hidden asset values and, 
consequently, they realised significant gains by divesting subsidiaries at higher prices than the 
conglomerate share price implied (Dong et al., 2006). Along with industrial, regulatory and 
technological shocks, the debased performance and managerial incumbency of the conglomerates’ 
management led to an unprecedented concentration of hostile bids, divestitures, leveraged and 
management buyouts (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Although the fourth merger wave has 
labelled as the ‘hostile wave’, the concentration of successful hostile bids did not exceed 14% of all 
deals (Andrade et al., 2001). 
2.3.5. Fifth Wave  
The Fifth U.S. merger wave has allegedly been the largest in the American economic history so far, 
both in terms of consideration and deal frequency (Moeller et al., 2005). It started in 1993 and it 
ended with the stock market crash in 2001. An increased number of cross-border deals dominated the 
wave, along with technological breakthroughs, market deregulation and unparalleled surges in stock 
prices (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Merger activity in this wave was stimulated by the 
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predominant desire of acquirers to strengthen their position in the global marketplace. This motive 
was further fuelled by the simultaneous decrease in foreign direct investment restrictions in several 
countries, leading to opportunities of market penetration (Black, 2000). The argument that 
international competition was the common denominator among the majority of deals is supported by 
the prevalence of related acquisitions (vertically or horizontally), along with the decreased proportion 
of divestitures (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Regarding acquirer characteristics, the Fifth wave 
had more young firms perform acquisitions when compared to more mature firms (Arikan and Stulz, 
2016). Another unique characteristic of this wave was the remarkable level of value destruction for 
acquirers, especially among technology firms. Nevertheless, only few devastating deals seem to be 
responsible for this notorious statistic (Moeller et al., 2005). 
2.3.6. Sixth Wave 
The Sixth U.S. merger wave lasted for almost half a decade, from 2003 up to 2007, concluding with 
the collapse of the market trust in the banking system. While the Fifth wave was the largest in terms 
of consideration and number of deals, the Sixth wave resulted in similar losses for acquiring firms and 
low premia for target firms (Alexandridis et al., 2012, 2013). Serial acquirers performed a smaller 
portion of the deals when compared to previous periods and, overall, acquirers used less stock 
consideration than before. The lower premia, the mitigated aggressiveness of serial acquirers, as well 
as the restricted use of stock consideration could indicate efficiency improvements in information 
distribution in the market, as well as moderated hubristic behaviour by acquirer management. 
Nevertheless, investors did not have a generally positive reaction to deal-making decisions, which 
drove acquirer returns lower than expected (Alexandridis et al., 2012). 
2.3.7. Merger Waves Overview 
The six documented merger waves in the U.S. display a blend of unique and shared characteristics. 
The drivers instigating each wave are special to each case, be it increase in operational efficiencies, 
diversification of risk, correction of investing inefficiencies, globalisation etc. However, all waves 
ended with the advent of an economic crisis that affected capital and funds liquidity in the market. It 
seems that regardless of the circumstances leading to the wave being initiated, heightened merger 
activity cannot continue when prospective acquirers cannot gather enough funds to perform 
acquisitions. This observation is in agreement to recent research suggesting that capital liquidity is a 
prerequisite for industry-specific waves to cluster in time and become market-wide phenomena 
(Harford, 2005). 
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2.4. Deal Attributes and Other Factors 
2.4.1. Method of Payment 
The three prominent methods of payment are stock swaps, cash, and a mix of the two. When target 
shareholders are paid with stock swaps, they exchange their company’s shares for a number of the 
acquirer’s shares. Cash can be raised via different methods. Acquirer management can use 
the cash accumulated from the company’s operating cash flows, or they could issue debt or equity in 
order to raise cash and pay for the target shares. The choice of paying or accepting each of the 
aforementioned methods is taken after several factors have been taken into account. 
Hansen (1987) observes that the probability of bidders using cash increases with the relative 
undervaluation and size differences with the target. The use of stock consideration has been shown to 
signal overvaluation to investors leading to average negative returns of approximately 10% (Travlos, 
1987), therefore using stock while being undervalued will prolong or even worsen the acquirer stock 
mispricing. However, it has been suggested that stock swaps increase the permanent investor base of 
acquirers, which in turn alleviates the cost of information asymmetry and opaqueness, therefore 
affecting positively bidder announcement returns (Lei et al., 2016). On top of the effects of 
mispricing, bidder management takes into consideration the costs of issuing stock. In order to justify 
these costs, the size or the value of the target should have a considerable impact on the acquiring firm. 
Recent evidence are not suggestive of the adverse effect of stock consideration. When controlling for 
the market reaction to companies’ seasoned equity offerings (SEO) then stock-financed acquisitions 
seem to have no excessive effect on acquirer returns (Golubov et al., 2015). 
The impact of method of payment on the existing ownership structure is a considerable factor as well. 
There is evidence for both U.S. (Martin, 1996) and Europe (Faccio and Masulis, 2005) regarding the 
defensive strategies of existing bidder shareholders in order to maintain the ownership structure, 
especially when the distribution of corporate control can significantly be affected by the method of 
payment. More specifically, intermediary levels of ownership by the largest shareholders (see e.g. 
Martin, 1996; Faccio and Masulis, 2005), e.g. 20-60%, instruct the use of cash. The same holds for 
the cases when major shareholder’s voting power is threatened in cases of both listed and unlisted 
firms (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). On the contrary, too low or too high ownership concentration 
leaves bidder shareholders indifferent to corporate control loss. In these cases, the decision between 
cash and stock payment is not affected by ownership structure. 
Apart from ownership structure issues, personal interests of bidder management may affect the 
method of payment. According to “agency cost” theory (see e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976), top 
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management may decide to extract rents from the firm at the cost of shareholder wealth. The pursuit 
of private benefits may be more pronounced when firms have available free cash flow (FCF) in excess 
of their future investment needs (Jensen, 1986). In this case, managers may prefer to invest the funds 
in excess in negative NPV projects, instead of redistributing it back to shareholders, as managerial 
compensation and influence are accruing with additional deals and the size of the entity they control 
(Yim, 2013). With respect to method of payment, FCF-rich firms may be prone to use their excessive 
funds via making cash bids. Accordingly, bidder management would prefer not to dilute their own 
firm control due to acquisitions and, as a result, they tend to use less stock consideration, when their 
ownership is low or threatened (see e.g. Stulz, 1988; Amihud, Lev and Travlos, 1990; Martin, 1996). 
Management is also bound to exaggerate about the needs for investment capital for the same reasons 
of “agency cost” theory (Stulz, 1990). Managers would attempt to maintain a reserve of funds for 
investments by keeping most of their cash balance inflated or raising more capital via stock offerings. 
The alternative is to raise debt, which proves to be restrictive for rent-seeking managers. Since 
increasing debt payments prevent managers from investing in negative NPV projects, accumulating 
debt is a natural hedging against overinvestment. On the other hand, exaggerating about investment 
fund needs allows management to have sufficient fund allowance for both positive NPV projects and 
self-serving endeavours. The contrasting effect of raising capital via debt or equity regarding 
overinvestment and underinvestment suggests that there is an optimal deal-financing decision that 
represses agency costs (Stulz, 1990). 
In addition, the financial condition of the bidder affects the means of payment decision. Bidders with 
increased leverage are more prone to use stock swaps as consideration in order to avoid financial 
distress, while targets with increased leverage are more likely to be offered cash (Hansen, 1987). 
Existing literature supports the positive relationship between growth opportunities for bidders and the 
probability of using stock financing (Jung et al., 1996; Martin, 1996), while there is inconclusive 
evidence on the relationship between growth opportunities and accumulated debt (no evidence: 
Titman and Wessels, 1988; negative relation: Smith and Watts, 1992; Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 
1984). Furthermore, apart from accumulated debt, existing high cash balances for the acquirer 
increase the probability of using cash financing, along with the overall probability that a firm will 
become a bidder (see e.g. Harford, 1999; but not Chaney et al., 1991). The target financial condition 
has also been shown to affect the targetiveness of companies, as acquirers seek to gain control of 
financially constrained firms and relieve them from excessive debt (Erel et al., 2015). 
There is evidence that bidder valuation, relative or absolute, affects the method of payment as well. 
For instance, high stock bidder valuations lead to equity financing (see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003). This applies better when the bidder is overvalued or relatively overvalued, as bidder 
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management tries to buy real assets with temporarily cheap capital. On the contrary, Eckbo et al. 
(1990) suggest that in mixed financed deals, targets of highly-valued bidders are more likely to accept 
cash for their shares. This result may be influenced by the element of asymmetric information 
between the bidder and the target: cash consideration is not contingent to future bidder cash flows, 
and target management, reluctant to undertake the risk of the information asymmetry, may prefer the 
certainty of cash over the risk embedded in stock swaps. 
Acquirers, in general, try to avoid bidding competition. Cash consideration may indicate that the 
target is highly valued (Fishman, 1989), which may discourage competing bids. In addition, corporate 
bidders tend to use a higher proportion of cash consideration when they compete against financial 
bidders (Dittmar et al., 2009). Accordingly, cash is used in tender offers and pre-emptive bids, as it 
allows for faster deal completion, when compared to stock consideration (Gilson, 1986; Fishman, 
1989). The benefits of cash deals regarding competition, information asymmetry, and swiftness in 
deal completion motivate acquirer and target directors to be more receptive to cash bids. 
2.4.2. Target Public Status 
The public status of target firms, i.e. whether their shares are listed on a stock exchange or not, has 
been extensively studied in the M&A literature. Public targets have been associated with lower bidder 
returns of about 3% when compared to targets (Yim, 2013; see also Officer, 2003, 2004; Mandelker, 
1974; Dodd, 1980), while private targets increase bidder returns (see e.g. Wruck, 1989; Hertzel and 
Smith, 1993). There have been several suggestions for the variety in returns with respect to target 
public status. One explanation is overpayment; public targets reportedly receive 63.3% higher premia 
than private targets on average (Bargeron et al., 2008; see also Alexandridis et al., 2013) except for 
the cases when the ownership structure is similar for both public and private targets, where the premia 
are similar (Bauguess et al., 2009).  
Another explanation stemming from the ownership structure regards the higher ownership 
concentration in private targets, and its effects on the combined entity after a deal is consummated. 
Reportedly, private deals have usually very large stock block-holders, while public firms are more 
accustomed with dispersed ownership (see e.g. Chang, 1998). According to the latter study, the 
combination of the ownership distribution and the method of payment is responsible for the positive 
abnormal returns observed in private deals. When private targets are purchased with stock, the 
sizeable large shareholders in the target will become block-holders in the new entity, providing better 
monitoring of managerial activities. This expected improvement in governance is reflected on positive 
abnormal returns for the bidder, and the lack of abnormal returns for cash private deals, where there is 
no new block-holder in the combined entity, supports this explanation. In a different context to 
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ownership structure, it has been shown that cash acquisitions of public targets yield positive bidder 
returns. Public deals tend to destroy more value than private deals, although the actual performance of 
a deal is contingent to the interaction between target public status and method of payment (see e.g. 
Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004).  
An additional remarkable pattern has been observed with respect to target status preferences by 
different types of acquirers. Arikan and Stulz (2016) show that firms follow a U-curve in the 
acquisition activity level after their initial public offering (IPO). The heightened acquisition activity 
soon after the IPO is focused more on private targets, while as firms mature and reach the second 
spike in their deal activity, they tend to acquire public targets more. The study does not conclude on 
whether the observed tendencies could be attributed to size relationships between acquirers and 
targets, as young firms and private targets tend to be smaller than mature firms and public targets. 
2.4.3. Toeholds 
Bidders occasionally resort to strengthening their position before officially attempting a bid on a 
target. One well-known strategy is acquiring a “toehold” on the target, i.e. a block of shares that is 
relatively sizeable. Toehold sizes can vary, ranging from anything between 1% up to just anything 
less than 50% of target’s stock, but they are usually around 20%, which is above the 5% threshold of 
ownership at which investors in U.S. have to inform S.E.C. (Betton and Eckbo, 2000).3 However, the 
size of the toehold seems to be independent to the prospective target’s stock price at the time of 
toehold investment and it is usually beneficial to the acquirer (see e.g. Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990; 
Chowdhry and Jegadeesh, 1994; but Singh, 1998). 
The existence of toeholds bears several advantages for both targets and acquirers. Block ownership 
serves as an effective monitoring mechanism, as target management and Board of Directors are aware 
that a block owner would be more effective in replacing ineffective managers (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Even if the management or director turnover is not applied 
via share voting, block bidders have an advantage on acquiring the firm in order to discipline the 
management (Dodd and Warner, 1983; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1989; Jensen, 1988). This action 
can be facilitated due to advantage of having a considerable portion of target stock acquired before the 
company becomes an active target. Bidders holding the toehold can afford bidding higher for the 
remainder of the target stock, as they have already acquired a significant ownership percentage 
without the extra cost of the premium usually paid to target shareholders. Competing bidders should 
be willing to pay much higher than the toehold acquirer, which proves to be an effective pre-emptive 
measure in favour of first-mover bidders. Nevertheless, hostile target management has the option of 
                                                          
3 Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) report average toeholds of 10% at the time of the acquisition attempt. 
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offering inexpensive “toehold options” to “white knights”, i.e. friendly acquirers which intervene 
against an unsolicited bid and get control of the target, rendering pre-emptive bidder investments 
ineffective (Bulow, Huang and Klemperer, 1999). 
Toeholds may also hold disadvantages for block investors. As mentioned before, owners with large 
ownership percentages have more value at stake compared to smaller shareholders. Therefore, they 
are more likely to actively monitor the actions and direction of the company management even when 
they do not seek full control of the firm. However, the certainty at which block owners will monitor 
the firm demotivates the monitoring by smaller owners. This phenomenon has been called the “free-
rider effect”, because smaller owners get a “free ride” on monitoring by owners with larger stakes in 
the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1980). The issue is further accentuated when the target company 
ownership is almost perfectly fragmented with the exception of one large owner (Berle and Means, 
1932; Grossman and Hart, 1980). In this case, the committed wealth by each small investor is not high 
enough to justify the time to monitor the firm, therefore small investors have to rely on larger owners 
to undertake the costs.  
The “free-rider” effect indeed bears some costs for the toehold owner, but the benefits of such stakes 
outmatch the corresponding costs. On top of mitigating bidding competition, bidders with toehold 
face overall only mild resistance by target management (Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993), which results in 
discounts on the premia paid to target shareholders (Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Bris, 2000). The 
importance of large toeholds in mitigating competition can be observed in the relationship between 
toehold size and number of bidders. Acquisitions with toeholds of 20% have only one contestant, 
while similar deals with only a 5% toehold evolve into auctions with multiple bidders (Bradley, Desai, 
and Kim, 1988). Regarding lower premia, there is contradictory evidence suggesting the target stock 
price rises with respect to toehold size prior to the bid announcement (Mikkelson and Ruback, 1985; 
Barclay and Holderness, 1991). At the same time, larger toeholds are related with lower pre-
announcement target run-ups (Betton and Eckbo, 2000). In summary, the evidence on whether 
acquirers pay less for targets in which they own a toehold does not provide unequivocal inferences. 
Toehold owners enjoy additional benefits to the opportunity of paying less for full control of the 
target. Bids with toeholds in place are more likely to be consummated (Walkling, 1985; Jennings and 
Mazzeo, 1993; Betton and Eckbo, 2000), but they prove to be profitable even if the bid is not 
successful and the toehold serves only as an investment. The premium to be paid rises by an average 
of 31% when competing bids appear (Bradley et al., 1988); this premium will be enjoyed by the 
toehold bidder in case the bidding competition is lost. Furthermore, the performance on a toehold 
investment may be augmented by the timing of the bidding investor, as toehold investments are 
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frequently placed when an acquisition attempt on the target is least expected by the market (Bris, 
2000). 
The benefits of placing a toehold investment has not prevented their frequency to wither through time. 
Their occurrence peaked during the Fourth U.S. merger wave, when pre-emptive investments offered 
a significant advantage to unsolicited bids (Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn, 2008). In the years after the 
Fourth wave, toeholds are expected to be either minor, around 5%, or materially large, at least 20%. 
Also, in the recent years there seems to be a threshold of toehold size, placed at approximately 9%, at 
which the deal consummation probability is highly in favour of the acquirer (Betton et al., 2008). 
However, even sizeable toeholds do not appear to be helpful against hostile and unwavering target 
management. 
2.4.4. Termination Fees 
Companies often use contractual agreements in order to insure themselves against changes during deal 
negotiations. Termination fees serve as such insurance, and they require one party to pay a fee to the 
counterparty if the deal is not consummated. Depending on the pre-deal agreements, either the target 
or the bidder may be asked to pay the termination fee. An early view on termination fees was 
provided by Ayres (1990), and Fraidin and Hanson (1994). Collectively, the two studies observed that 
having termination fees in place does not distort the overall pricing of deals.  
Studies on termination fees became more popular after Pfizer paid a stunning termination fee of $1.8 
bil in cash to American Home Products (AHP), in order to break its negotiations with the prospective 
target Warner Lambert, which was eventually acquired by Pfizer for $90 bil during the late 1990s 
(Officer, 2003; Bates and Lemmon, 2003). The bidding competition started at a lower point of $75 bil 
with the initial bid by AHP. The pricing competition raised the bidding price by 20%, resulting in the 
loss of AHP, which suffered a fall of 25% fall in its stock price in the aftermath. The adverse outcome 
for AHP highlighted the importance of termination fees as insurance during M&A negotiations, and it 
incentivised other firms to adopt the measure (Bates and Lemmon, 2003). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the proportion of deals incorporating termination fees was minor, about 
2% payable by targets and less than 1% by bidders (Bates and Lemmon, 2003). However, within a 
few years, the occurrence of termination fees has dramatically increased. The percentages went up to 
60% for targets and 13% for bidders in 1998 (Bates and Lemmon, 2003). In parallel, the absolute size 
of termination fees has increased through time. This trend has been attributed to the gradual increase 
in deal sizes during period 1997-2004, while the average fee stayed relatively stable at approximately 
4% of the target’s value (Andre, Khalil and Magnan, 2007). The magnitude of such fees compensate 
for the sunk transaction and opportunity costs in case deal negotiations fail. This attribute enhances 
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competitive bidding from the initial bidder (Brantley, 2002; Officer, 200; Oster, 2005, Boone and 
Mulherin, 2006). In general, target termination fees provide a persuasive motive for the bidder to 
disclose sensitive and crucial proprietary information during bilateral arrangements (Officer, 2003). 
Moreover, fees regarding (only) the initial bidder seem to stimulate the market for corporate control 
(Kahan and Klausner, 2000). 
Nevertheless, advocates of competition-disruptive features suggest that termination fees may prohibit 
an efficient auction process, thus harming competition and decreasing the gains of target shareholders 
(Braithwaite and Ciardullo, 2004). In addition, nepotism can allegedly be promoted via termination 
fees, as such clauses allow management to favour specific bidders, obstructing additional bids and 
restricting shareholder value maximization (Coates and Subramanian, 2000; Brantley, 2002). The fact 
that court decisions acknowledge the validity of termination fees is contrary to the latter argument, as 
the government has a stated goal of augmenting competition in the market for corporate control 
(Braithwaite and Ciardullo, 2004). 
Termination fees provide advantages for both targets and bidders, which is the main reason for their 
proliferation outside U.S. as well (Bugeaud, 1996). When targets cancel negotiations and pay the 
respective termination fee, the market receives the signal of superior company value, which may 
attract higher bids in the near future (Leshem, 2007). The benefits to target firms do not stop to future 
offers, as target termination fees are related to higher rate of deal completion, about +20% on average, 
and higher premia, +4% on average (Officer, 2003; Bates and Lemmon, 2003). Overall, termination 
fees payable by both counterparts are connected to large, risky deals with material information 
asymmetry between participants (Bates and Lemmon, 2003). These cases include high-growth asset 
acquisitions, although it is less likely to observe their activation when bidder holds a considerable 
toehold position. 
By the same account, bidder termination fees are related to lower premium paid, as well as lower 
overall target shareholder gains. This is an indication that there is a significant pay-off for the bidder, 
because of the agreement to provide insurance and a pre-emptive grip on the collective merger gains 
to target shareholders. 
2.4.5. Collar Offers 
Termination fees are not the only tools used in M&As providing assurances to either counterparty. 
“Collars” are contractual agreements limiting the possible payoffs to target shareholders to a set of 
scenarios within well-specified boundaries. They apply in stock-swap deals and there are two 
different types of collars (see e.g. Officer, 2004). Fixed Exchange collars set a fixed exchange ratio 
for the swap, i.e. the number of bidder shares exchanged for target shares, as long as the bidder stock 
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price remains within a certain price range. If the stock price increases or contracts beyond the 
appointed boundaries, then different exchange ratios apply. The purpose of this collar type is to 
mitigate unpredictable changes in the ownership structure of the new entity. The second collar type is 
called Fixed Payment collar, and it specifies a fixed value received by target shareholders for a 
specified range in the acquirer stock price. If the stock price moves beyond the agreed limits, different 
ratios apply. This collar type secures the value received by target shareholders, shielding acquirers 
against volatile price changes and, consequently abrupt rises in deal consideration. 
Collars are more frequently encountered in specific deal settings (see e.g. Fuller, 2003). First, they are 
frequent in deals where the relative size of the target over the acquirer is on the low end of the 
distribution, as smaller targets are bound to face higher stock price volatility. Second, in cases where 
insider ownership is high enough to create incentives for executives of either side to seek for 
assurances on the expected payoff. And third, when the uncertainty originating in information 
asymmetry on behalf of the acquirer is low. Collars have reportedly been associated with negative 
abnormal returns for bidders and higher premia for target firms, especially due to the impact of 
information asymmetries on the latter firm’s stock price (Fuller, 2003; see also Houston and Ryngaert, 
1997; Hansen 1987). 
2.4.6. Financial Advisors 
Some firms have departments that are responsible for the firm’s acquisition activity. These companies 
rarely use the services of financial advisors (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012). Most of them, 
however, seek the services external advisors, so that the acquisition process will lead to the best 
possible result. The use of these advisors reached levels of about 85% of all deals during 2007, when 
investment banks and financial consultancies facilitated the deal process at the end of the Sixth U.S. 
merger wave (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012). 
Major advisors are, in principle, investment banks and they charge a percentage fee on the deal value, 
where more reputable advisers charge premium rates, although the higher payment does not 
necessarily result in higher deal consummation rates (Chemmanur and Fulghiery, 1994). Advisors are 
paid in order to deliver three main services. First, they search the market for a fitting target or acquirer 
to buy their customer, and they provide their detailed suggestions in order to allow customer 
management to deliberate on the options. Second, after contact has been made with their customer’s 
counterpart, they structure the contractual agreements and they map the merger process, so that deal 
synergies will be maximized (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012). This service invokes their role 
as information providers, as one of the fundamental functions in structuring the merger process is to 
communicate proprietary information to both counterparts (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Booth and Smith, 
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1986; Titman and Trueman, 1986; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). Third, they advise their clients 
on strategic activities that will maximise the share of synergies enjoyed by their own shareholders at 
the cost of the counterpart’s shareholders (Brealey and Myers, 2000). Naturally, the latter step has to 
be done in modesty, as dissatisfied negotiators will cancel the process, leading to the manifestation of 
sunk costs for both the advisor and the customer. 
The choice of hiring advisors of exceptional reputation appears more prominent during sizeable deals 
(Golubov et al., 2012), with significant information asymmetries, hostility by the bidder, little to no 
acquisition experience for the buyer and high complexity of deal specifications (Servaes and Zenner, 
1996; Kale et al., 2003). In these cases, the presence of financial advisors serves to minimise the 
transaction costs, as well as to recommend strategic activities for the mitigation of unknown hazards. 
The decision to hire renowned advisors is based on evidence displaying financial advisors 
performance to be highly related to their reputation. However, there are studies suggesting that the 
reputation of advisors offers, at best, zero abnormal gains (see e.g. Rau, 2000; Servaes and Zenner, 
1996; McLaughlin; 1992; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Ismail, 2010). The literature has also evidence 
for contradicting inferences, since the reputation of the financial advisor seemed to positively connect 
to their client performance ($65.83 mil around the announcement) and the aggregate synergistic gains 
of the deal (see e.g. Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012). Even in cases of top rankings in 
reputation for both bidder and target financial advisors, the advisor with the relatively higher 
reputation manages higher returns for their client (Kale et al., 2003).  
An additional measure of advisor performance regards deal completion. Highly reputable advisors are 
connected to shorter deal completion time (Golubov et al., 2012) and higher completion rates, as they 
match compatible firms with high expected synergies (Kale et al., 2003). Also, advisors aim towards 
the best outcome for their customer, even if that is a bid withdrawal. Reportedly, they have 
contributed to cancellation of deals that would have resulted in substantial losses for their clients 
(Kale et al., 2003). When the deal is beneficial to their customer, highly reputable advisors achieve 
swift deal completion, which is an indication of success in acting on their client’s interests, as 
prolonged deals raise costs related to uncertainty and competition (McLaughlin, 1990, 1992). 
Nevertheless, there is occasional contradictory evidence demonstrating that their contribution to deal 
completion persists regardless of the deal effect on their clients’ wealth (Rau, 2000). 
Advisor performance is also affected by the level of their exposure to the market, which, in this 
context, regards the level of publicity of a deal (Golubov et al., 2012). Deals between public firms 
highlight the advisor’s contribution when compared to deals including non-listed companies. 
Consequently, these deals provide motivation for better performance. As for the bidder’s financial 
advisors, they have to overcome the negotiating power of public targets, which puts even more 
Chapter 2 General Literature Review 
22 
 
pressure on their reputation. Bidders may decide to hire the target company’s prior advisors. In this 
case, bidders companies tend to pay smaller premia, which translates in lower announcement returns 
for target shareholders (Chang et al., 2016). Target shareholders do not enjoy similar benefits when 
they hire past advisors of their prospective acquirers. This indicates the importance of information 
held by target’s previous advisors and the negative effect it may have on target shareholder returns, 
even when confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements are in place.  
2.4.7. Competition 
A significant source of uncertainty regarding the success of a deal is competition from rival bidders. 
During the period 1980-2002, around 34% of U.S. deals where not consummated by the initial bidder 
when an auction was completed (Betton et al., 2009). In the M&A context, competition may have 
different definitions. Some authors define bidder competition as the number of rival, publicly 
observable bids for the same target (see e.g. Schwert, 1996, 2000; Moeller et al., 2004). An alternative 
definition of competition refers to the number of potential rival bidders as bidder competition and the 
potential substituting target firms as target competition (James and Wier, 1987a). The lowest level of 
competition is observed when the target negotiates with only one possible bidder. In this case, the 
level of competition is considered zero. Higher levels of bidder competition are observed in auctions, 
when larger number of participants indicates higher level of competition. 
According to research, the aggregate level of competition in M&As varies through modern economic 
history. For instance, competition reportedly plunged during the 1990s, as fewer auctions were 
observed (Andrade et al., 2001; Schwert, 2000). Another study offers contradictory evidence, stating 
that about half of the deals during that decade were consummated through an auction process and the 
rest through negotiations (Boone and Mulherin, 2007). In the context of the latter study, the 
proliferation of antitakeover provisions has not resulted in an uncompetitive market for corporate 
control. Nevertheless, it has been shown that auctions and negotiations provide similar wealth changes 
for deal participants (see also French and McCormick, 1984; Hansen, 2001; Povel and Singh, 2006; 
Ye, 2004). Regarding acquirer wealth effects, there is a positive relation between buyer gains and the 
number of potential targets in an industry, as well as a negative connection between their gains and 
the number of potential rival bidders (James and Wier, 1987). 
Competition itself is affected by deal specific and industry specific characteristics. For instance, if the 
bidder and the target could enjoy a set of synergies unique only to their combination, the observed 
competition will be low (James and Wier, 1987). On the contrary, if the deal is initiated and aims at 
taking industry-wide inefficiencies that are not unique to the particular pair of bidder and target, 
competition is expected to be relatively high. Uncertainty in deal consummation and success has 
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similar effects on competition. In the banking sector, uncertainty over the insolvency of a specific 
bank has a negative relationship with the number of bids on that firm (Giliberto and Varaiya, 1989). 
As a side note, inferences from the banking sector may not be fully generalizable to the market 
population of acquisitions, especially due to the idiosyncrasies and high regulation of the finance 
sector (Giliberto and Varaiya, 1989, James and Wier, 1987).  
Access to information also drives the nature and magnitude of competition. Easier access to 
information on targets increases the probability of a negotiation turning into a competition, as well as 
having more rival bids (Fishman, 1988; Hirshleifer and PnG, 1989; Jennings and Mazeo, 1993). This 
information-driven competition may explain the reason why the number of participants in auctions, 
which may last for weeks (Bradley et al., 1988), is much higher than, for instance, English auctions, 
which usually last for minutes. As the information flow increases along with the auction duration, 
target valuation increases as well. During open auctions, competing buyers observe rival offers and 
can estimate competing target valuations (Fishman, 1988). The target management, on the other side, 
has to choose whether they want to assume the costs regarding information revelation to potential 
bidders. Specifically, they compare the implied costs of disclosing proprietary information to multiple 
bidders versus the magnitude of gains coming from increased bidder competition (Hansen, 2001). In 
case discretion is more beneficial, target management may avoid the auction in favour of negotiations 
with a selected number of bidders (French and McCormick, 1984; Ye, 2004; Povel and Singh, 2006, 
Boone and Mulherin, 2007). Also, positive association with specific buyers is closely related to 
observing a negotiation process (French and McCormick, 1984; Boone and Mulherin, 2007). 
It also seems that the nature of competitors can affect competition characteristics. For instance, 
financial bidders offer lower premia in auctions (Dittmar et al., 2012). In this context, a corporate 
rival bidder may place the winning bid by only marginally raising the prospective premium in a 
contest against a financial bidder, which is considered value-enhancing compared to “corporate-
against-corporate-bidder” contest. This framework provides a rare case when competition can be 
advantageous to the winning bidder. Most studies conclude on the adverse effect of auctions on 
acquirer returns (see e.g. Mandelker, 1974; Capron and Shen, 2007; Comment and Schwert, 1995). 
Firms employ strategic tools in order to deter competition on both the buyer and the seller sides. 
Bidders may resort to high pre-emptive bidding in order to discourage rival bids (Aktas et al., 2009; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Giammarino and Heinkel, 1986; Fishman, 1988, 1989) as the higher the 
magnitude of the initial bid, the more restricted the possible gains for the following rival bids 
(Fishman, 1988). An important issue of high bidding, especially if it is a winning bid, is the cost of the 
“winner’s curse”. According to the “winner’s curse”, the company that achieves the final and settling 
bid in a sealed-bid auction for assets of unknown value is the firm that has overstated their value the 
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most (Giliberto and Varaiya, 1989; Varaiya, 1988; Capen et al., 1971). Therefore, high initial bids that 
discourage competitors from joining may have offered an excessive premium, at least compared to 
that the rest of potential acquirers would be willing to offer. The deal may had still been consummated 
by the initial bidder if less aggressive bids were inviting the market’s reaction and opinion. “Winner’s 
curse” is still considered a controversial theory, as it has both supporters and critics. For instance, 
there is evidence financial advisors act on mitigating overpayment for targets by helping acquiring 
management to estimate the acquisition synergies accurately (Boone and Mulherin, 2008; Kale et al., 
2003).  
Instead of only bidding high, initial bidders may choose the method of payment more likely to 
discourage competition. Cash consideration is connected to lower rejection rates by target 
management, when compared to equity swaps (Fishman, 1989). Accordingly, there is evidence of the 
positive relation between the level of competition and the percentage of cash in the total consideration 
(Jennings and Mazeo, 1993), but negative relation to the level of cash holding of the bidder (Harford, 
1999). The combination of these findings suggests that if bidders have cash available, they will prefer 
to include it in the consideration package in order to entice target shareholders and expedite deal 
completion. Another tool for discouraging competition is the bidder purchase of a toehold in the target 
firm; a toehold of 10% ownership may prevent rival bidders from entering an auction (Betton and 
Eckbo, 2009).  
As for the seller side, target management has the ability to use termination fees or enter private 
negotiations with bidders of preference in order to achieve managerial personal gains, adversely 
affecting shareholders value (Hartzell et al., 2004; Wulf, 2004; Moeller, 2005). However, there is 
contradicting evidence on whether pre-bid contractual agreements restrict the competitive auction 
process (see e.g. Coates and Subramanian, 2000; Bulow and Klemperer, 1996; but not Boone and 
Mulherin, 2007). 
2.4.8. Managerial Opposition and Antitakeover Provisions 
Bidding companies often face resistance from target management. This resistance contributes to buy-
side competition, as it inflates the legal and opportunity costs for the bidder, and offers time to rival 
bidders to structure and submit their own offer (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989). Legal costs can be 
considered sunk costs and, as a result, decrease the deal’s net present value and put a ceiling to 
consecutive, otherwise value-adding offers from the same bidder. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) support 
the findings of previous literature (see e.g. Bradley et al., 1988) on the negative relationship between 
competition and bidder returns, and they also highlight the severe impact of the adoption of the 
Williams Act in 1968 on bidder gains. Williams Act is a set of amendments on Securities Exchange 
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Act in 1934 and it requires companies bidding in tender offers to provide registration forms and 
information before and during the bidding process. In addition, the delay originating from 
management opposition may be used in order to corrupt bidder management into offering higher 
premia (Jarrell and Bradley, 1980). 
Antitakeover provisions (ATP) are contractual and legal agreements that are usually in place in order 
to deter unsolicited bids. They are another form of managerial opposition to raiding acquirers, and 
they could arguably deter general takeover activity, along with competition among bidders. However, 
Comment and Schwert (1995) find evidence that “poison shareholder right issues”, commonly known 
as “poison pills”, and other similar provisions do not mitigate takeover activity during the late 1980s. 
In some cases, adoption of shareholder rights issues may result in increased competition and big 
jumps among consecutive rival bids (Comment and Schwert, 1995; Heron and Lie, 2006). The 
increase in premia is more profound when target firms have “staggered board of directors” in place 
(Bebchuk et al., 2002). Staggered boards are regular boards of directors with different rules in voting 
new members. All directors are allocated into different groups, and each time shareholders vote for 
new directors, they can replace only member of one group, therefore it takes time for shareholders to 
establish a wholly new board. Other studies offer evidence of a more refined effect of such provisions, 
as they suggest that they may cause bidder deterrence in the cases of deal cancellation, as withdrawn 
bids for targets with ATP in place signal target management entrenchment and unreasonable barriers 
for bidders (Dodd, 1980; DeAngelo and Rice, 1983). 
The adoption of antitakeover provisions provides controversial results in acquisition performance. 
Several studies report negative results in the short-run (see e.g. Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987; Malatesta 
and Walkling, 1988; Bhagat and Jefferis, 1991), negative in the long-run (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Bebhuck et al., 2009), positive or insignificant in the short-runs (Linn and McConnell, 1983; 
DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Brickley et al., 1988) or contingent to other deal- and firm-specific 
characteristics (see e.g. McWilliams, 1990; Brickley et al., 1994). 
2.4.9. CEO Overconfidence and Behavioral Factors 
There is a considerable body of empirical studies reporting the systematic overpayment by acquirers, 
which is usually attributed to overvaluation of the synergies of combining the two firms (see e.g. 
Firth, 1980; Bradley et al., 1983; Asquith, 1983; Morck et al., 1990; Hietala et al., 2003). In a 
previous section, high bidder competition has been related to overpayment due to the “winner’s 
curse”, i.e. winning an auction only because the winner overvalued the target more than any other 
participant (see e.g. Capen et al., 1971). These reasons for overpayment either acknowledge a fault  
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in the capabilities of acquirer management to assess the prospective synergies properly, or it assumes 
a random mistake by management. Another theory predicting overpayment considers managerial 
overconfidence, which assumes a character flaw in CEOs leading to the pursuit of risky acquisitions 
with usually unexciting returns (Roll, 1986). 
According to the aforementioned theory, managers believe in their own superiority against peer CEOs 
and, generally, the management of other firms. Their self-evaluation leads them to believe they could 
perform better than those peers if they handled the respective company’s administration. 
Occasionally, they do act on their belief and acquire such firms and, because of their confidence in the 
impending improvements, tend to pay higher premia than what can be justified by a rational approach 
on synergy extraction. The overpayment transfers potential synergies and value to target shareholders, 
leaving the acquirer company financially affected, even in the cases of stock-swap. This theory has 
found empirical support in the literature. CEOs who show overconfidence by not exercising in-the-
money options tend to perform more value-destroying deals (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). 
Furthermore, overconfident CEOs rely much more on funding acquisitions with internal funds, as 
issuance of equity would place the deal under additional scrutiny by shareholders (Doukas and 
Petmezas, 2007).  
The impact of managerial hubris is fairly accentuated for serial acquirers. Billet and Qian (2009) 
identify hubris in CEOs who have increased their exposure in their firm’s stock before a deal. They 
find that those CEOs who have experienced positive deal returns in the past and, subsequently, 
display hubristic behavior, tend to underperform in future deals. The outcome of this study suggests 
that CEOs have substituted “learning” from M&As with behavioral biases, since the accumulation of 
experience does not result in performance improvement, but value-destruction.  
An additional corollary of hubristic behavior is overinvestment. CEOs displaying such characteristics 
will invest in more projects than the less overconfident CEOs, because they have the sincere, though 
misguided, belief that they can create value for their shareholders (Heaton, 2002). The observed 
overinvestment occurs due to the diluted notion of higher control (March and Shapira, 1987), 
excessive optimism (Gilson, 1989), and undistributed free cash flows (Avery et al., 1998). Overall, 
hubristic CEOs tend to undertake riskier endeavors than their more rational peers (Cain and McKeon, 
2016), and they are not strangers to overstating earnings during providing market guidance, although 
within the investor-approved window of deviation (Schrand and Zechman, 2012). 
Overconfidence is not the only executive behavioral characteristic affecting corporate investment 
behavior. CEO narcissism, which is different from hubris, has been shown to have a negative effect 
on acquisition performance (Aktas et al., 2012). In the latter study, the authors measure the extent of 
narcissism in the use of personal pronouns during interviews. Moreover, CEOs who have adopted 
Chapter 2 General Literature Review 
27 
 
high-end living standards, i.e. consuming expensive services and owning luxurious products, tend to 
apply loose monitoring mechanisms on their supporting executives, which, presumably unwittingly, 
facilitates fraudulent activities such as insider trading (Davidson et al., 2015).  
The aforementioned characteristics of hubris, narcissism, and affinity to luxury focus on the CEO. 
Nevertheless, there can be market-wide tendencies that guide the evaluation of acquisition decisions. 
The price paid by acquirer shareholders has been shown to use the 12-month high of the target’s stock 
price as a reference point (Baker et al., 2009, 2012). The reliance on recent stimuli in order to make 
decisions on current matters has been labelled “anchoring effect” and it has been studied extensively 
in the psychology literature (see e.g. Kahneman, 1992; Kahneman and Trevsky, 1979; Trevsky and 
Kahneman, 1974). The anchoring effect affects bidder shareholders as well, as acquirers are more 
likely to face negative abnormal returns when the offer price is higher than the target’s 12-month high 
(Baker et al., 2012). It has also been shown that companies identify reference points beyond the 
prospective target’s stock price history. The premia paid for acquisitions in the recent past seems to 
have a significant effect on the premium in a deal, especially when past acquisitions share similarities 
with the one at hand, such as similar size, target country, and similar acquirer deal experience 
(Malhotra et al., 2015). 
2.4.10. CEO Retention 
The deal characteristics described so far regard aspects before or during deal consummation. Another 
deal aspect directly related to the firms involved regards the retention or replacement of the pre-deal 
CEOs. In this section, I focus on the related decision of CEO turnover in the context of acquisitions, 
but the general finance literature on CEO employment expands beyond the M&A framework. This 
topic is crucial for both shareholders and professional managers, since firm performance is affected by 
management quality, and a turnover due to poor performance is reported to materially affect the 
respective executive’s career. More specifically, it is rare for a replaced public-target CEO to assume 
a senior management position in a public firm afterwards (see e.g. Agrawal and Walkling, 1994). 
Top management is responsible for key decisions on corporate strategy, progress, and profitability. 
Consequently, top executives should be held accountable for any actions that do not contribute to the 
maximization of the shareholder value in the long-run, especially if they satisfy personal gains 
instead. In case they operate the firm inefficiently and ineffectively, participants in the market for 
corporate control are inclined to take action in order to gain control of the firm and discipline target 
management (Marris, 1963; Manne, 1965; Mitchell and Lehn, 1990). The disciplinary mechanism of 
the market for corporate control is also subsidized by the nature of target ownership structure. 
Monitoring costs are relatively high for individual shareholders, especially when the ownership 
Chapter 2 General Literature Review 
28 
 
structure of the firm is highly fragmented (Berle and Means, 1930). In these cases, the prospective 
acquirer will have a higher benefit in monitoring the firm, and the marginal cost for monitoring target 
management will be relatively lower than the one of smaller investors. Prospective bidders are 
encouraged by suboptimal asset allocation by the target, such as completed or scheduled value-
destroying acquisitions (Jensen, 1986; Mitchell and Lehn, 1990). The phenomenon of inefficiently-
operated firms being acquired and restructured was prevalent during the Fourth U.S. merger wave, 
when previously underperforming bidders became targets of hostile acquisitions (Mitchell and Lehn, 
1990). Even the increased probability of takeover can initiate management replacement by target 
directors (Huson et al., 2004).  
CEO turnover has been documented to be more probable for older CEOs (Murphy, 1999), but the 
majority of studies relate the underlying decision of turnover to performance indicators (Coughlan and 
Schmidt, 1985; Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Murphy and 
Zimmerman, 1993; Blackwell et al., 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Huson et al., 2004). The 
general consensus in the literature suggests that the probability a target CEO will be replaced rises 
inversely to the firm’s performance, be it operational or stock-based. This, of course, holds also for 
acquirer CEOs, as value destroying acquisitions affect the stock price significantly. Widely discussed 
examples of such deals are the acquisition of Snapple Group by Quaker Oats, and Time Warner by 
AOL, which resulted in announcement losses of approximately 10% for each acquirer, which were 
subsequently extended by losses from the steeply discounted divestitures of the respective firms (Lehn 
and Zhao, 2006). 
It has been suggested that stock performance may not be an accurate indicator of actual performance 
and, consequently, CEO retention. Acquirer management may take advantage of the company’s 
overvalued stock in order to safely buy real assets that are relatively undervalued (see e.g. Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2003). If this is the case, the post-deal firm performance is supposed to be higher when 
compared to firms that do not take advantage of their temporarily inexpensive stock (see also Savor 
and Lu, 2009). Nevertheless, this notion has been counter-argued by Lehn and Zhao (2006), as they 
observe that bidder CEOs of bad performing deals are replaced regardless of the method of payment. 
Other studies acknowledge the decision of replacing incumbent management as more complex than a 
mere reaction to the firm’s recent performance. Various firm-specific characteristics seem to affect 
this decision. Regarding the CEOs, there is evidence that the probability of turnover is negatively 
related to the level of internal ownership (Denis et al., 1997). This notion is connected to the literature 
on ownership structure, which advises on the effects ownership distribution on corporate governance 
and performance. For instance, dispersed ownership contributes to the “free-rider” issue mentioned 
earlier, which in turn increases the probability of takeover and managerial discipline. Regarding 
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acquisitions, the probability of target management retention after the deal increases along with the 
levels of target insider ownership (Bargeron et al., 2009). Despite internal ownership, the ability of 
target management affects the decision of turnover. It is suggested that well-performing management 
is more likely to be retained, in order to facilitate integration and the realization of synergies 
(Matsusaka, 1993; Bargeron et al., 2009). On the same grounds, competent management seems to 
increase the value of the deal for the bidders, as the implied premium paid to target shareholders is 
higher when target management is retained in private equity deals, suggesting higher synergies for the 
combined entity (Bargeron et al., 2009). According to the latter study, if there are no managerial 
synergies, but the deal is driven by industry-wide factors as mentioned earlier, then the probability of 
management retention is decreased. 
Excessive managerial power or revision of planned investments affects the turnover decision as well. 
For instance, CEOs who hold the position of chairman are less likely to be replaced, even in the light 
of poor performance (Goyal and Park, 2002). Moreover, CEOs that decide to cancel bids, which seem 
to destroy value, have higher retention probability, when compared to colleagues who complete value-
destroying deals (Lehn and Zhao, 2006). 
Another firm specific characteristic concerns the composition of the board of directors. It has been 
observed that BoDs with outsider independent directors are more likely to replace underperforming 
management (Weisbach, 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). The high quality of outsider-
dominated BoDs is evident in the respective increased post-replacement performance (Huson et al., 
2004). In addition, the size of boards may pose a hindrance to better corporate governance, as 
ineffectiveness increases along the size of the board (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). On the other 
hand, contrasting evidence suggests that corporate governance processes have been optimally 
customized, as it is implied by the lack of connections between the probability of value-destroying 
bidder management replacement and governance metrics (Lehn and Zhao, 2006). However, even the 
previously documented benefits of strict and disciplinary boards are not without caveats. While Board 
independence has been suggested to keep management in line, boards which are friendly to their 
CEOs have been associated with positive announcement returns (Schmidt, 2015). The latter is 
attributed to the capacity of friendly boards to advise the CEO, instead of being in a continuous 
alerted state on evaluating whether they should replace her. 
Deal characteristics may affect target CEO retention as well. Tender offers with a relatively high 
number of competing bidders result in lower probability of target management retention (Bargeron et 
al., 2009). This may be an indication of low management synergies or general administrating 
capacity. 
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Over and above CEO retention, target CEOs who want an exit themselves may invite acquirers to take 
over their firm. Specifically, CEOs who are closer to retirement are not only prone to act with short-
term gains in mind (Dechow and Sloan, 1991), but they may also seek to become acquired in order to 
receive a hefty departing bonus (Jenter and Lewellen, 2015). Nevertheless, this ostensibly selfish act 
does not result in losses for target shareholders, as target returns and premia paid are similar to deals 
and firms of similar characteristics. This is in accordance with recent literature suggesting that CEOs 
care to preserve their legacy by performing valuable long-term investments even when they approach 
retirement age (Kang, 2016). 
The retention of key personnel may endogenously affect the acquisition decision. CEOs are not the 
only employees that matter during acquisition deliberations, especially in firms which are human-
capital intensive (LaVan, 2000), since, at least in these cases, the quality and performance of human 
capital is one of the main factors of the company’s current and future success (Castanias and Helfat, 
1991). Accordingly, prospective acquirers will attempt a bid on firms as long as they are confident or 
reassured that key personnel will remain in the company after the deal is consummated (Younge et al., 
2015). This effect is stronger in industries in which companies rely on people for knowledge retention 
and, in reverse, weaker in industries where knowledge retention is insured by the judicial system with 
the application of patents, non-compete clauses etc. 
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2.5. Concluding Remarks 
M&As are market phenomena that cannot be studied in isolation; the respective industries of the 
participant firms, as well as the firms themselves have to be taken into consideration when 
investigating any aspect of a particular deal. Part of the current review has been devoted to corporate 
functions that are presumably only implicitly related to M&As, though after careful inspection they 
prove to have significant overlap. Acquisition decisions and performance yield sizeable effects on 
company performance, shareholder wealth, executive careers etc. The purpose of this review has been 
to provide a general scope of acquisitions, and highlight the different aspects at which the corporate 
finance practitioner, academic, student, or even enthusiast can analyze them. The review has not been 
complete by any means, and the reality described in the cited studies may be just an obsolete view, as 
the dynamically changing marketplace defines new rules and interrelationships in M&A conduct and 
performance. 
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3. Acquisition Target Prediction: Multi-period Analysis 
and Market-Wide Predictors 
3.1. Introduction 
The academic endeavour of predicting acquisition targets commenced in the early 1970s with the 
studies of Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) and Stevens (1973). The main motive for accurate and 
timely prediction of whether a firm will receive a bid resides in the abnormally high returns enjoyed 
by target shareholders. The high returns are attributed to the premium paid to shareholders in order to 
agree to sell their shares, and the stock price run-up, i.e. the target stock-price appreciation before the 
public announcement of the deal. Andrade and Stafford (2004) report the combined effect of 
acquisition premium and stock price run-up to be 23.8%, measured for the period starting 20 days 
before the announcement and ending with the deal completion. Even when considered independently, 
acquisition premia and run-ups offer striking returns to target shareholders. Mescall and Klassen 
(2013) estimate the international average premium to be 31.7% with respect to the target firm’s share 
price 4 weeks before the announcement. The respective average premium for U.S. firms has been 
52.6% for the period 1990-2007 (Alexandridis et al., 2013). Similarly, run-ups have amounted to an 
average of 13.3% (Schwert, 1996), a figure that has been connected to active management of news 
releases by the target management in the few weeks before the official announcement (Ahern and 
Sosyura, 2014).  
The impressively high returns of target shareholders invite investors to concoct strategies and tools 
that identify prospective targets in a timely manner. Jensen and Ruback (1983) have argued for the 
difficulty of timely predicting acquisition targets and, supporting their notion, the majority of studies 
have achieved relatively uninspiring progress to this day. A voluminous part of the general M&A 
literature has focused on identifying target characteristics and their effect on returns or completion 
probability (see, e.g., Hasbrouck, 1985; Powell and Yawson, 2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rossi 
and Volpin, 2004), while much fewer studies have attempted the development of potent acquisition 
prediction models. The seminal study in the literature strand of Acquisition Target Prediction 
(henceforth ATP) is provided by Palepu (1986). In his study, companies in the manufacturing industry 
are classified as prospective targets or non-targets on the basis of 6 key sets of factors, namely 
inefficient management, growth-resource mismatch, leverage, liquidity, industry disturbance, and P/E 
ratio. Palepu has established the logistic regression as the model of preference in the ATP literature 
and has accounted for several other methodological misspecifications. His findings support the 
arguments of Jensen and Ruback (1983), since he concludes for the improbability of constructing 
profitable investment strategies by predicting targets. Nevertheless, more recent studies achieve 
sizeable positive abnormal returns (Cremers et al., 2009; Brar et al., 2009). 
Chapter 3 Acquisition Target Prediction 
34 
 
The current study follows the most celebrated examples in the ATP literature (see e.g. Palepu, 1986; 
Brar et al, 2009; Bartley and Boardman, 1990), investigating potential factors of firm targetiveness, 
i.e. the firm’s attractiveness to potential acquirers, and providing robustness tests on the model’s 
prediction and investment performance. The new predictors, based on academic literature and 
anecdotal evidence, are mainly focused on the industry wide effects that may increase firm 
targetiveness. A set of predictors is based on the neoclassical theory of acquisitions (see e.g. Gort, 
1969) and the industry-wide activity in the market for corporate control. If a shock occurs in the 
industry, acquisition activity may cluster into an industry or market merger wave. The momentous 
nature of merger waves suggests that the incremental increase in the number and value of acquisitions 
in an industry could augment individual firm targetiveness. Similarly, the presence of an active serial 
acquirer is expected to have a positive effect on firm targetiveness, as the appearance of proven 
acquirers may be a prelude to more acquisitions. In addition, changes in market concentration have 
been theorised to predict market activity (see e.g. Gorton et al., 2009) and, thus, individual firm 
targetiveness. In the cases of market consolidation, expectations lean towards lower activity and 
targetiveness, as acquirers could be deterred by lack of liquidity (Harford, 1999, 2005) and potential 
regulatory intervention (see e.g. Brown, 1989).  
Targetiveness could increase with the relative level of cash in the industry, since capital liquidity has 
been established as a necessary prerequisite for industry merger waves to escalate into market-wide 
phenomena (Harford, 2005). In addition, the combined announcement performance of acquirers and 
targets in an industry may cause fluctuations in individual firm targetiveness. The argument is based 
on the behavioural characteristics of management, where CEOs may act on envy, personal incentives, 
or inflated optimism on the market’s contemporary view on deal-making. Finally, I include firm-
specific variables on the company’s past as a target, testing for the effects of received withdrawn bids 
in its recent past on its future targetiveness. 
The inferences drawn from previous studies regard single-period models. This methodology provides 
intuitive results, but it may allow for biases due to period-specific characteristics in the sample. The 
current study introduces a test for performance intertemporality in terms of both prediction accuracy 
and investment profitability. The multi-period analysis indicates the dynamically changing capacity of 
both individual predictors and the model as a whole. 
The period-varying results in the current study provide useful insights. For instance, when the model 
is performed on the sample period 2007-2011, it highlights only two of the novel factors as 
statistically significant. However, the multi-period analysis reveals a strikingly different picture. Most 
novel variables display statistical significance over time. The period-specific relevance of factors is 
strong evidence on the dynamically changing criteria regarding the acquisition decision-making 
process, as well as on the latent effect some of the factors may have on firm targetiveness. 
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The model for the sample period 2007-2011 performs better than the literature median in predicting 
acquisition targets. The concentration of actual targets in the “Predicted Targets Portfolio” for 2012 is 
8.6%, higher than the second best prediction rate of 4.8% (Powell, 2004), and falls behind the highest 
prediction rate of 45.2% achieved by Brar et al. (2009). Furthermore, the results reiterate the 
conclusions of recent studies regarding the construction of profitable investment strategies (Brar et al., 
2009; Cremers et al., 2009). I follow Brar et al. (2009) in using market-adjusted returns in order to 
measure the portfolio performances. The “Predicted Targets Portfolio” achieves returns of 4.62% for 
2012, considerably higher than the respective performance of -3.10% for non-targets. The investment 
performance of the model is emphasized in the multi-period analysis, as portfolios of predicted targets 
outperform the corresponding portfolios of non-targets in all periods, and occasionally surpass the 
“Actual Targets Portfolios”.  
This study contributes to several aspects of the extant ATP literature. First, prior ATP attempts have 
focused mostly on company-specific conditions and attributes in order to measure targetiveness. 
However, the indifference towards market or industry conditions implies that acquirers make 
investment decisions regardless of the economic environment, which is a proposition contrary to the 
corollaries of merger wave studies (see e.g. Harford, 2005). The set of potential predictors is extended 
to include industry-wide characteristics and the results verify the connection between firm 
targetiveness and market conditions. Second, this study provides insights on ATP model 
intertemporality. The time-varying statistical significance of factors is indicative of the dynamically 
changing decision-making criteria, as well as the surprisingly low intertemporality of acquisition 
predictors. The studies providing inferences from a single-period model may have over- or under-
estimated the importance of the predictors or the effectiveness of the methodological novelties they 
introduce. 
The rest of Chapter 3 is structured as follows. The second section presents the literature review on 
ATP studies. The third section discusses the criteria and specifications of target and control firms. The 
fourth section exhibits the methodological aspects of the study in detail. The fifth and sixth section 
present the results of the main analysis. Finally, the last section summarises the chapter with key 
concluding remarks. 
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3.2. Literature Review 
Academic literature in ATP can be traced back to the beginning of 1970s, where Simkowitz and 
Monroe (1971) and Stevens (1973) had the first attempt in establishing predictors of acquisition bids. 
The last 40 years of research have witnessed several studies on the field, but considerably fewer than 
other strands in the finance literature. Nevertheless, the evolution of the methodological tools and the 
potential acquisition predictors has been steady and meaningful, leading progressively to more 
effective models and higher levels of predictive accuracy. 
The following sections provides a literature review on the several hypotheses developed through time, 
the methodological developments, such as the different models used, the cut-off probability rules, 
sampling techniques, and, finally, the performance of the past studies in both predictive capacity and 
investment profitability. 
3.2.1. Hypotheses in the Literature 
3.2.1.1. Inefficient Management Hypothesis 
Several studies have documented the replacement of value-destroying management teams or top 
executives (see e.g. Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Parrino, 1997). In the context of acquisition activity, 
managers performing value-destroying acquisitions have higher probability of turnover (see e.g. Lehn 
and Zhao, 2006). A standard definition of firm value identifies the present value of all future cash 
flows pertaining to shareholders as the fair value of common equity (see e.g. Fisher, 1930; Williams, 
1938). Along these lines, the term inefficient management refers to collective executive actions which 
do not maximise the firm’s future cash flows. Although actual maximisation of the cash flows is 
impossible to verify, inefficient managers are usually those who considerably deviate from the 
industry standards in terms of performance. In this context, value-destroying acquisitions are 
endeavours which do not perform as well as other investments could, at least according to shareholder 
expectations. Accordingly, “Inefficient Management Hypothesis” posits companies which are not run 
optimally are more likely to be targeted and restructured. The hypothesis was introduced by Dietrich 
and Sorensen (1984) and yields the testable prediction that poor results in key performance indicators 
will be associated with disciplinary acquisitions. Palepu (1986) tests this hypothesis in his seminal 
work, and it has become a standardised component of most acquisition prediction studies. The proxies 
used to capture management efficiency vary significantly among the different studies in the literature, 
since managerial performance tends to be multi-faceted.  
Several studies have verified the hypothesis’ expectation, as they identify a negative relationship 
between managerial performance and firm targetiveness. Firms with sound performance offer fewer 
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opportunities for prospective acquirers to restructure the firm and run it materially better. Thus, firms 
displaying low performance indicators are more probable acquisition targets. However, statistical 
significance of managerial efficiency proxies has not been unanimous among studies. Only a portion 
of the available studies finds a statistically significant effect (Palepu, 1986; Chen and Su, 1997; 
Barnes, 1998, 2000; Cudd and Duggal, 2000; Brar et al., 2009), while the effect in each study has 
been captured by different instruments. The variation in results raises questions on the potential 
causes of non-consistent statistical significance, especially due to the highly intuitive nature of the 
hypothesis. A plausible explanation would attribute the occasional insignificant effect to the acquirer 
perception that, although the firm does not perform well, external disciplinary action would not 
improve the company’s performance enough to justify the acquisition attempt. 
3.2.1.2. Growth-Resource Mismatch Hypothesis 
Investor expectations on company performance is shaped by various factors, such as the resources 
availability and firm growth. The amount of resources have been approximated by accounting 
information on capital liquidity and leverage, and growth has been estimated with respect to sales (see 
e.g. Palepu, 1986). The “Growth-Resource Mismatch Hypothesis” considers contrasting cases of 
growth prospects and availability of resources. In detail, the hypothesis asserts a firm could be 
targeted if its performance has been disproportionate to the resources available. If the firm’s sales 
growth surpasses the industry average, while it displays below average liquidity and above average 
leverage, then the firm has outperformed the market’s expectations and could potentially be targeted 
for its efficiency , know-how etc. In this case, the perceived outperformance is attributed to a superior 
characteristic that allows remarkable sales performance, despite the restricted flexibility regarding 
both cash reserves and additional debt capacity. In the opposite case, where the firm shows below 
average sales growth and leverage, while liquidity is high, the company has fallen behind the market’s 
expectations. Contrary to the previous case, acquirers will seek to restructure the company and release 
its assets’ hidden value. “Growth-Resource Mismatch Hypothesis” is argued to have a significant 
connection to Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory of takeovers (Powell, 1997), as companies 
performing inconsistently to their available resources will become targets of disciplinary acquisitions. 
Several studies have found supportive evidence for this hypothesis (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997, 2001, 
2004; Cudd and Duggal, 2000). 
3.2.1.3. Industry Disturbance Hypothesis 
Gort (1969) theorises economic shocks may trigger a series of acquisitions clustered in time and 
industry, occasionally in the form of aggregate merger waves. This theory is the basis of one of the 
most prominent theories driving acquisitions, the “Neoclassical Theory”, which identifies adjustment 
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to economic shocks as the primary reasons for acquisitions and other restructuring activities. 
Accounting for Gort’s theoretical expectations, Palepu (1986) tests the “Industry Disturbance 
Hypothesis”, which postulates that an acquisition could be a signal of an industry-wide economic 
shock and, due to the clustering tendency, more deals would be expected in the same industry in the 
near future. The hypothesis finds support in several studies (Cudd and Duggal, 2000, Brar et al, 2009). 
However, Palepu (1986) finds results opposite to his expectation. Specifically, he reports a negative 
relationship between a company’s targetiveness and the occurrence of an acquisition in the recent 
past. Palepu attributes this counterintuitive result to the nature of merger waves, which tend to expand 
over longer periods of times than one or two years (see e.g. Harford, 2005; Alexandridis et al., 2012).  
3.2.1.4. Size Hypothesis 
The size of a firm yields intuitive expectations on a company’s targetiveness. The capital required for 
a firm purchase increases along with the company size, which can be a significant obstacle for 
prospective acquirers, as their fund-raising capacity cannot change significantly in the short-run. In 
addition, target size affects the post-acquisition integration process, as streamlining and incorporating 
larger entities may prove to be increasingly challenging (see e.g. Pablo, 1994; Alexandridis et al, 
2013). In the general M&A literature, the negative relationship between acquirer announcement 
returns and the relative size of targets versus acquirers has been established (Moeller et al., 2004). The 
“Size Hypothesis” accounts for all the aforementioned inferences and suggests a negative relationship 
between target size and targetiveness. 
Typically, target companies are considerably smaller than their acquirers. Ouimet (2013) shows that 
during the 1990s and 2000s, the average relative size of the target against the acquirer has been 11% 
in minority acquisitions and 18% in majority acquisitions. This relative size magnitude could be 
attributed to issues mentioned above. For instance, acquirers would face higher integration adversities 
with firms of the same size, when compared to much smaller targets (see e.g. Kusewitt, 1985; Datta, 
1991), thus they decide to aim for significantly smaller ones. On the front of corporate governance, 
large firms may have a broader and more effective arsenal of antitakeover defences (Palepu, 1986). 
Acquirers will have to pay a higher price in order to overcome the established defences, rendering the 
acquisition less profitable and, thus, less attractive. In contrast, smaller firms are expected to exhibit 
less resistance and, therefore, destroy less value in the pre-acquisition process.  
ATP literature has found ample support for the ”Size Hypothesis”, verifying that large companies 
display less targetiveness that their smaller peers (see e.g. Bartley and Boardman, 1990; Barnes, 1998, 
2000; Brar et al., 2009). 
3.2.1.5. Undervaluation Hypothesis 
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Neoclassical theory is not the sole theoretical framework speculating on the reasons stimulating 
acquisitions. Another popular framework identifies stock price misvaluation as a potent perpetrator. 
Specifically, companies valued lower than their fair price have higher targetiveness as acquirers could 
cash in the appreciation in target’s value after markets become efficient again (see e.g. Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003). A more general version of this framework regards relative mispricing, where acquirers 
pursue targets who are relatively undervalued to them, employing relatively cheap equity capital to 
acquire valuable assets (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). Studies in ATP literature have 
attempted to capture the effect of potential undervaluation. However, only few studies find supportive 
evidence (Walter, 1994; Powell, 1997, 2001, 2004; Brar et al., 2009). 
3.2.1.6. Price-to-Earnings Hypothesis 
Stock price valuation has an explicit relationship with the market’s view on the company’s growth 
prospects. The “Price-to-Earnings Hypothesis” addresses this relationship, assuming the market’s 
view on company’s price-to-earnings ratio will affect its targetiveness. Palepu (1986) suggests low 
P/E companies make promising targets for firms with higher ratios, as the acquirers are expected to 
apply their skills and resources so that target-earnings growth rate will rise to match their own. This 
argument assumes the market will consider the acquirer individual P/E ratio before the deal and apply 
it to the new entity after the deal consummation. Despite the intuitive expectations, the P/E hypothesis 
has not found support in the literature. 
3.2.1.7. Resources Hypotheses 
ATP literature has exhibited several hypotheses regarding the resources available to the firm. The 
main argument permeating all these hypotheses regards the increased firm targetiveness in the face of 
resource abundance or scarcity, depending on the resource. For instance, scarcity of liquidity in a firm 
could cause disturbance in operations and investments. The firm ought to have the necessary funds to 
pay suppliers within a considerable amount of time, otherwise procurement of raw materials or 
intermediate products will become restrained. If production is interrupted due to lack of necessary 
inflows, then the firm may not be able to achieve the required cash flows in order to pay back its 
obligations and, gradually, having fewer suppliers willing to allow it buy resources on credit. This 
situation may unfold into a vicious circle leading to bankruptcy. Similarly, companies with liquidity 
deficiency may underinvest and, eventually, lose market share to competitors who have been 
investing adequately. The operational and underinvestment issues could be alleviated by acquirers 
willing to inject liquidity to the firm. This concept has led to the “Liquidity Hypothesis”, which states 
that firms with low liquidity are more likely to be targets of acquisitions (see e.g. Palepu, 1986). The 
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underlying assumption is the willingness and ability of the acquirer to mitigate the target’s liquidity 
deficiency. ATP studies have not provided support for “Liquidity Hypothesis.” 
The “Leverage Hypothesis” accounts for a latent resource of the firm: debt capacity. Relatively low 
levels of debt in the capital structure imply spare debt capacity, which can be considered a form of 
dormant available resources. However, excessive debt does not suggest only lack of debt capacity, but 
also sizeable recurring payments to credit providers. Considerable costs of debt servicing may cause 
the same underinvestment issue with lack of liquidity, as managers would be focused on achieving 
adequate operating income to meet the company’s fixed obligations. In this case, safe investments 
would be preferred against riskier and, potentially, more lucrative projects. Furthermore, highly 
levered firms will have to face insolvency costs, both direct (higher debt yields) and indirect (deterred 
business relationships), even if they avoid full-scale bankruptcy. The combination of additional 
hurdles connected to insolvency hazard and fixed obligations to credit providers may trigger an 
avalanche of issues leading to bankruptcy. These adverse outcomes could be avoided in the same 
fashion with liquidity scarcity. The firm could be purchased by an acquirer willing to alleviate the 
target from its debt overload (Erel et al., 2015). Hence, “Leverage Hypothesis” asserts firms with high 
leverage will have higher targetiveness. Leverage indicators have found minor support in the literature 
(Cremers et al, 2008; Palepu, 1986). 
Cash liquidity and debt capacity are not the only resources available to the firm. Property, plants, 
equipment, as well as all other fixed assets are important resources with multiple uses. These assets 
could be used as debt collateral or be divested in order to augment liquidity and the operational focus 
of the firm. Ambrose and Megginson (1992) advised for higher attractiveness of firms with higher 
levels of fixed assets. The “Real Property Hypothesis” states that the level of fixed assets in a firm’s 
balance sheet should increase firm targetiveness. Ambrose and Megginson (1992) provide the only 
study with evidence supporting their hypothesis. 
3.2.1.8. Corporate Governance Hypotheses 
The firm is more than a legally defined collection of monetary and property resources. The 
managerial team, the board of directors, and even the ownership structure of the firm could yield 
effects on its targetiveness. For instance, higher managerial ownership has been argued to decrease 
the probability of a firm receiving a bid (Mikkelson and Partch, 1989), but it increases the probability 
of deal completion when a bid is eventually received (Song and Walkling, 1993).  
In addition, several studies have examined the connection between institutional ownership and the 
probability of an incoming bid. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) expect block ownership to result in more 
effective managerial monitoring and more likely to an acquisition, instead of a proxy fight or 
management turnover. However, institutional block ownership has a negative connection to target 
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shareholder premium gains (Stulz et al., 1990). The literature does not seem to have fully crystallized 
the multifaceted impact of institutional ownership on acquisitions. 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992), inspired by the aforementioned studies, have introduced variables to 
test the effect of insider ownership on firm targetiveness. They argue management teams with 
significant ownership share wealth interests with shareholders, thus high insider ownership is a 
deterrent to bidders with relatively low premium offers. They also expect lower targetiveness for 
firms with antitakeover provisions in place. As for large block-holders, they find empirical support 
only for year-on-year changes of institutional ownership, suggesting a negative relationship with firm 
targetiveness, i.e. decreases in institutional ownership in a firm will increase its targetiveness. 
Cremers et al. (2008) offer an opposing hypothesis on institutional ownership, expecting higher block 
ownership to augment targetiveness. Their hypothesis is in accordance with the argument connecting 
higher block ownership and the probability of takeover (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). They do not offer 
conclusive results, as the respective proxy display a positive effect on targetiveness for the aggregate 
sample between 1981-2004, but a negative effect for the latter portion of the sample, i.e. 1991-2004.  
3.2.1.9. Trading Attributes Hypothesis 
Brar et al. (2009) show that stock market metrics reveal information on company targetiveness. 
Specifically, they find targets display upwards momentum in stock prices and trading volume during 
the month before receiving a bid. Their arguments are in accordance to the literature identifying stock 
run-ups during the month before the bid announcement (see e.g. Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). 
Although their results could be an implicit indication of information leakage and potential insider 
trading, literature exhibits evidence of news management by the counterparts ahead of an 
announcement (Ahern and Sosyura, 2014).  
 
3.2.2. Methodology in the Literature 
Developments in ATP literature have not been restricted to only adding potential targetiveness 
factors. Methodological innovation has frequently been the main contribution in some studies but the 
literature has occasionally been reluctant to adopt these innovations, as each next study frequently 
suggests a new approach. I review the developments in key methodological aspects.  
3.2.2.1. Model 
The main goal of an ATP study is to measure the targetiveness of a company and classify it 
accordingly as a potential target or non-target. Since the categorization is binary, this type of study 
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requires the use of discrete choice models. The set of models used in ATP literature does not exhaust 
the variety of discreet models used in the general finance literature, and researchers seem to be 
undecided on which model is the most appropriate in the context of ATP.  
The most frequent models in ATP studies have been the multiple discriminant analysis4 (MDA) and 
logit models.5 In the context of ATP studies, the main advantage of logit models over MDA is the 
attribution of a probability to the event materialising (Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984). Some researchers 
have been inspired by bankruptcy prediction studies, which deploy a probit model to forecast events 
of insolvency (Harris et al., 1982; Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003).  
An attempt to compare the effectiveness of different models is performed by Espahbodi and 
Espahbodi (2003). They compare probit, logit, MDA, and recursive partitioning models in order to 
identify the most fitting model specifications for the context of ATP. The recursive partitioning model 
performed slightly better that the rest, though its superiority appears questionable during the model 
validation process. The results affirm the complexity of identifying takeover targets, and advised for 
the importance of introducing new potent factors of targetiveness instead of deliberating on alternative 
existing models. 
3.2.2.2. Cut-off Probability 
Logit models, by construction, offer the probability of an “event” materialising, which, in the ATP 
literature, is the instance of a firm receiving a bid. However, the standalone “event” probability is not 
adequately informative, as it is necessary to consider it in the context of the study to define whether 
the event is likely to materialise or not. Thus, studies utilizing logit and probit models specify a cut-
off probability, which serves as the threshold defining whether a firm is classified as a prospective 
target or not. 
Palepu (1986) has been the first to address the importance of a cut-off probability rule that shares the 
goal of a well-defined decision making process. Specifically, the aim of the ATP researcher should be 
reflected on the criterion used to classify firms as targets and non-targets. Initial studies in ATP (see 
e.g. Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984) and bankruptcy studies have been using random cut-off threshold of 
50% (see e.g. Eisenbeis, 1977; Ohlson, 1980). Palepu argues that the arbitrariness of the cut-off 
probability complicates the interpretation of results. He proposed a decision context for the cut-off 
probability, in which investors maximise their returns on a portfolio of potential targets. Specifically, 
he observes the density functions of targets and non-targets during the model-structuring period and 
he assumes the cross section of the two functions as the point where it would be equally probable for a 
firm to be a target and a non-target. Then, he defines the probability corresponding to the cross section 
                                                          
4 See Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Stevens (1973), Barnes (1990), Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003). 
5 See Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Palepu (1986), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Barnes (1999), Cudd and Duggal 
(2000), Powell (2001, 2004), Cremers et al. (2008), Brar et al (2009). 
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as the optimal cut-off probability, and he uses it to forecast potential targets for the year after the 
model structuring period. This methodology aims to minimize the classification errors and maximise 
the investment strategy returns. This process of optimal cut-off probability estimation has been 
adopted by several subsequent studies (see e.g. Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Walter, 1994; Barnes, 
1998). 
An important assumption in Palepu’s rule is the equal and unchanging effect of misclassification 
errors for incorrect events and non-events. In detail, Palepu assumes that the exclusion of a target and 
the inclusion of a non-target in the “Predicted Targets Portfolio” has the same impact on investment 
performance. However, dissimilarities in the stock market performance of the average targets and 
non-targets suggest a different effect by misclassification errors, especially in opportunity cost 
(Powell, 2001, 2004). This could be attributed to the significantly superior returns of targets versus 
non-targets (see e.g. Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Specifically, Officer (2007) documents a median 
acquisition premium of 50.53% for public targets during the period 1979-2003, while S&P 500 
displayed an annualised performance of 11.29% during the period 1964-2013 (Damodaran, 2014). 
Thus, the attempt to minimise misclassifications may result in the exclusion of targets who are 
attributed a probability below the cut-off threshold; their exclusion may improve the model accuracy 
in classification, but it may simultaneously hurt the performance of an ATP investor.  
Powell (2001, 2004) identifies the flaw in Palepu’s assumption and uses it as the foundation for a new 
classification rule. Specifically, he refocuses on the predominant goal for ATP studies: the formation 
of profitable investment strategies by timely and accurately classifying prospective targets. Since 
target firms enjoy higher returns than the average non-target firm, outperforming the market could be 
achieved by creating portfolios with higher concentration of targets. In order to apply this criterion, he 
constructs ten equally-sized portfolios and he sets the optimal cut-off probability to be the lower 
bound probability of the portfolio with the highest concentration of targets. This methodology does 
not perform better than Palepu’s rule in the context of Powell’s (2001) study, but it displays superior 
performance for Brar et al. (2009). The latter study introduces additional methodological innovations, 
hence the improved performance cannot be attributed to the classification rule without further 
investigation. 
3.2.2.3. Sampling 
The early ATP studies (e.g. Simkowitz and Monroe, 1971; Stevens, 1973) have used an equal number 
of targets and non-targets in order to structure the prediction model; this technique is labelled “state-
base” approach. Palepu (1986) discusses the downside of this sampling method with respect to the 
logit model used by the literature. He argues that random sampling would result into an 
inconsequential concentration of targets in the aggregate testing sample, as targets constitute only a 
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small fraction of the registered firms. Since the commonly used maximum likelihood estimator 
assumes random sampling, the combination of “state-base” sampling and the estimator results in 
biases in the variable estimates. The biases incurring after incorrectly assuming randomness have 
been discussed before by Manski and Lerman (1977) and, empirically, by Zmijewski (1984). Palepu 
applies the solution provided by Manski and McFadden (1981), replacing the common maximum 
likelihood estimators with conditional maximum likelihood estimators. The same methodology has 
essentially been used in several subsequent ATP studies (see e.g. Barnes, 1990; Cudd and Duggal, 
2000; Powell, 1997, 2001). 
Bartley and Boardman (1990) follow a different sampling procedure. After they structure the 
acquisition sample, they randomly select non-target firms as the control group. The size of the target 
firms group for each year corresponds to the percentage of deals pertaining to that year. For instance, 
if 5% of the deals of the overall deal sample occur in a year, the control sample would amount to 5% 
of the total non-target firms in that year as well. Brar et al. (2009) adopt a similar sampling 
methodology. Bartley and Boardman (1990) created this technique as a response to the “state-based” 6 
sampling technique used in Palepu (1986) and other studies. They advise that samples with more 
realistic proportions of targets and non-targets would mitigate the model estimate biases present in 
previous studies. This is suggestive of the ineffective correction of biases, i.e. the application of 
conditional maximum likelihood estimators introduced by Palepu (1986).  
3.2.3. ATP Performance in the Literature 
All ATP studies have stated at least one of the following two measurable goals. The first one is the 
construction of a model capable to identify effectively and efficiently potential target firms. The 
second goal regards the formulation of profitable investment strategies, which would enable investors 
to cash in the stock run-up and premium paid to target shareholders. 
Early studies have performed well in selecting actual targets, but the results are either inflated by 
methodological missteps or are counteracted by substantial misspecifications. For instance, studies 
before Palepu (1986) display very high forecasting performance, with ratios of both correctly 
predicted targets and non-targets ranging from 70% to 90% (see e.g. Stevens, 1973; Dietrich and 
Sorensen, 1984). These impressive results have been attributed to methodological improprieties, 
namely applying random estimators in non-random samples, conducting forecasting on samples 
unrepresentative to the general company population, and, finally, selecting arbitrary cut-off 
probabilities. After accounting for these misdeeds, Palepu identified correctly 80% of targets and 45% 
of non-targets. The model performed adequately in terms of Sensitivity, i.e. the percentage of actual 
                                                          
6 State-based sample include the same number of firms of mutually exclusive groups. These groups are defined by a specific 
criterion, and, in ATP context, this criterion has been whether the firm was a target or a non-target (see e.g. Palepu, 1986). 
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targets identified correctly, but inadequately on Specificity, i.e. the percentage of actual non-targets 
identified correctly. This discrepancy rendered the model impractical, especially since the non-targets 
population is materially larger than the target population. The extensive number of non-targets in the 
predicted targets portfolio led to stock performance indistinguishable from the non-targets portfolio 
and, consequently, the sample population. The classification performance has been improving in 
studies published after the year 2000. Powell (2001, 2004) reports correct classification of targets and 
non-targets ranging from 75% to 84%. Similarly, Brar et al. (2009) predict correctly 72% of targets 
and non-targets.  
The investment performance of predicted target portfolios has exhibited gradual improvement among 
studies. Palepu (1986) constructs investment strategies yielding returns similar to the aggregate 
manufacturing industry, attributing this result to the considerable volume of non-target firms in his 
“Predicted Targets Portfolio”. Similarly, Powell (2004) displays insignificant returns, while he 
presents negative and significant returns in a previous study (Powell, 2001). Two recent studies have 
achieved positive returns after investing in Predicted Target Portfolios. First, Cremers et al. (2008) 
create portfolios based on the probability of acquisitions. Then, they buy the high probability 
portfolios and sell the low probability ones. The firms are then allocated into quartile and decile 
probability portfolios. The quartile and decile classifications of portfolios led to long-short 
performances of 11.77% and 21.67% respectively. These strategies have been based on in-sample 
portfolio structuring and were adjusted for Carhart’s (1997) four factors. The second study illustrating 
positive results is conducted by Brar et al. (2009), who follow the same process of allocating firms 
into portfolios, though they do not allow for short-selling. They invest in the decile portfolio with the 
highest acquisition probability, assuming a holding period of 1 month. At the end of each period, the 
portfolio holdings are rebalanced into an equally weighted portfolio. The performance test is 
conducted on out-of-sample firms, and yields a market-adjusted annual return of 8.5%. 
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3.3. Data 
I collect the sample of M&A deals from ThomsonOne Banker (SDC). I include deals with publicly 
listed targets in U.S. (Amex, NYSE and NASDAQ) for the period 1988 – 2012. The deals included 
are both completed and withdrawn, as I intend to identify companies deemed desirable by the market. 
Since both completed and withdrawn bids indicate the company’s targetiveness, the inclusion of only 
completed deals would bias the model towards identifying deals with a higher probability of being 
consummated. On similar grounds, I include both friendly and hostile bids. 
I apply additional criteria for the size, bidder ownership, and type of deals. The minimum value of the 
deals is $10 million and the ownership of targets by prospective acquirers is zero before the bid and 
above 50% afterwards. The ownership restrictions serves a double purpose. First, it is advisable to 
avoid cases where toeholds render the acquisition either expected or of immaterial importance to the 
acquirer. Second, the intention of the model is to also capture the factors actively guiding acquirer 
management to bid for the target. If the particular deal is not important for the acquirer, then the bid 
may be based on a different set or subset of criteria, confounding the inferences of the model. 
Regarding the various deal types, I exclude the following: repurchases, exchange offers, self-tenders, 
recapitalizations, spinoffs, and privatizations. The mechanics of the aforementioned deal types have 
been reported to be substantially different from regular M&As,7 thus I exclude them on the grounds of 
sample purity. I also exclude financial and utility firms.8 The target firms should also have available 
data on Compustat and CRSP. 
After applying the above criteria, the deal sample consists of 1,243 deals, 682 completed and 561 
withdrawn deals. These deals correspond to a total of 1,084 firms, where 1,060 firms received 1 bid, 
81 firms received 2 and 7 firms received 3 bids throughout the whole period. All targets in the final 
deal sample have a maximum of one deal per calendar year. I also collect a control sample of non-
target firms from COMPUSTAT and CRSP for the period 1988 – 2012. The included firms are 
publicly listed in U.S. (Amex, NYSE, and NASDAQ). In order to maintain the sample purity of the 
control group, the firms that do not fulfil the aforementioned criteria of deal size and acquirer 
ownership are not included as control firms. The number of firms and firm-year observations in the 
control sample are 5,404 and 59,197 respectively. 
The targets of withdrawn deals are included as control firms in the regressions analysis for the years 
they are not targets. Specifically, I have included them as non-targets for every available firm-year 
observation they have not been targeted. As several firms are targeted more than once in the sample, 
                                                          
7 See for example Vafeas (1997), Villalonga and McGahan (2005), 
8 The classification of industries follows the definitions on the website of Kenneth French. More information regarding the 
details of the classification is available at the website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_49_ind_port.html). 
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excluding them after being targeted would bias the model against characteristics raising their 
targetiveness after the first acquisition. In the main analysis, a firm can be included in the model 
structuring sample as either a target or a non-target, not both. Thus, if the company has been targeted 
during the tested period, it will be automatically excluded from the corresponding period’s non-target 
pool. Also, the firm is not included in the non-target pool if it has a pending bid during a particular 
year. 
Annual figures on target and control samples are displayed in Table 3.1. The number and the 
aggregate value of deals follow the pattern of the 5th and 6th merger waves (see e.g. Alexandridis et 
al., 2012).  
[Insert Table 3.1] 
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3.4. Methodology 
3.4.1. Hypotheses 
ATP literature has evolved since the early studies in the 1970s. New targetiveness factors and novel 
methodologies have been applied with varying success. However, the majority of these studies focus 
almost solely on firm-specific characteristics, which appear intuitive at first, since acquirer 
management is expected to select targets based on compatibility, resources, inefficiencies to be 
resolved etc. Nevertheless, M&As have been identified as events sensitive to the market environment, 
a notion strongly indicated in the Neoclassical theory (see e.g. Gort, 1969; Mitchell and Mulherin, 
1996) and merger waves literature (see e.g. Harford, 1999, 2005; Rosen, 2006). ATP literature has 
mostly ignored a crucial factor of M&As, which is their connection to market conditions.  
Few ATP studies have accommodated predictors regarding market-wide attributes. Specifically, 
industry disturbance (see e.g. Palepu, 1986), shareholder protection, market sentiment, and accounting 
standards (Brar et al., 2009) are the only hypotheses transcending unilateral focus on target attributes. 
There have been efforts to account for industry-specific distributional characteristics of predictors (see 
e.g. Barnes, 1990), but this only translates into a refined effect of firm-specific factors. 
The current study includes industry-wide characteristics expected to either affect or be 
contemporaneously present during high aggregate M&A activity. The new hypotheses are based on a 
combination of gaps in the extant ATP literature and advancements in the general finance literature. 
For instance, the “Industry Disturbance Hypothesis” has stated that the probability of a firm being 
targeted increases with the appearance of shocks in the respective industry. So far, this hypothesis has 
been tested by a variable indicating whether there has been an acquisition in the industry during the 
year before the bid. This is a restricting approach on the effect of a market shock on merger activity 
(see e.g. Gort, 1969). Shocks to the market cause mergers to cluster into industry waves, which 
develop into market-wide waves under the presence of high capital availability (see e.g. Harford, 
2005). These waves, industry- or market-wide, display momentously changing deal frequency 
throughout their duration. Since the number of firms being targeted increases by definition during 
periods of high merger activity, the momentous changes in activity could indicate changes in 
individual firm targetiveness. 
The imbalance between target- and industry-specific characteristics has not been the only neglected 
dimension in ATP literature. Most studies have not considered the buy-side conditions leading to 
acquisitions. The firm-specific characteristics in the literature refer to target company attributes, 
assets, or processes that may be either desirable or worthy of improvement. The willingness or ability 
of promising acquirers to pursue M&As has not been taken into account, with the exception of Brar et 
al. (2009) who used market sentiment as a general proxy for investors’ appetite for acquisitions. To 
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the best of my knowledge, there is no framework in ATP literature identifying the possibility of a 
company becoming targeted conditionally on the availability of acquirers. Since acquisitions need 
both sellers and buyers, it would be appropriate to consider the possibility of observing more 
acquisitions when there are enough prospective firms in the pools of both target and acquirer 
companies. 
Acquirer availability and willingness may be related to a number of factors, such as the 
appropriateness of acquisitions as a growth option, the existing opportunities or resources, as well as 
CEO specific characteristics. A strand of M&A literature refers to CEO envy and its causal effect on 
merger waves. Goel and Thakor (2010) highlight that acquiring CEOs enjoy benefits (additional 
compensation, expanded area of influence etc.), which may instil envy to peer CEOs. Then, the latter 
CEOs’ envy triggers the pursuit of similar benefits via conducting acquisitions. If this process results 
to a chain reaction of acquisitions, then, essentially, “contagious” CEO envy would be at least 
partially responsible for the ensuing merger waves. The aspect of envy could be found in target 
management as well, but the dummy variable used to test the “Industry Disturbance Hypothesis” 
should have partially captured the effect. CEO envy on the acquirer side has not been addressed in the 
ATP literature. 
A second example of a buy-side predictor of acquisitions may be the availability of capital. The extant 
studies in ATP literature have focused on target firm liquidity. Low level of cash availability could be 
a warning for underinvestment issues and disruption of operations. While this issue could be mitigated 
by liquidity infusion by a cash-rich acquirer, ATP literature has not posed the question of whether 
there is enough liquidity available to prospective acquirers. Even in the cases where target firms are 
not cash-stripped, acquirers have to gather the necessary funds for the acquisition. If their access to 
any type of capital is restricted, fewer acquisitions should be observed, which in turn indicates lower 
relative targetiveness for targets. Thus, capital availability for acquirers may affect the probability of 
prospective targets receiving a bid. 
Similar under-researched aspects of acquisitions are identified and deployed towards the formulation 
of testable hypotheses. The following sections provide the rationale and formulation of the new 
hypotheses. 
3.4.1.1. Cash Reserves Hypothesis 
According to the Free Cash Flow hypothesis suggested by Jensen (1986), managers may have the 
incentives to invest their company’s free cash flow in value-destroying ventures in their pursuit for 
private benefits, such as restricting shareholder control, augmenting their incumbency in the firm, as 
well as increasing personal gain and area of influence. Capital liquidity is a prerequisite of the Free 
Cash Flow hypothesis, as CEOs cannot perform deals they cannot fund. The relationship between 
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capital availability and mergers has been established by Harford (2005). He acknowledged the cause 
of industry merger waves in industry-specific shocks (economic shifts, technological disruption, 
regulatory changes etc.), but he argued for high overall capital availability allowing for the clustering 
of industry waves into market-wide waves. 
Anecdotal evidence is suggestive of measures that capture the aggregate market’s liquidity. Several 
articles have focused on the excessive cash balances of large firms and the corresponding 
repercussions on future M&A activity. A relatively recent case has been Apple Inc., which held $137 
billion in cash during 2013. Shareholder activists, with David Einhorn being the most vocal, prompted 
Apple Inc. to distribute the excessive cash to its shareholders in fear of unnecessary spending on 
value-destroying ventures (Bloomberg Businessweek, 2013).9 Their fear was based on previous value-
destroying deals and investments by other leading firms with sizeable cash reserves. For instance, in 
2007 eBay had to impair more than 50% of the $2.6 billion spent on Skype in 2005 (The Wall Street 
Journal, 2007).10 In this case, eBay’s investment paid off in 2011, after selling Skype to Microsoft for 
$8.5 billion, though this was a wholly unexpected development. Microsoft itself has participated in 
all-cash acquisitions fuelled by overloaded cash balances. The acquisition of aQuantive, an Internet-
advertising firm, for $6.2 billion in 2007 led to a complete write-down in 2012 (Bloomberg, 2012).11 
Regardless of value-destroying deals, there has been extensive reference to general M&A activity 
initiated by cash-rich companies. Few examples are Pfizer’s bid on AstraZeneca for $118 billion 
(Thomson Reuters, 2014)12 and General Electric’s bid on Alstrom’s energy division for $17 billion 
(The Wall Street Journal, 2014).13 Although the consideration was not only cash-based in the 
aforementioned deals, the bids were heavily supported by a cash component.  
Irrespectively of the deals’ wealth effect on shareholders, the anecdotal evidence offers important 
insights. The Press and investors consider excessive cash balances a potent indication of overflowing 
liquidity provoking the incumbent management to pursue acquisitions. Investors understand that 
excess cash can fuel acquiring activity; their fear of value-destroying acquisitions is rooted in the rich 
history of corporate misdeeds. 
This effect of cash reserves on deal activity has drawn the attention of financial and consulting 
institutions as well. In 2006, Duke University’s survey showed a record high in corporate cash 
balances, and PWC, one of the four prominent auditing firms in U.S., predicted increased merger 
activity in banking, technology, and oil & gas sectors due to the overloaded cash balances (CFO, 
2006).14 Deloitte, another major auditing firm, reported that 80% of corporate cash in UK is held by 
                                                          
9 “Too much cash isn’t good for Apple”, Bloomberg Businessweek, 26 February 2013 
10 “'Sorry, Wrong Number,' eBay Says on Skype”, The Wall Street Journal, 2 October 2007 
11 “Microsoft Writing Down $6.2 Billion Over AQuantive Deal”, Bloomberg, 3 July 2012 
12 “Pfizer walks away from $118 billion AstraZeneca takeover fight”, Thomson Reuters, 27 May 2014 
13 “GE's Alstom Deal Shattered France's Dream”, The Wall Street Journal, 25 June 2014 
14 “Cash Stockpiles Will Fuel Mergers: PwC”, CFO, 10 March 2006 
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25% of firms in FTSE 100, excluding financial firms (Deloitte, 2014). However, they noted that cash-
rich firms seem more conservative with their spending, as companies with less cash are spending 
relatively more on CAPEX and M&As. Ernst & Young, a leading tax advisory firm, attributes the 
forthcoming deals in the technology sector to the exuberant cash piles on big tech firms’ balance 
sheets (EY, 2014).15 Consulting and auditing firms consistently indicate inoperative cash piles as 
preludes to acquisitions. This reflects the market’s perception of the relationship between cash 
availability and merger activity.  
I follow the academic literature and the anecdotal evidence in forming a hypothesis regarding the 
effect of overall industry cash availability on firm targetiveness. It is important to note that the 
standard level of cash at hand may vary among industries. For instance, sectors with high growth 
potential, such as technology and healthcare, would be expected to hold more cash in order to 
capitalize on investment opportunities (see e.g. U.S. News, 2010).16 In contrast, value industries, such 
as consumer staples and utilities display less growth opportunities, hence acquisitions could be 
triggered with relatively shorter spikes in capital liquidity. 
In addition, the level of cash may offer less information compared to incremental changes in the level 
of industry-wide liquidity. The aforementioned anecdotal evidence emphasizes on the deviation 
between recent and historical cash levels. The comparison between present and past level of resources 
is necessary in order to identify excessive cash availability. Thus, high level of cash reserves per se 
may not instigate acquisitions, while ample increases in cash balances could indicate the advent of 
deals. The “Cash Reserves Hypothesis” takes all the aforementioned into account and states the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1: Firm targetiveness will increase along with increases in industry-wide level of cash 
balances.  
3.4.1.2. Market Activity Hypothesis 
There are studies connecting corporate decisions made by top management and activity in the market 
for assets. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) display the negative relationship between asset market liquidity 
and asset sales discounts. In detail, high volume in the market for assets allows managers to sell assets 
without suffering price discounts. Similarly, the same study argues for a strong association between 
asset market liquidity and the optimal debt level in the capital structure of a firm, i.e. the higher the 
liquidity in the market, the higher the debt levels on a firm’s balance sheet, since assets will be able to 
act as collateral for debt without assuming value discounts.17  
                                                          
15 “Technology M&A soars by 57% in Q2; dealmaking on course for ‘blockbuster’ 2014”, EY, 21 August 2014 
16 “Value and Growth: Why Investors Need Both”, U.S. News, 11 June 2010 
17 This theory is indirectly related to Ambrose and Megginson’s (1992) “Real Property Hypothesis”, suggesting that firms 
with more fixed assets have higher targetiveness. 
Chapter 3 Acquisition Target Prediction 
52 
 
It would be enlightening to elaborate further on the arguments of Shleifer and Vishny (1992). Assets 
with a narrow range of alternative uses, such as steel plants, are expected to have less liquidity in the 
market compared to assets with capabilities for multiple alternative uses, such as commercial land. 
The narrow range of alternative uses results into a more restricted pool of potential buyers. Scarcity of 
buyers suggests future sellers may not be able to liquidate their asset immediately without assuming 
discounts, i.e. they would have to sell below the asset’s fair value in order to lure buyers. In the case 
of a steel plant, the range of potential buyers is restricted to specialized manufacturers, while 
commercial land could be utilized by a wider range of firms. Thus, the inferior market liquidity and 
the associated discounts are incorporated in the value of the asset. This affects the capacity of the 
asset as debt collateral. Between two assets with the same face value, the one with less market 
liquidity, and hence higher probability to sell at a discount, will correspond to lower debt-raising 
capacity. In the case of bankruptcy, the asset would be liquidated in order to cover for the capital 
provided, and most probably, the seller would have to accept the appropriate discount in order to 
liquidate it promptly. Consequently, the liquidity status of a company’s assets in the market implies a 
dynamically changing optimal capital structure. An additional conclusion of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992) is that management teams are more likely to sell company assets during high asset market 
liquidity periods, when the probability and magnitude of discounts are relatively low. 
In the same direction, Schlingemann et al. (2002) connect liquidity in the market for assets with the 
corporate decision of divesting assets. In accordance with Shleifer and Vishny (1992), they find that 
firms decide to divest the most liquid assets in the market. The reasons for divesting assets originate 
in the inefficient diversification process and the ineffective strategic planning of parent-firms, though 
the selection of the specific assets to divest and the timing of the sale are based on the discounts the 
divesting firm would have to accept. If the respective asset’s liquidity is low in the market, then the 
firm may have to accept high discounts and, therefore, incur a loss on sale. In a similar context, 
Gavazza (2011) argues that low thickness in the market for assets prompts firms to hold assets even 
when they are not adequately profitable. Assets corresponding to thin markets, i.e. a low number of 
buyers and sellers, are more likely to be withheld even when their profitability drops. Both 
aforementioned studies indicate the willingness of management to sell parts of their business when the 
probability of selling assets at discount is lower.  
The effect of asset-market characteristics on significant corporate decisions has been established in 
the literature. Capital structure, divestitures, and asset liquidation decisions could be accelerated or 
postponed depending on the asset market status. In the same fashion, the market for corporate control 
may affect the targetiveness of individual firms. For instance, Rosen (2006) finds a connection 
between positive market reactions to merger announcements and the surge in frequency of deals in the 
near future. This relationship is attributed to momentum in the market for corporate control. CEOs 
observe positive announcement returns in other firms’ acquisitions and engage in acquisitions as well, 
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wagering they will reap similar market reactions. Complementary, CEOs have been accused of 
pursuing acquisitions out of envy for the benefits enjoyed by peer CEOs (Goel and Thakor, 2010). 
Both studies promote the idea that CEOs find motivation to perform acquisitions in the activity of the 
market for corporate control. 
As mentioned in the “Cash Reserves Hypothesis”, high capital liquidity could increase overall merger 
activity (Harford, 2005). The expectation of increasing merger activity due to the availability of 
capital could increase individual firm targetiveness. Specifically, optimism could increase liquidity 
with a feedback mechanism. For instance, if liquidity allows for the consummation of acquisitions, 
investors may expect more acquisitions in the future. At that point, the expectation of firms being 
potential targets could raise their valuation in order to account for the expected premia to be received. 
These firms could use their recently rising stock price in order to perform acquisitions, as equity 
capital has become relatively “cheaper” than cash or debt. In this scenario, a small number of 
acquisitions would trigger a partial rise in overall liquidity and, therefore, more acquisitions in the 
future. The aforementioned theory serves only as a thought experiment of alternative drivers of M&A 
activity. 
It is apparent that more than one theory can provide a legible explanation of the relationship between 
past merger activity and firm targetiveness. Capital liquidity, CEO envy, economic shocks, valuation 
discrepancies etc. are not necessarily mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive theories. Multiple 
market forces could be stimulating firm-specific targetiveness. Additional insight is gained after 
inspecting activity statistics on merger waves. For instance, merger activity over several years (see 
e.g. Harford, 2005) exhibits year-on-year increases in the number of deals for most years. 
Furthermore, the probability of a firm being targeted increases during upturns in the aggregate merger 
activity. Hence, merger activity increments could be included in an ATP model as a predictor of firm 
targetiveness.  
Suggestions by literature and simple inspection of merger activity through time advocate the 
assumption that heightened activity in the past may result in even higher activity in the future. For 
instance, inspection of the deal activity year-on-year as presented in Harford’s (2005) study, shows 
the majority of increases in activity being followed by additional increases. Although this claim seems 
arbitrary, the momentous nature of M&A activity and management’s behaviour have already been 
documented (see e.g. Rosen, 2006). Thus, the expectation is that higher industry-wide merger activity 
in the past will lead to higher merger activity in the future, resulting in higher individual targetiveness. 
The heightened activity could be the manifestation of CEO envy, surge in asset market liquidity, or 
any force capable to yield a year-on-year increase in the aggregate merger activity. The identification 
of all the unique factors boosting aggregate merger activity is outside the scope of this study, but the 
incorporation of their collective outcome on firm-specific targetiveness is a novel aspect in ATP 
literature. Considering all the above, the “Market Activity Hypothesis” states: 
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Hypothesis 2: Increases in industry-specific acquisition activity in the past will increase individual 
firm targetiveness in the present. 
3.4.1.3. Withdrawn Deals Hypotheses 
Corporate events and announcements are rich sources of information. For instance, dividend 
announcements have been shown to reveal top management’s expectations on future performance. 
Grullon et al. (2002) suggest a permanent increase in the quarterly dividend is an indication of 
upcoming decreases in systematic risk and growth opportunities, signalling the firm’s advancement to 
maturity stage in the company life cycle. As growth opportunities decline, the needs for liquidity and 
investment funds decrease and sales growth will settle to relatively lower levels. In Grullon et al.’s 
study, dividend reductions were followed by profitability declines but higher than average stock-price 
increases. In general, literature is fairly populated on the informational content of dividend 
announcements (see e.g. Pettit, 1972; Laub, 1976; Aharony and Swary, 1980). 
Finance literature has traced informational components in other corporate announcements as well. An 
argument on the informational content of M&As is offered by Moeller et al. (2005). In their study, 
few large acquisitions with significantly negative announcement returns are found responsible for the 
average acquirer losses documented in the literature. The study demonstrates positive aggregate 
wealth effects for the new entities after excluding acquisitions with losses above $1 billion. The “large 
loss” firms have been enjoying value-increasing announcements for acquisitions during the two years 
before the fateful deal. The authors interpret the market reaction as a response to revelations on the 
firm’s strategy. Specifically, the “large loss” acquisitions allow investors to evaluate the firm’s 
prospects under the current strategic path. In hindsight, investor consensus on large-loss deals 
assumes improbable sustainability in the firm’s growth and general performance, unless the 
management decides a meaningful strategic shift. This results in the sale of the stock until it reaches a 
price reflecting the company’s fair value under the status quo. 
Withdrawn acquisitions have been proven to provide information as well. Savor and Lu (2009) 
contrast the long-run stock performance of acquirers of withdrawn and completed acquisitions. They 
show that value-destroying stock acquisitions are a better alternative to no acquisition at all, as 
matching acquirers with withdrawn bids have inferior long-run performance. Withdrawn deals also 
offer implicit indication of the acquiring CEO’s quality (Jacobsen, 2014). Acquiring CEOs who 
withdraw bids as pre-emptive protection against overpayment are considered less hubristic (see also 
Roll, 1986), less inclined to pursue acquisition benefits, and more skilful in evaluating investing 
opportunities. The bid withdrawal serves as a signal of high CEO quality and it affects market 
reactions profoundly in subsequent corporate events. Not surprisingly, this information has also been 
connected to CEO retention, as well as the executive’s successful career path in the cases of turnover. 
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CEO quality has also been measured with respect to their response to market reaction on corporate 
announcements. Kau et al. (2008) find that good managers tend to withdraw acquisition bids when the 
market responds unfavourably. Thus, the managerial decision to withdraw or see a bid through after 
an adverse market reaction is indicative of whether the CEO “listens to the market”. In case the 
manager does not comply with the market’s view, her insistence might be attributed to overconfidence 
or hubris (see e.g. Roll, 1986). 
Withdrawal of bids could be informative regarding the target firm as well. A firm should attract a bid 
due to desirable attributes, such as performance and profitability, access to unique resources, 
managerial talent, or knowhow. Jacobsen (2014) reports the percentage of withdrawn deals related to 
the revelation of negative information for the target to be around 6%. In the rest of the withdrawal 
cases, the deal cancellation is unrelated to the target’s prospects. Thus, the withdrawal should not 
affect the desirability of the target per se. The expectation should be to observe acquisition attempts 
on the target in the future, as the firm’s persisting targetiveness should attract bids in the future. 
Recent anecdotal evidence supports this notion. Objections from regulators forced Sprint to cancel its 
bid for T-Mobile, a deal between two major telecommunications carriers in the U.S. (Thomson 
Reuters, 2014).18 The two firms have been expected to reattempt consolidation in the future, while an 
upcoming cross-border bid from a French company, Iliad, has been insinuated. This is an indication of 
T-Mobile’s desirability lasting even after a bid cancellation.  
Firm targetiveness may persist for more than a couple of months after the withdrawal. For instance, 
Yahoo! received an unsolicited offer from Microsoft in 2008, shortly after the latter has made its 
entrance to the search-engine and online advertising business (The New York Times, 2008).19 The bid 
was cancelled and several years later, activist investor firm Starboard was aggressively promoting the 
merger between Yahoo! and AOL in an attempt to reap cost and revenue synergies (Wall Street 
Journal, 2014).20 The second bid six years after a failed attempt may render Yahoo! a “serial target”, 
whose targetiveness seems to endure through time. Therefore, academic and anecdotal evidence 
inspires the “Withdrawn Deals Hypothesis”, which states the following: 
Hypothesis 3: The firm’s current targetiveness should be higher if it has received failed bids in the 
past.  
3.4.1.4. Hot Market Hypothesis 
Market activity has been reported having a feedback effect on corporate decisions. For instance, 
CEOs have been accused of pursuing acquisitions out of envy for the pecuniary and other benefits 
                                                          
18 “Sprint drops bid to buy T-Mobile, changes CEO”, Thomson Reuters, 6 August 2014. 
19 “Microsoft Bids $44.6 Billion for Yahoo”, The New York Times, 1 February 2008. 
20 “Starboard Pushes for Potential Yahoo-AOL Tie-Up”, Wall Street Journal, 26 September 2014. 
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enjoyed by their peer CEOs (see e.g. Goel and Thakor, 2010). These reactive acquisitions are not 
expected to be value enhancing, as the managerial incentive behind them is most probably based on 
collecting private benefits and not in maximising shareholder value. Simultaneously, envious CEOs 
are expected to raise the number of deals in the following period.  
In general, managerial motives for personal gain could trigger a series of acquisitions, potentially 
resulting in merger waves. For instance, acquirers willing to maintain their status are likely to perform 
defensive acquisitions, even if they destroy shareholders value in the process (Gorton et al., 2005). 
The aim of defensive acquisitions is to inflate the size and complexity of the firm, discouraging 
prospective acquirers. The CEOs’ fear of unsolicited bids regards losing status and power. The 
unwelcome buyer is unlikely to promote the target’s previously top executive to the combined firm’s 
CEO, so even if the current target CEO is allowed to keep her position, she will not be the top 
manager of the entity any more. This fear is amplified for CEOs who have not performed defensive 
acquisitions, as their firm becomes relatively smaller to the defensive acquirer and, thus, could be 
considered an easier target. In order to protect themselves against this imposed relative disadvantage, 
these firms resort to defensive acquisition themselves. Hence, when the market is “hot” with envy-
driven or defensive acquisitions, the number of future industry deals is expected to rise. 
Managerial incentives for acquisitions are not restricted to private benefits. Several studies exhibit 
prevalent CEO optimism during heightened market activity in security offerings (see e.g. Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002; Helwege and Liang, 1996). A source of optimism 
could be identified in the lucrative past performance of corporate events in the same industry. Rosen 
(2006) highlights positive acquirer announcement returns as factors of the industry-wide merger 
activity.21 If the market acknowledges synergistic gains in acquisitions through high announcement 
returns for the involved entities, CEOs of other firms are expected to take advantage of market 
optimism by engaging in acquisitions. In consequence, industries with high combined wealth effects 
on deal announcements are expected to exhibit more acquisitions in the near future. Since there will 
be more acquisitions, more firms in these industries are expected to receive bids. Thus, the “Hot 
Market Hypothesis” states the following: 
Hypothesis 4: Firm targetiveness increases with the industry-wide synergistic gains of past 
acquisitions. 
3.4.1.5. Industry Concentration Hypothesis 
Regulatory bodies overseeing antitrust and competition allegations pose an influential stakeholder 
group with significant power over deal consummation. The institutions in U.S. responsible for 
                                                          
21 For additional information on the effect of “hot markets” on acquisition activity see also Petmezas (2009), 
Antoniou et al. (2008), Croci et al. (2010). 
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investigating pending deals include the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and other private and public entities. Their official main concern regarding 
consolidation is consumer protection against collusion, monopolistic behaviour, and any kind of 
action that would hinder free competition among firms.  
The concentration of excessive market power effectively under one firm has been the most 
highlighted concern of regulators. If they believe market share consolidation could generate 
monopolistic behaviour and unfair pricing, they reserve the right to block any deal. In this case, firms 
participating in the blocked deal could resort to litigation against the antitrust ruling. A recent 
example of regulatory interference regards the bid by Louisiana-Pacific Corp. to Ainsworth Lumber 
Co (McCarthy, 2014).22 Both firms produced “oriented standard board” (OSB), a component used in 
construction and remodelling of buildings. A merger would result in an entity holding over 50% of the 
market in the U.S. Pacific Northwest and upper Midwest, a market share precarious to fair 
competition in the region. Both firms initially proclaimed a litigation battle against the ruling, though 
they did not follow through their intention due to monetary and time constraints.  
In the cases of globally operating firms, regulatory consent may involve multiple regional authorities. 
The recent acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook, two prominent texting and social network 
companies, has been a model example. Facebook announced the acquisition of WhatsApp on 
February 19, 2014 for approximately $19 billion (Thomson Reuters, 2014).23 The approval from FTC 
was issued on April 8, 2014 (New York Post, 2014).24 While both acquirer and target had their 
headquarters in U.S., they had been waiting for the regulatory approval of E.U. until October 6, 2014, 
(Financial Times, 2014)25. If the deal had not been approved by E.U. but was still consummated, there 
would have been repercussions on both companies’ operations in E.U. countries.  
The level of market share concentration has been measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
by ATP and general finance literature (see e.g. Brar et al., 2009; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010). The 
measure utilizes the sum of squared individual-company market shares of sales, having only positive 
values, a ceiling of 1 for fully concentrated markets and a theoretical value approaching 0 for almost 
perfectly fragmented industries. The index has also been used by regulatory authorities, such as the 
Federal Trade Commission, to define the level of market share concentration.26 In the case of FTC, 
the concentration of market power has been classified uniformly for all industries under the three 
categories of “Unconcentrated”, “Moderately Concentrated”, and “Highly Concentrated”. FTC 
investigates the changes in market share concentration, and “Highly Concentrated” industries are 
more likely to experience regulatory intervention. Thus, fewer acquisition bids would be expected to 
                                                          
22 “Louisiana-Pacific Corporation and Ainsworth Lumber Co. Ltd. Terminate USD$1.1B Deal Due to Regulatory Hurdles”, 
McCarthy, 2 June 2014. 
23 “Facebook to buy WhatsApp for $19 billion in deal shocker”, Thomson Reuters, 20 Feb 2014. 
24 “FTC gives Facebook go-ahead on WhatsApp deal”, New York Post, 8 April 2014. 
25 "Facebook’s bill for WhatsApp climbs to $21.8bn”, Financial Times, 6 October 2014. 
26 See e.g. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010). 
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occur in highly concentrated industries, since, ceteris paribus, firms would be more reluctant to 
undertake the initial costs of a bid, only to be obstructed by regulatory bodies. 
The level of HHI is deemed less informative than the year-on-year change of the index. Some 
industries, such as military equipment manufacturers, tend to have fewer listed firms than industries 
with fewer entry barriers, such as telecommunication equipment manufacturers. The HHI level for the 
highly concentrated industries would still be high even if it drops slightly, while even minor decreases 
in concentration could be enough to indicate room for further consolidation. Hence, the Industry 
concentration hypothesis states the following: 
Hypothesis 5: Industries with recent decreases in market-power concentration will exhibit more 
acquisitions and, therefore, individual firm targetiveness will increase. 
3.4.2. Variable Construction 
In this section, we analyse the construction of the new and control variables in the current study. The 
year of observation is year “t”, i.e. when a particular firm is registered as a target or non-target. The 
dependent variable in the context of the ATP study is a dummy variable expressing the latter status; 
the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the company has received a bid in year t and the value of 
0 otherwise. Regarding the targetiveness factors, the novel variables use information of up to two 
years before year t, while control variables draw data from year t-1. The first subsection regards the 
variables on testing the new hypotheses and the second one illustrates the construction of the 
remaining control variables. 
3.4.2.1. Proxies for New Hypotheses’ Testing 
In order to account for the “Cash Reserves Hypothesis”, I divide the sum of all cash balances over the 
sum of all assets in an industry in a specific year. I name this as “Capital Liquidity” ratio. Higher 
ratios indicate higher level of cash per unit of assets in the overall industry. I also account for 
incremental changes in Cash Liquidity ratio, as positive year-on-year changes may foreshadow higher 
deal activity, therefore increasing individual firm targetiveness. This variable is labelled “Capital 
Liquidity Change” and it regards the change of “Capital Liquidity” between years t-2 and t-1. 
Regarding “Market Activity Hypothesis”, I construct 3 testing variables. First, I consider the study of 
Schlingemann et al. (2002), who determined market activity by estimating the ratio of total M&A 
consideration over the sum of assets in an industry. The proxy stood for the liquidity in the market for 
corporate control and it was deployed in the estimation of divestiture discounts. Their measure has 
been amended for the current study. I divide the total value of all U.S public-target M&A transactions 
in a specific industry, as reported on ThomsonOne Banker, over the same industry’s total market 
Chapter 3 Acquisition Target Prediction 
59 
 
capitalization, taken by CRSP. I label this variable “Activity Value” index. The deals included refer to 
year t-1 and the market capitalization is estimated at the end of t-1. Then, I estimate the incremental 
change of the ratio between years t-2 and t-1, naming the variable “Activity Value Change”. The 
prediction suggests a positive relationship between year-on-year increases in the Activity Value index 
and individual firm targetiveness. 
The Press does not focus only on aggregate deal value, but also on the number of deals. For instance, 
Forbes uses both deal value and frequency to comment on the “hot M&A market” on a global scale 
(Forbes, 2014).27 I consider deal frequency in the same fashion with the Activity Value index. The 
“Activity Concentration” index is the number of U.S. public M&A deals over the number of firms in 
the industry, which is then used to estimate the year-on-year change of the index between years t-2 
and t-1, which is named “Activity Concentration Change”. The expectation for the latter is consistent 
with Activity Value Change, i.e. higher increases in the concentration of deals in the past should lead 
in greater activity in the future and, consequently, increase firm targetiveness.  
The aforementioned indices account for direct measures of the aggregate activity in the industry. The 
nominator of both measures regards the sell-side of a deal, while a measure regarding the presence of 
acquirers could contribute to the understanding of the dynamics in the market for corporate control. A 
notable example is the group of highly active acquirers. Serial acquirers, i.e. firms who perform 
several deals within a short period of time, are responsible for almost 25% of the global M&A activity 
(Boston Consulting Group, 2011). These acquirers are usually large firms with enough liquidity to 
perform multiple acquisitions even within the same year. Popular serial acquirers are IBM, Walt 
Disney, Foxconn Electronics, Caterpillar etc. (McKinsey, 2012). Another example is Google, which 
performed 19 acquisitions in the first half of 2014, spending over $5.5 billion mostly on purchasing 
knowhow on “smart houses”, i.e. dwellings that have most functions operated remotely or 
automatically via technology (The Guardian, 2014).28 In addition, Google announced in May 2014 an 
international acquisition spree funded by inflows of foreign operations (MarketWatch, 2014).29 The 
expectation of acquisitions in the technology sector should be higher after the announcement and, 
generally, when there is a proven serial acquirer present in the industry. 
Accordingly, merger activity is also accounted for by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
there is a serial acquirer that has previously targeted a specific industry in t-1 and 0 otherwise. The 
variable construction is based on one of the serial acquirer definitions of Humphery-Jenner and 
Powell (2011),30 identifying serial acquirers as companies who have performed at least 2 acquisitions 
within the last 3 years. Specifically, I classify a firm as a serial acquirer in t-1, if it had performed 2 or 
more acquisitions during the years t-3 to t-1. Firm targetiveness is expected to increase with the 
                                                          
27 “No Slowdown In Sight For 2014's M&A Frenzy”, Forbes, 24 June 2014. 
28 “Google acquisition spree takes in Dropcam and Alpental”, The Guardian, 24 June 2014. 
29 “Google eyes $30 billion overseas buying spree”, MarketWatch, 21 May 2014. 
30 Alternative specification of Serial Acquirers offered qualitatively similar results. 
Chapter 3 Acquisition Target Prediction 
60 
 
presence of a serial acquirer. The respective dummy variable is named “Serial Acquirer”, which takes 
the value of 1 if there is a serial acquirer that has acquired in the respective target’s industry within the 
previous 3 years and 0 otherwise. 
As mentioned in a previous section, past withdrawn bids are expected to raise firm targetiveness in the 
near future. Despite the arguments of persistence in target attractiveness, it is not recommended to 
consider withdrawn bids too far in the past, as firms may change enough through time to be deemed 
new entities. I consider whether a firm has received a failed bid within the last 3 years prior to the 
observation, i.e. I set the value of the “Past Withdrawn Bid” dummy variable to 1 if there has been a 
withdrawn deal within years t-3 to t-1 and 0 otherwise. The reason of withdrawal is not examined due 
to the rarity of withdrawals pertaining to deteriorating target firm attractiveness (see e.g. Jacobsen, 
2013). Firm targetiveness is expected to increase with the presence of withdrawn bids in the recent 
past. 
The intention behind the “Hot Market Hypothesis” is to test whether momentum of optimism in the 
market stimulates aggregate merger activity and, consequently, firm targetiveness. I account for 
optimism in the market for corporate control with the combined wealth effect of acquisitions around 
the date of announcement. In detail, I accumulate the market adjusted returns for the window (-1, +1) 
for both acquirer (ACAR) and target (TCAR). Then, I use the market value of targets and acquirers at 
the end of the month before the bid as weights for the wealth effect. The expected deal synergies are 
depicted in the weighted average of ACAR and TCAR. This method of valuing synergies of 
acquisitions is in accordance with the literature (see e.g. Moeller et al., 2004). In order to measure 
aggregate optimism, I estimate the average of all deal synergies in the same industry for one year. The 
interpretation of the “Industry Synergy” index suggests that the optimism in the market for corporate 
control should be higher as aggregate synergistic gains increase. I also include the incremental change 
of the index between years t-2 and t-1. The expectation is that higher values of “Industry Synergy 
Change” in t-1 will lead to more deals in year t and, hence, individual firm targetiveness will increase. 
The regulatory institutions have drawn public’s attention on cases where market share concentration 
harms the consumer. An appropriate testing instrument for the “Industry Consolidation Hypothesis” is 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (see e.g. Giroud and Mueller, 2011). I account for the 
different changes of concentration observed per industry by considering the incremental change in the 
respective HHI for years t-2 to t-1. The probability of a firm being targeted is expected to increase 
when the industry consolidation has receded in the recent past. 
3.4.2.2. Control Variables 
Control variables in this study are based on hypotheses tested in ATP literature. Specifically, I include 
variables pertaining to Inefficient Management, Leverage, Liquidity, Market-to-Book, and Price-to-
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Earnings hypotheses as they have been stated in Palepu (1986). I introduce alternative measures based 
on the expectations and outcomes of previous studies. The process of the variable construction is 
explained below and the summarised information on control variables is displayed in Table 3.2. 
[Insert Table 3.2] 
For each hypothesis, I separate companies per industry and sort them according to the designated 
continuous variable that has been used as a test proxy in the literature. According to each hypothesis, 
high or low values of the corresponding variable should indicate higher firm targetiveness. In other 
words, I consider the direction indicated by the hypothesis and assign the value of 1 if the firm lies in 
the respective top or bottom 25% of the industry. For instance, the “Inefficient Management 
Hypothesis” suggests higher targetiveness for firms performing poorly on ROA. Thus, the 
corresponding dummy variable will assume the value of 1 if the firm exhibits ROA lower than the 
bottom 25% of its industry and 0 otherwise. A different example is the control variable regarding the 
“Leverage hypothesis”. In this case, the value of 1 is assigned to a firm if its leverage is in the top 
25% of its industry.31 Company past performance is also measured by the annual buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns on the full calendar year t-1. The adjustment is based on the equally-weighted CRSP 
index. The calculation follows monthly compounding of the monthly returns for both the security and 
the benchmark, and the subtraction of the two as can be seen in formula (1). 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡, 𝑇) = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) − 
𝑇
𝑡=1 ∏ (1 +  𝑅𝐵,𝑡) 
𝑇
𝑡=1 ,  (1) 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of the month for security i in month t, and 𝑅𝐵,𝑡 is the return of the equally-
weighted CRSP index in month t (see e.g. Brar et al., 2009). 
3.4.2.3. Variables and Sample Statistics 
The preliminary analysis focuses on testing the targetiveness factors for statistical differences between 
targets and non-targets. Following the literature standard, I present the variables that will take part in 
the analysis. The mean and median values are reported in Table 3.3, along with the p-values of the 
respective T-tests and Wilcoxon tests for the mean and median difference, respectively. The analysis 
has been performed on all firm-year observations available after accounting for data availability. 
Inspection of the mean statistics display an only occasionally surprising picture. Targets in the sample 
have significantly higher market capitalisation compared to non-targets, although the sample size 
differences may be responsible for the discrepancy. Both subsamples have similar Market-to-Book 
and Price-to-Earnings ratios, with targets having slightly lower median ratios, indicating that target 
firms may indeed be undervalued or mismanaged. The accounting ratios show differences in 
                                                          
31 The new construction holds superior explanatory power versus the variables’ continuous form. The statistical difference is 
exhibited in Table 3.4. 
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agreement with the theoretical expectations of previous studies, as performance indicators and 
liquidity are significantly lower for targets, while leverage is significantly higher. Targets display 
lower performance for the BHAR measure. It is also impressive that for the most firm-year 
observations, almost 90% of firms have at least one serial acquirer present in their industry. This 
suggests that the presence of a proven acquirer in the industry may not foreshadow an increase in deal 
activity. The industry synergies are higher for the industries of targets, though the statistical 
significance is not accompanied by an impressively high magnitude. The variables Activity 
Concentration and Activity Value are both higher for the target subsample. The collective inference 
from the variables on market activity show some support towards the argument that firms are targeted 
when there is heat in the market. The HHI variable shows similar means for both groups, while the 
median variable is slightly higher for the non-target group. This is an indication in favour of an earlier 
argument predicting lower deal activity in highly concentrated industries, presumably due to higher 
probability of regulatory intervention. The final variable, Capital Liquidity, offers surprising results. It 
indicates that targets are in industries with lower levels of average cash over assets ratios. This is 
contrary to the stated expectation that targeted firms should be concentrated more in industries with 
higher levels of cash. Overall, the preliminary analysis suggests that the sample does not display 
significant differences with previous ATP studies (see e.g. Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997, 2001; 
Cremers et al., 2008).  
[Insert Table 3.3] 
3.4.3. Methodological Techniques 
The current study is based on the methodological techniques established by the ATP literature. The 
general process of acquisition prediction in this study is described below, and more details are 
provided in the subsequent sections. 
I create a 5-year sample of targets and non-targets in order to estimate the model parametres. 
Companies are registered as targets or non-targets according to their status in the year of observation, 
i.e. year “t”. The logit model identifies relationships between variable values in the year t-1 and target 
status in year t. The model’s outcome is the probability of each firm becoming a target in year t. I use 
these in-sample probabilities in order to decide the cut-off probability to be used in the out-of-sample 
forecasting, which is performed on the year following the 5-year sample. The cut-off probability 
obtained from model estimation is used to classify firms in the forecasting year as potential targets or 
non-targets.  
A unique component in this study is the conduct of model structuring and testing for successive 
periods. I construct 18 partially overlapping samples in order to estimate the model for 5-year 
subsamples and perform forecasting on the year after. For instance, the chronologically first iteration 
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has an estimation sample based on 1990-1994 period and a forecasting sample on year 1995. The next 
period has an estimation sample from years 1991-1995 and a forecasting sample on 1996, and so on. 
The first iteration to present in the analysis is based on the estimation period 2007-2011 and the 
forecasting year of 2012 in order to show results on the most recent period in the sample. 
The rolling estimation is necessary for the examination of model intertemporality. It is possible that 
some factors display time-varying levels of significance in the decision-making process of acquirers. 
Strong indications could be identified in the nature of the U.S. merger waves. The Third U.S. merger 
wave in 1960’s was characterized as the conglomeration wave, as acquirers sought diversification by 
acquiring firms outside their main area of operations (see e.g. Mead, 1969). The Fourth U.S. merger 
wave yielded the opposite effect on firms, as acquirers purchased conglomerates and divested the 
secondary business segments (see e.g. Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Therefore, while acquirers 
in the third wave aimed at increasing hedging against industry-specific risk, acquirers during the 
fourth wave acted in order to correct the inefficiencies created during the previous wave. This 
timeline of alternate acquirer intentions is indicative of the evolving motives fuelling acquisitions. 
The rolling model estimation in this study provides information on potential shifts in acquiring 
criteria. The basic methodological components are analysed in detail in the following sections. 
3.4.3.1. Model 
Previous studies have deployed two main models for acquisition prediction: logit and multiple 
discriminant analysis (MDA) models. Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) show immaterial differences 
in the performance of the two models, therefore the well-established logit model is employed. 
Furthermore, this more choice is in accordance with Palepu’s (1986) seminal study, as well as the 
studies inspiring the sampling technique (Brar et al., 2009) and the cut-off probability criterion 
(Powell, 2004; Brar et al., 2009). The different forms of the logit model can be seen below. Formula 
(2) shows the generic form and formula (3) shows the transformation of the model into the linear 
form. Target is the categorical variable taking the value of 1 if the company is a target and 0 
otherwise, X is the vector of all predictors applied in the model, and ε is the error term.  
Target =
1
(1+e−(a+𝐛 ∗ 𝐗+𝜺))
    (2) 
Logit(Target | 𝐗)  =  a +  𝐛 ∗  𝐗 + ε   (3) 
The domain of outcomes in the standard logit model contains two mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive outcomes. Typically, one outcome is labelled as the “event” and the other one as the “non-
event”. In the context of ATP studies, a firm receiving a bid within a specific year is considered the 
“event” and the firm remaining a non-target is the “non-event”. These two outcomes are mutually 
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exclusive, as a firm cannot be considered both a target and a non-target in the same year or the same 
period. 
3.4.3.2. Sample 
Several studies construct “state-based” samples of targets and non-targets (see e.g. Stevens, 1973; 
Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1999; Powell, 2001) and the main argument for their use regards the decrease 
in sample size needs, especially for non-target firms. At the time of earlier studies, gathering data may 
have posed an important hurdle to researchers in terms of both availability and manual-collection 
time. Advancements in technology and commercial databases such as COMPUSTAT, DataStream, 
CRSP, and ThomsonOne have led to facilitation of data access, along with the corresponding 
increases in sample sizes and steep decreases in computation time. A comparison between sample 
sizes of early and recent studies illustrates the progress in ATP sample sizes. Simkowitz and Monroe 
(1971) included 23 targets and 25 non-targets while Powell (2004) increased the sample to 471 targets 
and 9,420 non-targets.  
State-based samples allow for a non-random selection of targets and non-targets, as the sample 
concentration of either type of firms does not approximate the population of companies (see e.g. 
Powell, 2004). Palepu (1986) recommends adjustments to the maximum likelihood estimators in order 
to account for the non-random sampling, insisting on the use of state-based samples. Nevertheless, 
more recent studies include samples with numbers of targets and non-targets closer to the population 
distribution (see e.g. Powell, 2004; Cremers et al., 2008). The reason for this transition is attributed to 
the biases afflicted on the coefficient estimates and classification accuracy, rendering the model 
estimators biased despite the adjustments of the likelihood estimators (see e.g. Bartley and Boardman, 
1990).  
This study follows the example of sampling in the more recent studies in order to avoid biases in the 
model estimates from state-based sampling. In particular, I base the sampling technique on Brar et al. 
(2009) in selecting a number of control firms per year proportional to the percentage of acquisition 
activity pertaining to that year. I use 5-year samples in order to estimate the model and 1-year of data 
for out-of-sample forecasting. The choice of a 5-year span for the estimation sample is based on the 
appropriateness of sample size for this study. The literature exhibits periods of varying sizes, ranging 
from 2 years (see e.g. Barnes, 1999) to 11 years (Brar et al, 2009). The results have been consistently 
modest regardless of the sample’s time span.32 
Each firm is represented only once in the estimation sample. Firms targeted during the 5-year period 
are included as targets, and they are excluded from the pool of non-targets for the same period. The 
                                                          
32 In untabulated analysis, I use alternative time spans for the estimation samples (2 years up to 10 years) and the results 
remain qualitatively the same. 
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forecasting sample consists of all the target and non-target firms with available data in the year 
subsequent to the estimation period. Firms which have been targeted in the estimation sample are also 
included in the forecasting sample, as every firm is a potential target in practise, even just 1 year after 
receiving a failed bid. 
In the main analysis, the estimation sample retrieves data from the period 2007-2011. The total 
number of deals in the period is 199. In year 2007, the market activity amounts to 48 deals or approx. 
24.12% of the 199 deals in the 5-year period. The available non-target firms are 2,004 for the same 
year. The number of non-target firms selected for that particular year will be 483 or 24.12% of 2,004 
firms. These 483 firms are excluded from the pool of non-targets for the rest of the 5-year period, and 
companies are randomly allocated into the sample for the rest of the period in the same way.33  
After the model has been estimated and the cut-off probability has been set, I perform forecasting on 
the 1 year following the estimation period, i.e. 2012.The forecasting sample consists of 27 targets and 
1,430 non-targets. These proportions of targets and non-targets are closer to population proportions, 
similarly to Powell (2004). 
3.4.3.3. Cut-off probability 
The cut-off-probability rules have evolved along with the literature. The first well-justified 
methodology in deciding the appropriate cut-off point was established by Palepu (1986). The 
intention has been to minimize the misspecification errors, i.e. the incorrect classification of 
companies as either targets or non-targets. However, minimization of misspecifications implies Type I 
and Type II errors have similar effects on the investment performance of “Predicted Targets 
Portfolio”. Barnes (1999) argues that the main motive of ATP studies is to form profitable investment 
strategies, and the average cost of Type I (i.e. not identifying an actual target) and Type II (i.e. not 
identifying an actual non-target) errors are unequal. Thus, a classification rule consistent with the 
investment performance objective would be to maximize the returns of the “Predicted Targets 
Portfolio”. Powell (2004) and Brar et al. (2009) argue that this is possible in the context of ATP by 
maximizing the concentration of targets in the respective portfolios.  
The latter rule may not be in complete alignment to the intention stated in both studies. The aim of 
their classification rule has been to maximize returns, which would be hypothetically achieved by 
maximizing the relative number of targets in their investment portfolio. The selection of the cut-off 
probability in regards to the one particular portfolio with the highest concentration may neglect the 
distribution of target concentration among portfolios. Due to high model misspecifications, there may 
be a non-monotonic concentration of targets in the “Predicted Targets Portfolio”, which may be 
                                                          
33 In the cases where there are not enough firms to match the number of non-targets required because the sampling pool has 
“no replacement”, I use all the available firms remaining in the sample. 
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reflected on the forecasting results in the out-of-sample testing. Therefore, instead of segmenting the 
in-sample probabilities into different portfolios, it would advisable to focus on an aggregate sample, 
of which the target concentration will define the cut-off probability. In order to follow this approach, I 
report the concentration ratio of predicted targets in the estimation sample for different cut-off 
probabilities, starting with probability of 5% and with a step of 5%. The designated cut-off probability 
is the one resulting in the highest concentration of actual targets in the “Predicted Targets Portfolio”. 
This classification includes firms which might have been omitted by the rules of Powell (2004) and 
Brar et al. (2009) due to the non-monotonic classification accuracy. 
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3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Single-period Regression 
This section elaborates on the results of the single-period model. The first part of the analysis follows 
the estimation of the model for the period 2007-2011 and the subsequent testing of the model’s 
forecasting performance for the year 2012. Other important aspects of the analysis involve the 
identification of the appropriate cut-off probability and the assessment of the “Predicted Targets 
Portfolio” investment performance.  
Table 3.4 displays three versions of the estimated model on the period 2007-2011. The purpose of this 
table is to show the gradual improvement in the model’s (McFadden) pseudo R-square and justify the 
choice of predictors. The first regression deploys variables that have been suggested by the extant 
ATP literature. All the control variables, except for BHAR, are industry-adjusted. It is surprising to 
observe statistical significance only for the variables Return-on-Assets and Sales Growth, whose 
negative signs are in line with the expectations of “Inefficient Management Hypothesis”: lower 
profitability indicates subpar administration and, therefore, a higher probability of an incoming bid. 
While most of the control variables have presented controversial results among studies, the most 
surprising result is the insignificant effect of the “Size Hypothesis” proxy, i.e. log of Market 
Capitalization. The negative sign of the estimate suggests the expected higher targetiveness for 
smaller firms, but statistical significance does not reach the 10% threshold, obstructing safe 
inferences. Size predictors have been proven statistically significant in most previous ATP studies, 
with the exception of Ambrose and Megginson (1992) who find an inconsequential effect of net asset 
book value on targetiveness. The rest of the control variables in the first regression bear the expected 
signs, with the exception of Market-to-Book and Liquidity. The expectation would be for the 
estimates to have a negative sign, indicating higher firm targetiveness during potential undervaluation 
and lack of liquidity. Nevertheless, the corresponding statistical insignificance negates the 
implications of the unexpected signs.  
The first model provides an adjusted pseudo R-square of 0.007. The Pseudo R-square statistic for logit 
models, in contrast to the Adjusted R-square in OLS models, does not express the percentage of the 
dependent variable’s variance explained collectively by the regressors. The statistic’s value serves the 
distinct purpose of comparison between models, as it cannot provide a more intuitive interpretation. In 
essence, the inclusion of new variables and the modification of existing ones should aim at increasing 
the Pseudo R-square, indicating model better fit. 
The second regression retains some variables from the first regression, i.e. BHAR and the size proxy. 
The control variables containing accounting information have been transformed into dummy 
variables. Specifically, the dummy variables for ROA, Sales Growth, Market-to-Book, Price-to-
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Earning, and Liquidity assume the value of 1 if the company lies in the bottom 25% of the industry 
distribution, while the dummy for Leverage takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs in the top 25% of 
the industry population. The construction of the variables offers intuitive representation of the results, 
as a positive sign would be in accordance with suggestions in the literature.  
The reconstruction of the control variables offers improvement to the pseudo R-square, but the 
statistical significance of variables does not improve significantly. The ROA dummy retains its 
significance, although it became more marginal at 10% confidence level. Sales Growth dummy is not 
significant as its continuous form, and all other dummy variables are insignificant However, the size 
proxy becomes statistically significant at 5% confidence level, complying with the expectations in the 
literature. Despite the zero net improvement regarding variable significance, the second model will be 
retained since it has a higher pseudo R-square. 
The third model retains all variables of the second model, along with the new variables introduced in 
the current study. The improvement compared to the first two models is apparent in the higher pseudo 
R-square of 0.016. In spite of the higher R-square, the new variables do not seem to perform well 
individually. The variables Activity Concentration Change and Serial Acquirers display the expected 
sign and statistical significance, indicating that market activity indeed increases individual firm 
targetiveness. The variables Capital Liquidity Change, Activity Value Change, HHI Change, and Past 
Withdrawn Bid bear the expected negative sign, but the estimates are statistically insignificant, while 
the variable Industry Synergy Change has an unexpected negative sign and it is statistically 
insignificant. The collective results from the 2007-2011 regression provide only partial support to the 
“Market Activity Hypothesis”, while the rest of the novel hypotheses receive no supportive evidence. 
Despite the overall discouraging results of novel variables, the improved R-square advises for the 
inclusion of the new variables. Therefore, the analysis continues based on the form and outcomes of 
the third model.34 
[Insert Table 3.4] 
The next step after model estimation is the identification of the cut-off probability that will serve as 
the appropriate classification threshold for companies in 2012. Table 3.5 displays statistical 
information on the in-sample prediction performance of model 3 in Table 3.4. For each level of cut-
off probability, the table presents the correctly and incorrectly classified target and non-target firms. 
The columns under the label “Correct” display the number of actual targets and non-targets specified 
accurately. In contrast, the columns under the label “Incorrect” show the number of firms 
inappropriately identified as targets and non-targets. The table provides the corresponding Sensitivity 
and Specificity statistics, which show the correct percentage of actual targets and non-targets correctly 
                                                          
34 The model variables, both control and novel, have considered adjustment for industry average or conditions. 
Therefore, the inclusion of industry fixed effects would be excessive. 
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identified. The sharp changes in Sensitivity and Specificity as the probability level increases is an 
indication of an ineffective model, suggesting actual targets are assigned disproportionately low 
probabilities compared to actual non-targets. This is an early indication of the model’s ineffectiveness 
in appropriate classification. 
[Insert Table 3.5] 
According to the classification criterion stated in a previous section, the cut-off probability should 
maximise the in-sample ratio of actual targets in the “Predicted Targets Portfolio”. This portfolio 
consists of all firms classified as potential targets, thus it is the horizontal sum of the columns (2) and 
(4), i.e. Correct targets and Incorrect targets respectively. The concentration of targets in the portfolio 
is calculated as the ratio of Correct targets over the sum of Correct and Incorrect targets. The cut-off 
probability should be the lowest probability threshold accompanied by the highest Concentration 
ratio. For the model corresponding to 2007-2011, the designated probability is 25% with a 
corresponding Concentration Ratio of 21.21%. This probability will be applied on the out-of-sample 
testing, where all firms in 2012 assigned with a probability of 25% or higher will be included in the 
“Predicted Targets Portfolio”. 
The estimates of Model 3 in Table 3.4 are applied on the forecasting sample of 2012. The use of a cut-
off probability of 25% produces the results displayed in Table 3.6. The actual targets for the year 2012 
have been 27, while the current model succeeded in identifying only 3 of them correctly (8.6%). The 
remaining misidentified firms in the sample did not receive bids during 2012. The model seems to fail 
in identifying a significant portion of the actual targets, but it is impressively accurate in identifying 
non-events, as it correctly classified 1,366 out of 1,430 non-targets (96.1%). However, the 
concentration of actual targets in the “Predicted Targets Portfolio” is minor, therefore even relatively 
few misspecifications in the classification of actual non-targets leads to ineffective forecasting.  
[Insert Table 3.6] 
Despite of the general poor performance of the model in classification, a proper evaluation has to 
consider the general context of ATP studies. Table 3.7 provides a comparison between this and 
previous studies’ models. The second and the third columns regard the number of predicted targets 
and the percentage of actual targets in the predicted portfolio, respectively. The fourth and fifth 
columns display the Sensitivity and the Specificity of the prediction, i.e. the corresponding percentage 
of targets and non-targets in the sample identified correctly. The last column summarizes the overall 
classification accuracy of the model, dividing the sum of correctly predicted targets and non-targets 
over the total number of firms in the forecasting sample.  
[Insert Table 3.7] 
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The current study’s model performs better than the literature average.35 It achieves the second best 
concentration of actual targets in the “Predicted Targets Portfolio”, faring above average in terms of 
Sensitivity, Specificity, and Overall Accuracy. In terms of the latter, the model is second only to 
Powell (2004), although the latter’s superior performance is attributed to higher Specificity, not 
Sensitivity. Brar et al.’s (2009) model performs better in terms of target concentration and Sensitivity, 
but it yields lower overall accuracy, which reflects the trade-off between identifying many targets and 
minimizing misspecifications. An additional advantage of the current study’s model is the smaller 
number of potential targets in absolute numbers, rendering the investment easier to implement and 
monitor. 
On the grounds of prediction accuracy, this study’s model is arguably among the top performers in the 
literature. Nevertheless, the ultimate purpose of ATP studies has been the formulation of profitable 
investment strategies. Thus, the appropriate test of an ATP model regards the stock-market 
performance of “Predicted Targets Portfolio”. 
The investment strategy entails the construction of a buy-and-hold portfolio with monthly decisions 
on liquidation. Specifically, I form an equally weighted portfolio at the end of 2011. At the end of 
each month, investments in firms that received a bid are liquidated, and the proceedings are equally 
reallocated to the remaining firms in the portfolio. The results are compounded monthly until the end 
of the year 2012, when all remaining securities are fully liquidated. Then, the returns are adjusted for 
the annually compounded monthly returns of the equally weighted CRSP index. Table 3.8 shows the 
investment performance for 2012. I apply the same investment strategy to actual and predicted targets 
and non-targets. Performance comparisons between portfolios with actual and predicted status provide 
a useful evaluation of the investment strategy. 
The performance difference on the actual targets and non-targets portfolios is an excellent example of 
the superior stock performance of targets. By the end of 2012, actual targets portfolio earned an 
impressive return of 43.07%, while the non-targets lost 3.57%. The predicted targets portfolio 
performed better than the predicted non- targets portfolio as well, though at a lessened degree 
compared to the actual targets and non-targets. Investment in the predicted targets portfolio yielded a 
return of 4.62%, while the non-targets portfolio lost 3.10%.  
I further test the effect of actual targets on both predicted portfolios’ performances. In untabulated 
analysis, I exclude the actual targets from predicted targets and non-targets portfolios. The 
performance for the target portfolio drops to 1.84% and for the non-targets to -3.68%. The 
interpretation of these results is very important for the model’s evaluation. The predicted targets 
outperform predicted non-targets even when the actual targets are excluded. This is an indication that 
                                                          
35 The study by Cremers et al. (2008) is not reported in Table 3.7 and is not taken into consideration regarding performance 
comparison, as it focuses on creating profitable long-short strategies and it does not focus on the model’s classification 
accuracy. 
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the model manages to choose firms which outperform the market, regardless of their realised 
acquisition status. A conjecture on this outcome could be the identification of firms which were 
prospective targets but did not receive a bid, at least within the investment horizon.  
The investment performance of the model has been along the lines of Brar et al. (2009) and Cremers 
et al. (2008), who manage to outperform the market by investing in predicted targets. Brar et al. 
(2009) achieve a portfolio performance of 8.5% after adjusting for market returns. Cremers et al. 
(2008) deploy a long-short strategy, which dictates buying and selling firms with high and low 
targetiveness, respectively. They achieve a return of 21.67% after adjusting for Carhart’s (1997) four 
factors. The current study’s investment outcome seems to be lower than the respective rates in the 
aforementioned studies, but it is one of the few models to accomplish positive returns in the ATP 
literature, as it has been reiterated that ATP cannot lead to profitable strategies by investing into 
prospective targets (see e.g. Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 2000). 
[Insert Table 3.8] 
The general evaluation of the model suggests relatively satisfactory performance in both predictive 
accuracy and profitability of investment strategies. Target concentration in the “Predicted targets 
Portfolio” and other accuracy metrics yield above average performance. Furthermore, this study offers 
rare evidence on the ability to formulate profitable investment strategies by investing in potential 
targets. However, the results could be the outcome of period-specific conditions. Consistent, time-
resilient model performance is a crucial aspect of the strategy’s applicability in real-market 
conditions. In order to assess the model’s intertemporality, the model is subjected to rolling estimation 
and performance testing. 
3.5.2. Multi-period Analysis 
The robustness tests presented in the literature are limited to the distributional characteristics of 
variables (see e.g. Cudd and Duggal, 2000), the benchmark portfolios (Brar et al., 2009), and the 
performance of the investment strategies (Cremers et al., 2009). The current study focuses on model 
stability. The performance variation of the model through time may hold information on the examined 
acquisition criteria, along with the transparency of the acquisition targeting process.  
In order to test the model’s intertemporality, i.e. how consistently the model performs over time, the 
model analysis displayed in the previous section is performed for 18 partially overlapping time 
periods. Each iteration involves estimation of the model out of a 5-year period, and forecasting on 
data of the succeeding year. The earliest analysis starts from the period 1990-1995, drawing data for 
the estimation sample from the years 1990-1994 and performing forecasting on year 1995. The second 
analysis is performed for the years 1991-1996 and the period progression leads up to the period 
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examined in the previous section, 2007-2012. Each period is analysed independently from the others, 
thus the sampling process is independent among the 18 iterations.  
Rolling estimation with one-year step assists the identification of patterns regarding the important 
factors of targetiveness. In addition, the successive annual forecasting of potential targets enables the 
formulation of long-term investing strategies. The 18 regressions are displayed in Table 3.9. The 
progression of estimates and their statistical significance through time offer insights on the spurious 
inferences drawn by single-period analysis, particularly due to the varying importance of acquisition 
criteria and inconsistencies in model performance. 
[Insert Table 3.9] 
The model used in the single-period analysis drew data from the period 2007-2011, and it showed that 
most control variable estimates are statistically insignificant. The multi-period analysis yields 
contradicting results. The variables Market Capitalisation, ROA, Market-to-Book, Liquidity, and 
Leverage show occasional statistical significance, while the variables BHAR, Sales Growth, Price-to-
Earnings do not show significance in any of the iterations. This is indicative of the potentially 
opportunistic significance of targetiveness factors which are standard in the literature. 
Novel predictors also find support in the multi-period model estimation. The Past Withdrawn Bid 
estimate is positive and significant in 11 out of 18 models. This provides evidence on the persistence 
of attractiveness on firm targetiveness. Especially in the first half of the examined period, companies 
have higher probability to receive a bid in the present if they have unsuccessfully been targeted in the 
recent past. Other variables seem to be significant within specific sub-periods. An apparent example is 
HHI Change. The variable bears both the expected negative sign and statistical significance for two 
periods in the first half of the sample and for several models in the aggregate period 2001-2009. The 
negative sign satisfies the expectations of the “Industry Concentration Hypothesis”, since decreases in 
the concentration of market power in the industry result in higher individual firm targetiveness, as 
prospective acquirers expect lower probability of regulatory intervention. 
A less accentuated example of a non-intertemporal factor is the Serial Acquirer dummy, which is 
positive and significant in four models, one in the first half of the sample and the last three models. 
The findings regarding the presence of serial acquirers are in accordance with the earlier inference 
drawn during the preliminary analysis of the univariate testing: the presence of serial acquirers in the 
market is so prevalent among industries that it usually does not contribute in predicting whether 
individual firm targetiveness is increased. Furthermore, considering the poor performance of Activity 
Concentration Change and Activity Value Change, there is at best thin support for the “Market 
Activity Hypothesis”. All three variables rarely display significance, indicating that market conditions 
with respect to deal frequency or activity only occasionally increase individual firm targetiveness. A 
plausible explanation for the result could be that the market factors that actually count for a 
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company’s targetiveness during market shocks are company or industry-specific over and above the 
mere number or value of deals performed in the recent past. 
Similar lack of support is observed in the results of Capital Liquidity Change. The variable does not 
display significant results in any of the models, suggesting that changes in the relative level of cash in 
an industry is not enough to increase individual firm targetiveness. The “Cash Reserves Hypothesis” 
has been inspired by anecdotal evidence insinuating that high levels of cash in an industry could be 
the fuel behind acquisitions. Although this theory has found support in the literature (Harford, 1999, 
2005), it does not find the expected support in the current ATP study. As for the Industry Synergy 
Change, the result is opposite to the initial expectations. The “Hot Market Hypothesis” theorised that 
increasing synergies in the company’s industry will have spill-over effects on individual firm 
targetiveness. However, the effect is usually insignificant, and the few cases displaying significance 
bear the opposite sign. This suggests that the increases in synergistic gains in the year before the 
observation result in lower probability that the individual company will receive a bid. A plausible 
interpretation to this counter-intuitive result might be in the opposite direction of what has been 
suggested. Specifically, acquiring CEOs may be rational enough to understand that the increases in 
synergistic gains during earlier years have positive spill-over effects on potential targets and have 
raised the respective valuations enough to render possible acquisitions unprofitable. The literature has 
documented the first-mover advantage in acquisitions (see e.g. Carow et al., 2004), and acquiring 
CEOs may be aware of the potential misfortune of acquiring late in a wave, although momentum in 
the market for corporate control expects good recent performance to manifest in more deals soon 
thereafter (Rosen, 2006). The theory on first-mover advantage and CEO awareness may explain why 
the negative and significant coefficients for the Industry Synergies Change variable are concentrated 
in models with data on the period 2001-2008, which include the end of the fifth and the whole sixth 
merger waves, the latter of which has occurred soon after the devastating crash in 2001 (see e.g. 
Alexandridis et al., 2012). 
Overall, most variables do not display consistent significance over time. The reported seasonality in 
statistical significance poses a compelling argument for the dynamically changing managerial focus 
on acquisition criteria. Although it is counter-intuitive to observe, for example, target liquidity has not 
been an acquisition criterion except for the period 1999-2007. In essence, the concentration of 
statistical significance within a specific sub-period supports an argument on the seasonality in criteria 
prioritization. A probable explanation could state that even if these factors are part of the bidding 
decision process for most of the time, the changes in criteria prioritization allow them to be visibly 
important only when they are among the top concerns of acquirer management.  
The multi-period model estimation reveals the inaccuracy of several inferences drawn from the 
original analysis. Apart from the misleading insignificance of several control and novel factors, the 
opposite outcome is observed as well. Several variables yield significant results for 2007-2011, only 
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to rarely show statistical significance in the majority of iterations. For instance, ROA and Activity 
Concentration Change are mostly insignificant among the 18 iterations, suggesting low prioritization 
of valuation and solvency factors by acquirer management. If the analysis had stopped at the single-
period analysis, then the overall inferences about the model would be misrepresentative of reality. 
According to the current study, there is no factor that holds intertemporal significance in defining firm 
targetiveness. 
The model employed includes a long, but non-exhaustive number of predictors, and the variation in 
the statistical significance of the predictors included attests to the model’s time sensitivity. This could 
also be inferred by the fluctuation of the Pseudo R-square among iterations. R-square starts at 0.023 
for the first iteration, then it goes below 0.020 in the second half on 1990’s, it remains similarly low 
for several years and it starts increasing in the last few iterations. The pattern suggests that the model 
fitness is volatile over the sample period. Further analysis could reveal factors that were more “wave 
specific”, in regards to the 5th (1994-2001) and 6th (2003-2007) U.S. merger waves (see e.g. 
Alexandridis et al., 2012), and mitigate the volatility in the fitness of the model. 
The varying and questionable appropriateness of the model emphasizes the opaqueness in the 
acquisition decision process. The managerial criteria leading to pursuing deals have yet to be captured 
by the ATP literature, including the current study. This can be verified by the statistical insignificance 
of even the most intuitive predictors, e.g. leverage and liquidity, and the level of misspecification in 
classifications of targets. A conjecture explaining this ineffectiveness regards the idiosyncrasy of 
acquisition criteria, since the decision process may be unique to particular pairs of acquirers and 
targets, and cannot be comprehensively captured by a generic model. The level of information needed 
in order to extract dependable predictions may require operational and strategic details that cannot be 
found in financial statements and, potentially, cannot be acquired by external observers, such as 
customer networks, supply chains, minority-shareholder behaviour etc. 
3.5.3. Predictive Capacity and Stock-Market Performance 
The rolling estimation of the model reveals the unstable performance of acquisition predictors. 
However, as stated previously, the assessment of the model should be based on two criteria, i.e. the 
actual predictive capacity and the success of the suggested investment decisions. The evaluation based 
on those criteria is performed in the same fashion with the single-period analysis.  
In untabulated results, I estimate the cut-off probability for each model in Table 3.9. The classification 
criterion remains the same, i.e. the designated cut-off probability should maximise the actual target 
concentration in the “Predicted Targets Portfolio”. The next step is to apply each model’s estimates 
and cut-off probability on the data of the year after the estimation period in order to classify the firms 
as prospective targets and non-targets. For instance, the 1990-1994 model estimates will be deployed 
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in order to calculate the acquisition probabilities of all firms in 1995. Then, the cut-off probability 
calculated from the 1990-1994 data pool will separate prospective targets and non-targets in 1995 
according to the chosen probability. Then, two different portfolios are created, including the predicted 
targets and non-targets respectively. Each portfolio is formed at the beginning of the forecasting year. 
At the end of each month, the holdings of firms which received a bid are liquidated and the 
proceedings are reinvested equally to the remaining securities in the portfolio. Finally, at the end of 
the year under examination, all portfolio holdings are liquidated. This process is employed 
independently for all examined sub-periods. 
Table 3.10 exhibits the model performance in forecasting accuracy and investment returns. In Panel 
A, four portfolios capture the performance of actual and predicted targets and non-targets. The 
“Predicted Targets Portfolio” outperforms “Predicted Non-Targets” portfolio in all 18 years, but it 
also surpasses the performance of “Actual Targets Portfolio” in 9 years. This superior performance 
poses a strong argument for the prospects of investing in predicted targets. The suggestion holds even 
after inspecting the volatility in the respective portfolios’ performance. The single-period analysis 
offered positive returns of 4.6 for the “Predicted Targets Portfolio”, which is immaterial when 
compared to the respective portfolio’s performance in most previous periods. The arithmetic average 
return for the 18 year period is of 26.88%, higher than the average performance of actual targets at 
22.97%. This difference is affected by the extreme returns of predicted targets in 2009 (132.2%) and 
an exclusion of the outlier year offers an, again, impressive average of 20.68%. Actual and predicted 
non-target portfolios display indistinguishable performance, with average returns of -1.27 and -1.72 
respectively. 
[Insert Table 3.10] 
On the sole aspect of investment performance, the model manages to provide significant returns for 
most periods, despite the high volatile performance. “Predicted Targets portfolios” outperform 
“Predicted Non-Targets portfolios” and yield returns almost on par with “Actual Targets”. In terms of 
investment performance, the model proves to be successful. 
The second aspect of model evaluation regards the prediction accuracy. Panel B of Table 3.10 
presents statistics about the actual and predicted figures for each year. The model seems to be 
consistently predicting a minor number of targets correctly, and the size of the “Predicted Targets 
Portfolio” fluctuates significantly, reaching low three-digit number of predicted targets. This volatility 
passes onto the target Concentration Ratio (Correct over Predicted targets). Nevertheless, the model 
remains second best after Brar et al.’s (2009) on target concentration for the majority of periods.36 
Thus, the classification capacity evaluation of the model suggests better performance than most 
studies, despite the inconsistent sizes of suggested portfolios. 
                                                          
36 According to Table 3.7, the third best performance is attributed to Powel (2004), who achieves a concentration ratio of 
4.8%. 
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Overall, the model performs comparably well in terms of investment returns and classification for the 
majority of iterations. A surprising outcome is the highly superior investment performance of the 
“Predicted Targets Portfolio” in past periods, despite the inconsequential differences in prediction 
accuracy. The occasional superiority over the “Actual targets Portfolio” adds to the astonishment on 
the model’s performance. A plausible interpretation is that the model consistently manages to identify 
firms worthy of a bid, though unknown conditions do not allow for bids to manifest. These firms may 
have received a run-up in their share price discounting the imminent bid, and the market has not 
readjusted its expectation during the year under examination. This scenario needs further investigation 
which is beyond the scope of this study. 
However, in absolute terms the model does not seem to perform objectively well regarding its 
predictive capacity and accuracy. The “Predicted Targets Portfolios” vary significantly in size among 
the years, occasionally amounting up to 168 firms. Secondly, Sensitivity and the concentration of 
actual targets are, in several cases, significantly lower than 2012. This variation could characterize the 
model as unreliable for the purpose of corporate managers, who want to understand the characteristics 
of a prospective target. However, the same model can provide lucrative investment-decision tools to 
fund managers. The discovery of the reasons the models performs well in investment strategies could 
contribute to its improvement in classifications. This is a task to be undertaken by subsequent studies. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
Acquisition target Prediction (ATP) studies attempt to predict targets in order to inform unaware 
management and help fund managers create profitably investment strategies. Most of the studies have 
focused on company-specific characteristics, and have offered innovation in the cut-off probability 
rules on logit models, as well as new sampling techniques. This study, based on previous works on 
ATP (see e.g. Palepu, 1986; Brar et al., 2009), investigates the effect of market wide characteristics on 
individual firm targetiveness. The change in merger activity, the presence of a serial acquirer, market 
momentum in synergistic gains, industry fragmentation, and company-specific history as a target are 
expected to increase the probability of a firm receiving a bid. This is the first ATP study to conduct 
multi-period analysis, performing model estimation, forecasting, and investment portfolio comparison 
for 18 partially overlapping periods. The model performance is better than the literature average both 
in target classification and investment performance, which has occasionally been higher than the 
performance of actual targets. Nevertheless, the initial expectations on the novel predictors were not 
satisfied, as only few of them yield occasionally significant results.  
The multi-period analysis offers important insights on the dynamically changing nature of firm 
targetiveness, and it raises questions on the inferences drawn in previous studies. Most individual 
models do not display the same set of statistically significant factors with the rest in the analysis, 
suggesting that focusing on a single period or aggregating data over a long period of time can bias our 
understanding. Similar discrepancies are observed in the investment performance. Although the 
forecasted portfolio of targets achieves higher results than the non-target portfolio, the magnitude of 
the performance and the size of the portfolio vary significantly per period. This is an indication of low 
model stability, which can be the focus and motivation of future studies. 
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4. CEO Deal Experience: Too Much of Anything Will Kill 
You 
4.1. Introduction 
The contribution of CEOs to corporate success has been highlighted and reiterated in a voluminous 
number of academic studies. The job description for the top executive is riddled with complex tasks, 
and operation under stifling uncertainty (Kotter, 1982). This level of uncertainty requires versatility, 
rapid cognition, and the capacity to thrive under multiple, ever-changing economic environments 
(Kesner and Sebora, 1994). The importance of these skills for the majority of CEO positions has been 
indicative to position similarities across industries and eras (Mintzberg, 1973). In other words, an 
executive who utilises these skills in an uncertain environment is more likely to be successful in 
managing organisations in different industries and eras. 
The Board of Directors (henceforth BoD) has been entrusted with the power to choose, monitor, and, 
when appropriate, replace the CEO. These tasks are critical to the performance of the company, as an 
incompetent leader may considerably hurt firm performance and, consequently, investor wealth (see 
e.g. Bertrand and Schoar, 2002; Crossland and Hambrick, 2007). Therefore, directors should be 
diligent with their fiduciary duty; in order to perform it adequately, they should be aware of the skills 
and attributes required of the top executive in their firm. 
Academic literature has been elaborate with the essential skills for the CEO position. Katz (1974) 
categorises the necessary skills into human, technical, and conceptual. He underscores the 
significance of conceptual skills, as the CEO has to devise, communicate, and apply the strategy 
across the organisation. Most of these skills need time to be cultivated, and they are better refined 
during the executive’s tenure as CEO. This concept has stimulated research on CEO succession with 
respect to, among other factors, CEO experience on the job. The general research strand of finance 
and management studying the effects of experience has been labelled as “learning” literature (see e.g. 
Aktas et al., 2009). Up to the time of writing this thesis, published studies have not reached consensus 
regarding the effect of learning on firm performance (see e.g. Bragaw and Misangyi, 2013; Barkema 
and Schijven, 2008). 
The inconclusive evidence relating experience and general company performance casts a shadow on 
the arguments suggesting CEO capabilities are essential across industries and time periods (see e.g. 
Mintzberg, 1973). However, the discrepancy between expectations and outcome could be attributed to 
the nature of experience studied: general experience on CEO positions may not be the defining 
component leading to superior company performance. It may be more appropriate to investigate 
experience in more focused areas of corporate leadership, such as acquisitions, and subsequently 
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consider the benefit of such experience in the appropriate context. Practising on acquisitions may 
refine the managerial skills needed to achieve superior deal performance, especially due to the 
experience gained as leaders for a variety of acquirers. If this is the case, then the transferable nature 
of such skills would render experienced individuals more potent executives, and therefore more 
attractive candidates to hiring directors (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Giambatista et al., 2005).  
Mergers and acquisitions allow for the examination of context-specific experience and its effect on 
company performance. M&As are distinct events in the life of a company, usually the most sizeable 
investment undertaken by acquiring firms (see e.g. Jaffe et al., 2013), and they can be attributed to 
CEOs as “badges” of experience. The academic literature has studied the effect of organisational deal 
experience on future deal performance, but researchers have yet to reach consensus on the effect’s 
direction and magnitude (see e.g. Billet and Qian, 2008; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989). 
Previous studies in the learning literature in M&As have considered different reference points when 
measuring experience. Most studies have considered organisational experience (Hayward, 2002; 
Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Kroll et al., 1997; Wright et al., 2002) 
while there are few studies also considering CEO experience (Billet and Qian, 2008; Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999). However, in the latter case, researchers study the deals performed by the CEO in 
the current firm, which results in a confounding measure of experience; the deals performed during 
the CEO’s tenure in the current firm may also be affected by the organisational heritage in 
acquisitions. Fee and Hadlock (2013) argue for the existence of company-specific strategies, which 
persist after CEO turnovers. Although there may be a selection bias of the CEOs hired by BoDs, the 
only safe method to measure the effect of CEO-specific experience is to isolate and remove the 
components of organisational experience. 
In order to define an appropriate measure of CEO-specific deal experience, I focus on the experience 
accumulated by the executive up to the time of the CEO appointment. This configuration of 
experience differentiates the executive-specific experience from the organisational experience. The 
disentanglement of personal and institutional experience provides an insight on the value of personal 
experience in acquisitions during similar events. Without the distinction of experience between 
personal and institutional, the inferences on the effects of experiences would be spurious: 
confounding measurements of experience will not be able to provide generalizable implications and 
insights.37 
I consider the CEO successions as the cut-off points for measuring CEO deal experience. I investigate 
managerial turnovers for S&P 1500 companies over the period 1992-2012, and I manually collect 
information on the exectuves’ prior CEO positions from publicly available online sources. I include 
                                                          
37 Several studies have presented evidence in favour of the importance of other CEO characteristics and talent-
related features on company performance (see e.g. Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Shrader et al., 1997). 
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the deals performed within a decade before the appointment date to construct two categories of 
experience measures: general experience, i.e. the overall number of deals performed over the decade 
before the appointment, and related experience, i.e. the number of deals performed over the same 
period while having shared attributes (industry, public status, nation, value) with the deal performed 
in the new firm.  
My hypotheses follow the literature acknowledging a positive relationship between deal experience 
and company performance (see e.g. Fowler and Schmidt, 1989). The main argument follows that 
experience in acquisitions, in general or related contexts, would equip the executive with the 
knowledge and intuition to avoid harmful decisions and pick the most beneficial strategies. The 
analysis produces insignificant results for the short period surrounding the announcement; cumulative 
abnormal returns around the announcement are not affected by the CEO’s deal experience. However, 
acquirer shareholders seem to benefit by such experience in the long run; 1-year buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns are influenced by CEO deal experience over and above standard control factors. 
A major difference between this and the previous studies is the form of the relationship between 
experience and performance. Contrary to my initial hypothesis and the final results, intermediate 
analysis suggests that the level of experience results in negative long-run returns, similar to prominent 
studies in the literature (Billet and Qian, 2008; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). Additional tests 
reveal a non-linear, non-monotonic pattern. Specifically, CEO deal experience and BHAR display an 
inverse U-shaped relationship. General or related deal experience can be valuable to acquirer 
shareholders when the CEO is modestly experienced, while high magnitude orders of experience yield 
exponentially adverse returns. This relationship is similar to the one presented by Hayward (2002), 
who attributed the effect on the missed investment opportunities resulting by excessive focus on a 
single target industry for a prolonged time period. 
Other academic studies have attributed the negative relationship to inappropriate generalisation of 
acquisition lessons (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999), and hubristic behaviour (Billet and Qian, 2008). 
The inverse U-shaped relationship persists after accounting for conventional measures of CEO 
overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). However, hubristic behaviour prevails as the best 
explanation of the observed pattern: CEOs with modest deal experience have yet to succumb to 
arrogant tendencies, while their more experienced peers tend to do worse deals. 
Since the analysis has accounted for the effect of CEO hubristic behaviour as suggested by 
Malmendier and Tate (2008), the resulting haphazard executive behaviour could be attributed to a 
different type of overconfidence. Malmendier and Tate (2008) identified whether CEOs believe they 
can do even better than their coutnerparts. However, another shade of overconfidence may regard the 
CEO’s belief that her current knowledge and intuition is enough to compensate for lack of effort. In 
the latter case, overconfident behaviour is similar to the inappropriate generalisation suggested by 
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Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), but without the eventual learning benefits. Haleblian and 
Finkelstein observed that positive deal performance leads to increasingly adverse returns on 
subsequent acquisitions, which is due to the inappropriate generalisation and application of prior 
experience. However, accumulation of experience has an inflection point, after which performance 
improves, although it remains negative. In the current study, the results could be explained by 
inappropriate generalisation in the long-run; the confidence of CEOs in using their existing 
knowledge manages to overcome the learning benefits of deal-making. Both Billet and Qian’s (2008) 
and Haleblian and Finkelstein’s (1999) adjusted framework explain my results, and both their 
arguments are closely related to overconfidence. 
This study provides three contributions to the academic and practitioner communities. First, I add to 
the literature on CEO experience and its impact on company performance. The importance of 
experience, be it organisational or executive-based, has stimulated studies for a prolonged time period 
(see e.g. Bragaw and Misangyi, 2013; Kusewitt, 1985; Graffin et al. 2011). To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the contribution of CEO-specific deal experience on 
company performance. Second, this study contributes to the value creation during M&As strand. CEO 
deal experience can be valuable to acquirer shareholders, as long as CEOs do not get too comfortable 
with the type of deals they perform. This is the basis for my third contribution, which bears policy 
implications: directors should be aware of the experience level of the CEO at the time of hiring, and 
adjust their monitoring and incentivising mechanisms so that deal familiarity will not yield negative 
results for shareholders.38 
In the following sections I provide the theoretical framework of this study, elaborating on the 
appropriateness of M&A events for the research framework used, the importance of the CEO as the 
leader of the firm, as well as the general and specific skills she needs to lead her firm in success. In 
parallel, I provide a review on existing literature, as well as the limitation of the current studies. I 
proceed with the formation of hypotheses, data specifications, and the main body of the analysis. I 
proceed with the implications and limitations of the current study, and I conclude this chapter with a 
summary of the research outcomes. 
                                                          
38 In untabulated results, I find that the level of general and related deal experience does not affect the salary, 
bonus, equity-based, and total compensation of the CEO in the year of appointment after controlling for 
executive and company factors. 
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4.2. Literature Review 
4.2.1. Theoretical Framework 
In this section, I provide s short literature review and insights on the importance of acquisitions, 
managers, and deal experience in the context of measuring the effects of CEO event-specific 
experience on company performance. 
4.2.1.1. Importance of Mergers and Acquisitions 
Mergers and Acquisitions often represent the most significant company investment. This can mainly 
be attributed to the staggering consideration paid by acquirer to target shareholders. Jaffe et al. (2013) 
report an average deal size and relative size ratio of $339.5 mil and 23.31% respectively for the period 
1992-2007. In other words, about one fifth of the combined entity’s value comprises of assets 
assimilated through the acquisition. If the deal Return-on-Investment (ROI) does not meet the 
acquirer long-term ROI, then the new firm has committed a sizeable portion of its value to a value-
destroying venture.  
Acquisitions are also important due their capacity to facilitate strategic shifts, as it has been the case 
with the $2.85 bil acquisition of Firth Rixson by Alcoa in 2014 (Financial Times, 2014). Alcoa, an 
aluminium producer, undertook the acquisition as an opportunity to expand its product portfolio to 
automotive and aerospace parts. Refocusing is not exclusive to the acquirer business strategy, as 
acquisitions are also performed with the aim of disciplining and reinventing over-diversified target 
firms (Chatterjee et al., 2003). 
The magnitude and strategic implications of acquisitions impose sizeable effects on shareholder 
wealth; the most cited stylised fact about acquisitions so far is that acquirers either lose or do not gain 
during deals (see e.g. Firth, 1980; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Fuller et al., 2002; Alexandridis et al., 
2012). The extreme cases of deals yielding losses of billions of dollars in acquirer market 
capitalisation are not as rare as acquisitive managers would hope, rendering acquisitions risky and 
investors wary.39 Managers pursuing acquisitions are exposed to uncertainty even when they follow 
the established etiquette in pursuing deals. For instance, targeting private firms or paying with cash 
consideration have repeatedly displayed superior performance against similar deals with public targets 
or stock consideration (see e.g. Travlos, 1987; Fuller et al., 2002). Nevertheless, following 
conventional wisdom does not guarantee full protection from significant losses (see e.g. Moeller et al., 
2005). Acquiring managers have to make decisions for a series of issues far beyond target public 
status and consideration type. They have to reach a working plan tailored to the deal at hand and the 
                                                          
39 Moeller et al. (2005) estimated the percentage of deals losing more than $ 1 bill. for the acquirer at 2.1% for 
the period 1998 – 2001. 
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concurrent business environment. It would be an unsurprising outcome if managers with exposure to 
multiple deals perform better acquisitions than their less experienced peers, since they have had the 
opportunity to learn the inner workings of deal-making first-hand, as well as by trial and error. 
However, prior literature has not been conclusive on this topic, as deal experience has been shown to 
offer positive (Fowler and Schmidt, 1989), negative (Billet and Qian, 2008), U-shaped (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999), inverse U-shaped (Hayward, 2002), and even immaterial gains (Kroll et al., 1997) 
to acquirer shareholders. The lack of consensus indicates the need for further investigation under 
alternative research frameworks. 
4.2.1.2. Management – General Skills 
This section provides a general review on managers and CEOs in order to highlight the importance of 
management to company success and, therefore, investor performance. 
Notwithstanding the impact of acquisitions to corporate financial health, successful administration of 
the firm relies on a multitude of decisions. The CEO, as the top administrator of her organisation, 
should be, or promptly become, a master of several skills in order to be a competent leader. Katz 
(1974) has categorised managerial skills into human, technical, and conceptual. Human skills allow 
the individual to proficiently understand and cooperate with people. Technical skills define the 
capacity to identify, utilise, and create processes and techniques towards the completion of a task. 
Conceptual skills relate to the strategic aspects of the firm; they reflect the aptitude in identifying the 
interaction and dynamic co-evolution of groups and processes through time, and along different 
contexts. Aptitude in conceptual skills is an indispensable asset for a CEO, as she is responsible for 
steering the firm through a sea of countless alternative routes, of which only a fraction has the 
potential to lead to success. Katz (1974) argues that an effective manager should be adept in 
conceptual skills, even if it means she has to partially rely on her immediate subordinates for human 
and technical skills. Although this proposition seems exaggerated, it succeeds in highlighting the 
unique responsibility of the CEO to continuously generate, disseminate, and materialise the 
company’s vision. 
The responsibility and job complexity faced by CEOs justify their aversion to unnecessary haste in 
understanding the firm’s processes, especially during their first time on the job. This aversion can be 
identified in the executives’ preference for learning by trial and error, which results in the 
contemporaneous adjustment of both their management style and the corporate layout (see e.g. 
Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Miller and Shamsie, 2001). This experimentation stage coincides with 
the radical reforms performed by the CEO in the first 6 to 18 months of her tenure (see e.g. Kotter, 
1982; Gabarro, 1987). On average, these reforms are fully incorporated by the company over a period 
of 3 to 5 years. During this time span, the new management style has been fully assimilated by the 
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employees (Kao, 1985). The decisions made during the adjustment phase will affect the firm for years 
after the CEO turnover. In academic literature, the CEO’s adjustment to her environment’s feedback 
has been connected to “learning.” 
CEO learning has been discussed in a diverse set of frameworks. For instance, Lant and Mezias (1992) 
find evidence on the environmental effect regarding transforming learning into action. Specifically, 
they find that CEOs managing firms in a more stable market environment are more likely to reorient 
the firm strategically after periods of poor performance. On the opposite side, companies operating in 
more volatile business conditions tend to retain their strategic path regardless of performance. Along 
the same lines, Henderson et al. (2006) identify that the learning capabilities of managers help them 
improve their performance in less turbulent industries. In slow-changing environments, CEOs are 
inclined to invest into learning, as the lessons learned in one period will most probably be relevant in 
the future. However, in fast-moving industries, any experience gained will most probably be 
irrelevant to future events, so CEOs are less motivated to engage in learning, and more prone to attend 
to arising problems reactively. The corollary of this behaviour is knowledge stagnation across top 
management teams, and, consequently, higher rates of top-executive replacement with more 
appropriate successors (Henderson et al., 2006). 
4.2.1.3. Management – Deal experience  
The review thus far has provided evidence on the significance of acquisitions, the complicated 
requirements for the CEO position, and the impact of learning on general corporate performance. 
Academic researchers have combined their collective curiosity on these three issues, as they 
embarked on investigating whether corporate acquisitions could be associated with the concept of 
learning. The nature of acquisitions as distinct, meaningful, and repetitive events has equipped 
management and finance researchers with appropriate testing grounds for understanding whether the 
documented learning elements apply in investments of such importance. Specifically, researchers 
have attempted to answer whether there is an efficient feedback mechanism between investor 
reaction, deal performance, and management decisions.40 
A substantial share of the learning literature has studied the effect of CEO and company strategic 
decisions on deal-making. For instance, there have been numerous studies indicating the influence of 
deal experience among companies in different countries, cultures, and industries. Shimizu and Hitt 
(2005) exhibit the different effects of divestiture experience on future divestiture decisions between 
the computer and pharmaceutical industries. Gaur and Lu (2007) display a negative relationship 
                                                          
40 For a summary of acquisition learning literature see Barkema and Schijven (2008).  
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between deal experience in foreign countries and the probability of company survival (see also 
Barkema et al., 1996). 
A more populated literature strand in acquisition learning is concerned with value creation. For 
instance, Fowler and Schmidt (1989) found a positive relationship between the number of deals 
performed during the 4 years prior to a deal and the acquirer announcement returns. Their results 
imply the existence of positive learning curves, as additional institutional deal experience resulted in 
further improvement of future acquisition performance. A restricted number of studies (Kroll et al., 
1997; Wright et al., 2002) have investigated the performance of acquisition experience on 
performance in the context CEO rewards and deal performance; their findings suggest the relationship 
between deal experience and performance is insignificant. 
The inferences on positive or non-existing relationships stand straightforward; companies may learn 
from their past mistakes and improve in future acquisitions, or they may learn nothing and repeat the 
same mistakes. The circumstances pertaining to acquisitions may be so dissimilar among deals, that 
there cannot be an effective learning process to prepare the company for future deals. However, there 
are a few studies reporting more intricate relationships. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) detect a U-
shaped relationship between deal experience and performance. Specifically, they find a negative 
relationship between the number of deals performed in the past and subsequent acquisitions of targets 
in unrelated industries. The authors attribute the adverse relationship to inappropriate generalisation of 
past deal experience after an instance of successful deal performance. More interestingly, the 
incremental effect of each additional deal in the company’s deal experience yields negative effects of 
smaller magnitude. The result is a U-shaped relationship between performance and past deal 
experience, which indicates that inappropriate generalisation subsides as experience increases.  
The study by Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) drew academic attention to the heterogeneity of deals 
and the multifaceted aspects of acquisition experience. Hayward (2002) elaborates further on the 
concept, highlighting the need for both specialised and general deal experience. In detail, he attests to 
the short-run benefits of related deal experience; recent, related experience leads to superior 
announcement returns for the acquirer, as the accumulated know-how and related assets can increase 
the overall scope and influence of the acquirer. However, the market environment changes over time, 
and, eventually, growth opportunities will become scarce in the acquirer industry and affluent in other 
industries. Firms without exposure to industries beyond their core business area will be less potent in 
identifying valuable opportunities in peripheral or unrelated industries (Hayward, 2002). As a result, 
companies with more diverse deal exposure will identify and exploit growth opportunities in the 
economy faster than their narrowly focused competitors. Therefore, while related deal experience 
improves deal performance in the short-run, acquirers should also perform diverse acquisitions in 
order to stay alert for emerging growth opportunities in unrelated industries. The positive short-run 
effect of related experience, and the subsequent negative effect on the company’s ability to identify 
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profitable opportunities in unrelated industries leads to an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
industry-specific experience and acquisition performance. This result is contrary to the one in 
Haleblian and Finkelstein’s (1999) study, who have predicted the opposite; a U-shaped relationship. 
However, Hayward attributes this inference to related experience with respect to target industry and 
not general deal experience. 
Billet and Qian (2008) study the performance of serial acquirers and report declining returns for 
successive deals. In their study, companies are willing to consummate value-destroying deals if earlier 
deals yielded positive announcement CARs. At the same time, the corresponding CEO purchases 
relatively more stock of her own company prior to high order deals. Billet and Qian interpret this 
behaviour as hubristic: CEOs seek for higher ownership in their firm before an acquisition, as they are 
confident in their capacity to augment the combined entity’s value. The fact that the market does not 
agree with that view, as the adverse announcement returns suggest, is a signal of their overconfidence 
(see Roll, 1986). 
In a related context, Aktas et al. (2009) reach an alternative theoretical conclusion on the relationship 
between managerial learning and hubris. They justify the adverse effect of acquisition experience as 
CEO risk aversion, arguing that even rational, serial-acquiring CEOs will increase their bidding 
aggressiveness for every consecutive deal. Their intention is to prevent competing bids, since 
prospective acquirers are more likely to be discouraged by high initial bids. Similar aggressive 
behaviour should be observed for overconfident CEOs, who believe in their own ability to extract 
unrealistically high rents from target firms. Thus, while hubristic CEOs display similar behaviour and 
returns with the rational CEOs, the motivation behind their initial high bids is different. 
Aktas et al. (2011) find modest support for their previous theoretical predictions. Investigating 
acquisitions for the period 1992-2007, they illustrate that CEO bidding takes into consideration prior 
investor reactions to deals; this is consistent with the notion of CEO learning from bidding 
experience. In other words, both hubristic and rational CEOs seem able to learn from past acquisition 
experience, and therefore moderate any hubristic behaviour, and improve announcement returns. In a 
later study, Aktas et al. (2013) shed more light on learning in the post-acquisition process of 
integration. For an unrestricted sample of US serial acquirers, they document a shrinking time gap 
between deals during the period 1992-2009. They argue CEOs become more experienced in 
integrating acquired companies, thus the process of integration becomes shorter after each deal, and 
acquirers proceed to the next acquisition sooner than before. This finding endorses earlier suggestions 
about the need of CEOs to learn by “hands-on” practice (see e.g. Katz, 1974; Gabarro, 1985). 
Despite the recent trend to focus on hubristic behaviour, academic literature offers inconclusive 
results regarding the connection between acquisition learning and performance. Few studies document 
an insignificant relationship between deal experience and performance (Wright et al., 2002; Kroll et 
Chapter 4 CEO Deal Experience 
87 
 
al., 1997), several find a positive connection (e.g. Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Barkema et al., 1996), 
some find a negative effect (see e.g. Billet and Qian, 2008; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999), and few 
studies find non-monotonic relationships (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002). The 
inconclusiveness in the literature applies to both general and specialised learning. For instance, 
researchers have yet to reach consensus on whether international deal experience is beneficial for the 
firm. While Markides and Ittner (1994) identify a positive relationship between international 
experience and short-term stock returns, Barkema et al. (1996) find a non-significant connection 
between international deal experience and the probability of company survival after the deal.  
Apart from the impact of deal experience, academic studies have looked into the impact of 
management-specific knowledge on deal-making overall. Nadolska and Barkema (2014) probe into 
the impact of diversity in the managerial team on deal activity. They discover lower frequency but 
higher performance in the deal-making of Dutch companies with higher managerial diversity in tenure 
and educational background. Their results are firmly supported by the literature (see e.g. Barkema and 
Shvyrkov, 2007; Cannella et al., 2008). 
The academic research body has shown commitment to discovering the connection between learning 
and corporate performance. However, existing studies do not offer conclusive or unifying results, 
indicating the incompleteness of the framework regarding organisational and managerial learning. In 
itself, this provides strong motivation to investigate the relationship further. 
4.2.2. Limitations of Existing Literature 
The overwhelming majority of studies in corporate learning and performance implicitly identifies 
learning as a dynamic process. They use the number of deals consummated within a range of time 
before the event as the measure of experience (see e.g. Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Kusewitt, 
1985; Fowler and Schimdt, 1989; Wright et al., 2002). Regardless of the time frame of past deals, all 
studies include the deals which are relatively recent to the event under investigation. In principle, the 
treatment of knowledge and skills as evolving attributes is intuitive, since every new experience yields 
an effect of variable magnitude on individual perception. It would also not be an exaggeration to state 
that every acquisition constitutes a new experience for the acquirer, since the management team will 
have to improvise and adjust on at least few of the several deal aspects, such as payment, publicity, 
and integration (Galpin, 2014). 
The first seminal work in this literature strand is provided by Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999). They 
identify non-linear relationships between organisational deal experience and performance. They 
conclude that companies have steep learning curves, as they tend to perform poorly until enough 
experience has been assumed. Another major study has been conducted by Billet and Qian (2008). 
They identify a significant and negative effect for “high-order” deals, interpreting the adverse results 
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as the product of management overconfidence. Instances of positive performance in the past lead to 
negative performance in the future, while the corresponding CEOs purchase more stock before the 
value destroying deals. 
The main difference between Billet and Qian’s (2008) study and prior work is the focus on the agent 
of experience. The overwhelming majority of researchers constructs experience measures on the deals 
performed by the organisation, regardless of changes in the top management (see e.g. Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Ingram and Baum, 1997, Lubatkin, 1983; Power, 1982; Kusewitt, 1985; De Noble 
et al., 1987). Billet and Qian focus on CEO deal experience, thus they track the CEO deal-making in 
previous CEO positions. However, their research structure does not adequately distinguish between 
executive and organisational experience. They consider all past deals up to 5 years before the deal 
announcement, thus they also formulate their deal experience variable with deals occurring after the 
CEO appointment. The construction of this experience measure has significant overlap with the 
organisational experience, as deals performed in a firm after an executive’s appointment could be 
registered as experience to both the CEO and the rest of the company. In order to measure the effect 
of the CEO-specific deal experience, it would be most appropriate to exclude confounding experience 
components. Therefore, the experience accumulated after the CEO appointment should be excluded 
when measuring CEO-specific deal experience. 
An additional implication of considering organisational instead of managerial experience is that 
changes in top management remain unaccounted for. The lack of concern for management shifts 
premises a set of assumptions, which impede the generalisation of previous studies’ inferences. The 
first assumption postulates that organisational knowledge is retained throughout the years of the 
company’s operation and deal activity even after several managerial shifts. Management literature has 
provided evidence on the benefits of organisational knowledge such as decreasing cost per unit (see 
e.g. Darr et al., 1995), especially through the application of rules and routines in the industrial setting 
(see e.g. Argote et al., 1990; Benkard, 2000). Regarding mergers and acquisitions, there have been 
several studies theorising on knowledge retention (see e.g. Makri at el., 2010; Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001). However, there is still a gap between theoretically suggesting and finding explicit 
evidence on knowledge retention and application from one acquisition to the next. Assuming 
organisational knowledge on acquisitions is retained through time sounds as an intuitive inference due 
to the indications of knowledge retention in non-acquisitive activity, especially after the steep learning 
curves in acquisitions suggested by Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999). Nevertheless, the proposition 
has not been empirically supported. 
The second assumption of using organisational experience as a measure of knowledge suggests that 
top management is able to access and effectively apply the retained knowledge, regardless of whether 
the same executives have had any direct exposure to the amassed experience. For this assumption to 
hold true, it would require that either high rank executives can pass their knowledge down before 
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departing from the firm, or at least a set of executives remain in place for a much longer time than 
their peers. The latter notion may be deemed excessively optimistic, as the top management is 
unlikely to remain in place after a CEO turnover. Specifically, the mobility among the top 5 
executives is at least as high as the CEO’s, and the job safety of these executives correlates positively 
with CEOs retaining their position (Fee and Hadlock, 2003). Nevertheless, even if a significant 
portion of the top management team has a long tenure within the firm, the organisational knowledge 
pool may still be inaccessible. These executives may not have the skills of acting on the knowledge, 
or it is possible that other more powerful executives may decide to enforce their personal view on the 
matters at hand and disregard their colleagues’ input. In other words, it should not be surprising if the 
top management team does not have either the capability or the opportunity to benefit from latent 
organisational knowledge. 
The third and, arguably, most impactful assumption is the disregard of the CEO’s importance in 
making customised and pace-setting decisions for the firm. This implicitly suggests that executives, 
especially the CEO, will act along the lines of the collective spirit of the organisation without 
necessarily contributing with their personal, distinct opinions. This suggestion has found occasional 
support in the literature (e.g. Fee and Hadlock, 2013). Golubov et al. (2015) report high and 
significant company fixed effects on acquisition performance, after controlling for change of 
management and other deal- and firm-related characteristics. However, their results do not account for 
CEO selection bias, as acquirers may deliberately hire CEOs fitting a specific profile. In support to 
this contradiction, Edmans et al. (2009) present a theoretical model in which larger firms are expected 
to attract highly talented CEOs. Furthermore, a number of studies have attested to the importance of 
the CEO making decisions regarding investments, along with capital structure, and disclosure policies 
(see e.g. Bertrand and Schoar, 2002; Graham et al., 2012; Bamber et al., 2010).  
Management literature extends beyond the significance of CEOs in administrative and strategic 
decisions (see e.g. Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998), and establishes the importance of CEOs in 
performing acquisitions. Several studies argue for the benefits of managerial talent on acquisitions 
and general performance (see e.g. Falato, 2008; Cremers and Grinstein, 2013). Kaplan et al. (2012) 
show a strong relationship between successful buyouts and Venture Capital CEOs with a particular set 
of skills. Specifically, CEO success is more closely related to superior execution capabilities than 
interpersonal skills. On the topic of managerial skill type, Custodio et al. (2013) find a significant and 
positive effect of general managerial ability on the company’s performance during industry shocks. 
They also document a distinct and superior performance for “generalist” CEOs when compared to 
their “specialist” peers, a difference leading to materially higher total payments for the former. The 
account of the aforementioned studies, although not exhaustive, strongly argues for the importance of 
top managers in leading most, if not all, major corporate decisions.  
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A specific example on the importance of leadership in corporate prosperity is the case of General 
Electric (GE), which has widely been considered one of the most effective institutions for 
development of managerial talent (Bartlett and McLean, 2003). GE executives receive strict and 
meticulous training in both processes and adaptation. The benefits of training become apparent when 
considering the standardization of post-acquisition integration process: full-integration of acquired 
firms spans over just 100 days. Although it is GE’s organisational structure and culture encouraging 
these phenomenal results, the executives responsible for the outcome are well-esteemed in the market 
for CEOs. In a recent study by Rowe et al. (2009), it is shown that firms hiring former General 
Electric executives as CEOs perform higher in the stock market than firms hiring from the general 
population of executives. The case of General Electric offers additional affirmation on the importance 
of CEOs, as well as the cross-sectional variation in executive performance. 
Academic researchers seem far from willing to accept “corporate learning and performance” as an 
adequately investigated strand. This is apparent due to the lack of consensus in the respective studies’ 
inferences, and the persisting limitations of the applied frameworks. The current study provides an 
alternative outline for measuring the utility of CEO experience and accounting for misspecifications 
in previous studies.  
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4.3. Data 
4.3.1. Manual data collection 
One of the focal points in this study is the CEO turnover event; experience indicators measure the 
number of deals performed by the CEO up to her appointment date. I collect data on appointment 
dates, compensation, and tenure characteristics from Execucomp database on S&P 1500 companies 
for the period 1992 to 2012. Since Execucomp includes only S&P 1500 firms, this study reports on 
the deal performance of CEOs of S&P 1500 firms only. The information on prior positions of the 
executives as CEOs (not exclusively in S&P 1500 companies) and whether the manager has been a 
member of the current firm (executive, director or chairman) before the appointment has been 
collected manually from online websites and databases (EDGAR, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 
LinkedIn.com, nndb.com). All executives reported as interim or those with a total tenure of less than a 
year in the new firm have been excluded from the sample.  
The starting point for the manual collection was the sample of CEO turnovers. I searched for the name 
of the incoming CEO in the aforementioned online databases and I gathered the company names in 
which CEOs have held CEO positions during the decade before their appointment. Then, I matched 
the identified company names with the CUSIP code available in Thomson One Banker (SDC). I 
proceeded with identifying the deals performed during the executive’s prior CEO positions for up to a 
decade before the appointment. Then, I used the information gathered in order to create the CEO deal 
experience variables. After I compile the sample of post-appointment acquisitions, I match the 
respective CEOs in the S&P 1500 firms to their deal experience measures. 
4.3.2. Main sample 
In order to construct the sample of post-appointment acquisitions and collect all the relevant 
information needed, I use Execucomp, SDC, CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and RiskMetrics databases. The 
deals considered, both for the pre- and post-appointment samples, were screened according to several 
criteria. The public status of targets had to be either Public, Private or Subsidiary. Furthermore, 
several deal types are excluded due to their irrelevance with the purpose of the study.41 It is also 
intuitive to reason that not all deals are very important for a firm. It is highly likely that CEOs will not 
actively participate in deals that are either too small or which do not result in control of the target 
firm. If their engagement is not major, then it is only natural to assume that they do not learn from 
these deals, and investors do not use the same criteria when evaluating low magnitude or non-
                                                          
41 I consider the classification provided by Thomson One Banker and exclude the following deal types: minority 
stake purchases, privatizations, leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, recapitalisations, self-tender offers, exchange 
offers, and repurchases. 
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controlling bids. Consequently, this study focuses on deals commanding the CEO’s attention. In order 
to establish the importance of the deal for the acquiring firm, value and ownership restrictions are 
applied. All deals have minimum value of $1 mill. In 2015 dollar terms and the relative size between 
deal value and acquirer market capitalisation is at least 1%.42 Also, I include only completed deals, for 
which acquirers own less than 10% more than 50% of the target before the announcement and after 
the consummation of the deal, respectively. 43 
Subsequently to matching CEOs with deals before and after the appointment, I draw accounting and 
stock market information from COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases respectively. The categorisation 
of industries follows the Fama/French 10-industry classification.44  
After accounting for all data restrictions among the sources used, the post-appointment deal sample 
amounts to 3,785 deals for the period 1992-2014.45 Out of those deals, 1,163 were performed by 
executives with prior CEO experience, and 247 were performed by CEOs with prior deal experience. 
The sample also includes 1,508 unique CEOs working for 1,154 different firms throughout the sample 
period. Of those 1,508 CEOs, 456 have experience in a CEO position in the decade before the 
appointment in the investigated S&P 1500 firm and 100 have deal experience during their previous 
CEO tenures.  
Table 4.1 shows the number of deals per level of CEO deal experience. Column (1) displays the 
number of deals per level of general CEO deal experience and columns (2) to (6) show the number of 
deals per level of related deal experience. In general, there is a trended decrease of deal frequency as 
the magnitude of experience increases; it is infrequent for CEOs to have deal experience at the time of 
the appointment. A noticeable outlier can be identified in an executive with a general deal experience 
of 14 deals, who went on to perform 9 more during his tenure. The said executive is Stephen F. 
Bollenbach, and the 9 deals were performed for Hilton Hotels Corp. during the period 1996 – 2005. It 
also seems that the majority of deals have some similarity to the CEO’s prior deal experience, with 
the exception of deal value similarities. Specifically, 97.2% of all deals performed by deal-
experienced CEOs have at least one similarity (industry, status, value or nation) with a deal performed 
during the CEO’s pre-appointment tenures. Even if we exclude the “country bias”, i.e the tendency of 
CEOs to acquire targets in the same nation as their firms, the related industry and public status 
                                                          
42 All information on accounting, stock market, CEO payment, and deal value has been transformed to 2015 
dollar terms using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) provided by the Bureau of Labour Statistics of the United 
States Department of Labour. 
43 The sampling criteria differ from Chapter 3 due to the nature of the underlying study. The threshold of size 
has increased in order to allow for a larger sample, while the restrictions of ownership have been loosened to 
reflect the mitigated importance of having an unexpected deal announced by the acquirer. The results remain 
qualitatively the same for the sampling criteria of Chapter 3. 
44 The results of the study remain similar when applying different Fama-French industry classifications, such as 
12-industry and 48-industry classifications. 
45 In the initial stages of data screening, there have been 348 deals that have been performed within 10 days 
from each other. For reasons of sample purity, I have excluded them from the analysis. The results remain 
qualitatively the same these deals are retained in the sample. 
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experience amount up to 68.0% and 61.1% of all deal experience, respectively. This is indicative of 
the tendency for the experienced CEO to pursue deals with familiar specifications. As for deal value 
related experience, it seems fairly rare for CEOs to perform deals of familiar size. Only 38 deals have 
a CEO familiar with the deal size, for which the maximum magnitude of experience is 2 deals at the 
time of the appointment.  
[Insert Table 4.1] 
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4.4. Methodology 
4.4.1. Hypotheses 
The Board of Directors is responsible for monitoring, evaluating and, when deemed appropriate, 
replacing the CEO. Events of managerial turnover are suitable for academic studies, as CEO 
appointments are distinct and deliberate occasions. For the evaluation of each CEO candidate, 
directors ponder over several criteria. For instance, will the CEO be an insider or an outsider? Will 
she be a generalist or a specialist? Their respective decisions are based on the circumstances of the 
market and the firm (see e.g. Borokhovich et al., 1996). The directors’ decision has to be well 
calculated and thoughtful, thus the possibility of having an executive randomly selected for the job is 
low. Directors have to be thorough in identifying the potential candidates, evaluating them and finally 
choosing the successor. They have to ensure their decision will yield the best possible outcome for 
their shareholders.  
It is at the time of reviewing potential candidates that directors weigh the pros and cons of all relevant 
CEO attributes. Candidates with experience on CEO positions will most likely bring in know-how, 
professional connections, and prestige; these attributes should increase their hiring prospects as long 
as the candidates have not underperform considerably in the previous firm. It is also at this point of 
the hiring process that the executive’s acquisition experience will be evaluated. The directors should 
be expected to consider whether the candidates have credentials in deal-making and, then, whether 
their experience could benefit the firm. If their deal experience is anticipated to advance shareholder 
wealth, the candidates should have a higher probability of being hired as CEOs and, in the course of 
time, perform better acquisitions when compared to their inexperienced peers. 
The CEO hiring process is not an entirely uncharted area in academic research.46 However, the 
information asymmetry between CEO nominating committees and outsider researchers can be 
unbridgeable, rendering the reverse engineering of the full process almost impossible. Even after 
considering databases with information on the top 5 executives (e.g. Execucomp, Capital IQ), it 
would be almost impossible to evaluate the actual range of executives considered for the CEO 
position. Specifically, even if the information on all executives in the market was available, it would 
be impractical to guess the subgroup of CEOs considered in the screening process. It would not be an 
exaggeration to state that the actual deliberations of the BoD are by construction a “black box”, an 
opaque process in which outsiders have virtually no chance of deciphering without inside help. 
Consequently, the assessment of deal-experience value has to be conducted in a more transparent 
context. 
                                                          
46 For an insight on the hiring process see Carpenter et al. (2004), Worrell et al. (1993), Furtado and Rozeff 
(1987), Worrell and Davidson (1987). 
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If deal experience has a fundamental effect on the executive’s ability to perform acquisitions, then the 
performance of her deals after the appointment should be statistically different when compared to the 
performance of her inexperienced peers. As mentioned before, literature has to offer a variety of 
different potential relationship structures between experience and performance (Barkema and 
Schijven, 2008). These studies, however, have not focused solely on the deal experience amassed by 
the CEO before the appointment in the acquiring firm. The deal experience gained after the CEO 
appointment could be attributed to both the CEO and the company as an institution; a refined measure 
of CEO-specific deal experience should exclude confounding portions of deal experience, which is 
necessary in order to measure the effect of CEO-specific experience on company performance. 
The distinct difference between the experiences acquired before and after the appointment lies with 
the repercussions of the experience. For instance, the literature has not yet concluded on the effect of 
acquisition performance on CEO turnover.47 Although value-destroying deals may lead to turnovers 
(Lehn and Zhao, 2006), the process of replacing a CEO could also be inert, as directors may slow 
down or impede the process due to personal or professional ties with the executive. This idea is in 
accordance to the managerial power hypothesis (see e.g. Ryan and Wiggins, 2004) which suggests 
that CEOs are capable of extracting higher rents and job security from exerting material control on 
directors. However, CEO candidates most probably have no apparent or strong control of the BoD 
before their appointment in the firm, even in the case of internal candidates. Thus, the collective 
evaluation of the executive’s skills before the appointment is more likely to be based on merit, and 
less likely based on personal ties with the prospective CEO. In this case, they should consider deal 
experience as an asset only if it is expected to lead to higher acquisition returns after the appointment.  
After considering all of the above, along with the expectations of the learning hypothesis, i.e. more 
experience leads to better results, I form the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Higher CEO acquisition experience at the time of the appointment will lead to higher 
returns for the acquisitions performed by the CEO after the appointment. 
It has been suggested that not all types of experience lead to superior performance. Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999), applying the transfer theory from the discipline of cognitive psychology to 
acquisitions, published the first study proposing that not all managerial experience contributes to 
better corporate outcomes. They highlight the penalty of misguided generalisation of experience: 
CEOs and companies performing deals in industries dissimilar to the ones in the past fare worse than 
those performing deals in familiar industries. The market rewards institutions and executives when 
they apply their knowledge wisely on high-stake ventures such as acquisitions.  
                                                          
47 Lehn and Zhao (2006) showed a higher probability of turnover after value destroying acquisitions, and 
Alexandridis et al. (2015) showed an improvement in acquisition performance after forced turnovers. However, 
Yim (2013) reported an insignificant effect of acquisition performance on the probability of turnover.  
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Inappropriate generalisation of experience, nevertheless, should not be the norm. For instance, in 
strategy literature, it has been suggested that incoming CEOs are better capable of applying 
knowledge and expertise within the same industry (see e.g. Castanias and Helfat, 1991, 1992; Bailey 
and Helfat, 2003). In general, when a CEO enters a new company, she is expected to display 
discretion in the application of her past knowledge. The process of the mutual adjustment between the 
top manager and the firm takes up to three years for a first-time CEO (see e.g. Hambrick and 
Fukutomi, 1991). During that time, which may be shorter for seasoned CEOs, she has to achieve 
convergence of her management style and the corporate modus operandi in order to optimise the 
overall performance in the new environment. The specific skills she may have acquired during her 
career should contribute to a better response to the issues at hand. Hayward (2002) shows that deal 
experience in the same industry yields a positive effect on future acquisitions, at least in the mid-run. I 
extend this argument to the relationship between pre-appointment deal experience and post-
appointment deal performance. Specifically, I assume that experience in deals similar to the one under 
investigation should lead to superior returns. Accordingly, the second hypothesis of this study is the 
following: 
Hypothesis 2: Similarities between the acquisition under investigation and pre-appointment CEO deal 
experience will result in higher returns. 
Both hypotheses are tested with the appropriate measures and discussed further in the “Results” 
section.  
4.4.2. Model 
The main analysis of this study is conducted via the application of Ordinary Least Square regressions. 
The multivariate model has the following form: 
𝑌 = 𝑎0 + ∑(𝑎 𝑋) + 𝜀    (1) 
Where Y is the dependent variable, X is the vector of all independent variables, and 𝜀 is the residual. 
The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity according to White (1980). The model has 
also been tested for multicollinearity with the variance inflation factors (VIF) (see e.g. Stine, 1995; 
Mansfield and Helms, 1982) and all variables display VIF values below 3, suggesting there is no 
concern of multicollinearity in the model. 
4.4.3. Variables 
4.4.3.1. Dependent variable 
The central question permeating the two hypotheses in the current study is whether acquiring CEO 
deal experience materially affects acquisition returns. Following the literature on event studies, I use 
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the cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date in order to measure the short-run value 
creation (Brown and Warner, 1985), and the buy-and-hold returns adjusted for 25 Size-B/M portfolios 
in order to measure value creation during a longer period (see e.g Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). I use a 
3-day window for CAR48 and a 12-month window for BHAR.49 Excess positive abnormal stock 
returns for the firm around the announcement could be interpreted as the impulsive investor approval 
of the overall management’s acquisition plan. If CEO deal experience is important in shaping 
announcement CARs in any direction, it would suggest investors recognise the effect of CEO deal 
experience. As for the long-run returns, BHAR is expected to capture the better educated approach of 
investors, since more information is disseminated over a longer period of time. In other words, I 
expect to capture both the impulsive and well-informed investor reactions to the acquirer strategic 
move. The calculation of both variables is described below. 
The cumulative abnormal returns are estimated in line with Brown and Warner’s (1985) methodology. 
The first step in the estimating process is applying the market model as seen in equation (2), where Ri,t 
is the return for security “i” at time “t”, and RM,t is the return of the market at time t. The benchmark 
market is the equally-weighted CRSP index, which draws data on NYSE, NYSE MKT, NASDAQ, 
and NYSE Arca Exchanges. The estimation interval of the model spans over 255 trading days, 
finishing 46 days before the event date. The coefficients deriving from the estimation are used for the 
calculation of the expected return E(Ri,t). In the second step, the expected returns stemming from 
equation (2) are subtracted from the observed returns, as it is displayed in equation (3). The outcome 
is the excess return, i.e. abnormal return ARi,t, of the stock over the expected returns for that day. In 
equation (4), the abnormal returns of three consecutive days are accumulated in order to create the 
cumulative abnormal return for the window (-1, +1), which is the CAR surrounding the acquisition 
announcement. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝜄 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡     (2) 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (ᾱ𝑖 +  𝛽𝜄 𝑅𝑀,𝑡)   (3) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(−1,+1) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+1
−1      (4) 
 
The second dependent variable serves the purpose of investigating the effect of CEO deal experience 
on long-run performance. The measure used is the 1-year monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
                                                          
48 The analysis provides qualitative similar results for multiple configurations of the event window. Untabulated 
analysis tests for the following CAR windows: (-5, +5), (-20, +1), (-30, +1), (-30, +30). The aforementioned 
windows have been used in the “experience-performance” literature (see e.g. Hayward, 2002), and also in the 
general literature of “wealth creation in acquisitions” literature (see e.g. Moeller et al., 2005). 
49 Most studies in acquisition learning literature have used daily CARs in order to investigate the effect of 
experience (see e.g. Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002) and long-run performance measures were 
used in complementary analysis (Billet and Qian, 2008). 
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(see e.g. Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Fama and French, 1993; Bouwman et al., 2009). For each 
acquirer, I consider the raw returns for 12 months including the month of the announcement. I 
compound the returns as seen in equation (5). I do the same for the corresponding 25 Size-B/M 
equally weighted portfolio returns as seen in equation (6). Then, I subtract the compounded portfolio 
returns from the company’s compounded returns in order to calculate the buy-and-hold returns as seen 
in equation (7). The portfolio Size and B/M thresholds and equally weighted returns are retrieved 
from Kenneth French’s website.50 I use the market capitalisation in the month before the acquisition 
and the previous year-end book value in order to match the companies to one of the 25 Size-B/M 
portfolios. 
𝐵𝐻𝑅(0,11),𝑖 = [∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖)]
11
0 − 1    (5) 
𝐵𝐻𝑅(0,11) ,𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 = [∏ (1 + 𝑅𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘)]
11
0 − 1  (6) 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅(0,+11) ,𝑖 = 𝐵𝐻𝑅(0,11),𝑖 − 𝐵𝐻𝑅(0,11) ,𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘  (7) 
The following section offers information and insights on the variables used in the main analysis. 
4.4.3.2. Independent variables – Deal Experience Variables 
The current study bases the deal experience measures on the example set by previous studies (see e.g. 
Billet and Qian, 2008; Hayward, 2002). There are two main differences with previous studies. First, I 
focus on the CEO-specific deal experience instead of the company experience. Second, the 
measurement of experience regards the period leading to the appointment of the CEO in the respective 
firm. Thus, I account for the acquisition experience component that was considered by the Board of 
Directors when they hired the executive for the top position. The analysis is also conducted on deal 
experience metrics combining the pre- and post-appointment deal experience of the executives; the 
inferences of the study remain qualitatively the same. 
The key experience metric, “Deal Experience”, is the number of deals performed by the current CEO 
during the ten years before her appointment in the current firm. The deals considered are only the 
ones performed by the executive while holding a CEO position in previous places of employment. 
This measure provides a pure metric of CEO experience and allows for the study of CEO-specific 
indicators and company performance. 
The duration of 10 years before and after the appointment represents a trade-off between two 
contrasting characteristics. First, the data availability regarding both prior CEO positions and deal-
making is biased in favour of more recent and younger CEOs, as CEO databases are less curated 
before 1992.51 Second, it is important to consider experience topical to the current state of the CEO. 
                                                          
50 For more information see: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
51 Execucomp provides data on S&P 1500 CEOs starting in 1992. 
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Deals performed far before the appointment may either offer obsolete experience or be irrelevant to 
the respective state of the executive. Similarly, deals performed far after the appointment are less 
likely to be affected by pre-hiring experience and more likely to be driven by the circumstances long 
after the appointment. One could follow this argument and narrow down the interval to fewer years. 
Nevertheless, a fine balance between availability of data and relevance of information suggests the 
decade of experience be the appropriate threshold.52 
The CEO deal experience measures have been constructed with the respective hypotheses in mind. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relationship between the deal performance and the quantity of CEO 
deal experience at the time of her appointment. Therefore, the expectation is to observe a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for the “Deal Experience” variable when regressing it against 
announcement CARs or BHARs. In other words, the higher the deal experience of the CEO at the 
time of the appointment, the more knowledgeable and skilful she will be in stirring the acquisition 
process in the right direction, thus improving the company outlook for investors. 
Hypothesis 2 assumes a more particular effect of CEO deal experience, which originates in potential 
benefits of relevance between experience and the deal at hand. The relatedness regards similarities in 
the target industry, nation, public status or deal value. The variables “Deal Experience - Industry” 
reflects the number of deals in CEO’s past which had targets in the same industry as the present 
target. Industry-related experience in has been reported to improve deal performance in the mid-term 
(Hayward, 2002). Furthermore, there are a number of studies suggesting the distinct effect of deal 
experience across industries, with higher acquirer company experience increasing the probability of 
entry barriers for new comers in e.g. the computer industry, but not the pharma industry (see e.g. 
Shimizu and Hitt, 2005; Li, 1995). The aforementioned studies portray industry-specific experience 
during acquisitions as a key source of value creation for acquirer shareholders. Similarly, I expect 
industry-related experience in the CEO deal activity to yield positive results for the current firm. 
The variable “Deal Experience - Target Nation” counts the respective past deals which had the same 
target nation as the one in the deal at hand. The effect of cross-border acquisitions has been studied 
thoroughly (see e.g. Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Lee and Caves, 1998; Barkema et al., 1996; Gaur and 
Lu, 2007), though there is no consensus on whether the effect is uniformly dissimilar to local 
acquisitions. The premise leading to the construction of this variable is the country-specific intricacies 
which will be familiar to a relatedly experienced CEO. This argument holds even for the cases of 
local acquisitions, as there could be knowledge-intensive requirements related to the acquirer’s local 
market.  
                                                          
52 I have performed untabulated analysis with the alternative configuration of 5 years of deal experience before 
the CEO appointment, and inclusion of deals performed over a 5-year period after the appointment. The results 
have been qualitatively identical. 
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The variable “Deal Experience - Status” accounts for the number of deals in the CEO’s past which 
had targets with same public status (public, private or subsidiary) with the target at hand. The 
literature on wealth creation during acquisitions is abundant with references to the target firm’s public 
status (see e.g. Harford et al., 2012; Fuller et al., 2002). The academic consensus so far suggests 
private targets lead to higher acquirer performance than public targets. I consider public target status 
another source of valuable experience and I create a variable indicating the CEO’s experience with 
targets with the current target’s public status.  
The fourth relevant experience variable “Deal Experience - Value” considers the number of deals 
performed by the CEO that are between -20% and +20% of the value of the current deal (all deals 
values transformed in 2015 dollar terms). 53 The size of the deal has been suggested to be an indicator 
of the integration complexity (Alexandridis et al., 2012), therefore CEOs with experience in similar-
size acquisitions may have an edge during the post-mergers integration phase (see e.g. Uhlenbruck et 
al., 2006). The last variable of related experience, “Deal Experience – Any Similarity”, counts the 
past deals with any similarities in the aforementioned four areas (industry, public status, nation, deal 
value) to the current deal. 
In order to allow for comparison between the outcomes of this study and the extant literature (see e.g. 
Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Billet and Qian, 2008), the analysis has also incorporated the order 
of the deal after the appointment as a potential factor of announcement CARs. The variable, “Deal 
Order”, consists of the serial number of the deal after the appointment of the CEO, i.e. 1, 2, 3 etc. I 
also account for experience beyond the sole context of acquisitions. I include the number of years the 
CEO has served in CEO positions during the decade before her appointment. The maximum value of 
the variable is 10, as high as the number of years under inspection. There are several CEOs who have 
been reported to hold more than one CEO positions at a time, but in all cases the positions have been 
in subsidiary firms of a parent company. This variable is similar to the CEO experience variables used 
in the literature (see e.g. Bragaw and Misangyi, 2013). 
4.4.3.3. Independent variables – Control Variables 
Research in value creation during acquisitions has offered several contributing factors. Most of the 
control variables used in the regressions are standard in the literature, as they have been repeatedly 
used in peer-reviewed studies (see e.g. Fuller et al., 2002; Yim, 2013). 
Cash acquisitions have been connected with positive signalling by the bidder, since the stock price of 
the bidder is undervalued (Travlos, 1987; Schwert, 1999). In order to account for the effect of cash 
deals on announcement CARs, I include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal is 
100% cash and 0 otherwise. Fuller et al. (2002) find lower bidder returns for acquisitions of public 
                                                          
53 The results remain unchanged for various size-similarity brackets, ranging from +/-10% to +/-30%. 
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targets, and therefore I include a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the target is a public firm. 
Bhagat et al. (2005) offer several potential factors on value creation as well. After studying the stand-
alone and combined bidder-target value change around the announcement, they advise for higher 
bidder returns for hostile bids, and lower bidder returns for diversifying deals. Following their study, I 
employ two dummy variables indicating whether the acquisition is hostile and diversifying, 
respectively. Similarly, a dummy variable indicating whether the deal is a tender offer is included, 
following the study of Lang et al. (1989), who found positive returns for bidders during tender offer 
announcements.  
Billet and Qian (2008) have indicated hubristic behaviour as a crucial factor leading to monotonically 
negative returns for consecutive acquisitions. In order to account for CEO hubris, I follow 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) and create a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO is hubristic or 
not. The dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO has failed to exercise 67% in-the-money 
options at least twice in their tenure and 0 otherwise.  
The model includes additional control variables regarding more fundamental information on 
companies. Moeller et al. (2004) suggest adverse bidder size effects on announcement CARs, and so 
size is accounted for with the use of Market Capitalisation of the bidder.54 Alexandridis et al. (2013) 
follow up on Moeller et al. and show an adverse effect originating on the size of the target, which is 
also accounted for in the current study. Following the general literature on acquisitions and value 
creation (see e,g, Moeller et al., 2005, Fuller et al., 2002), I include several other fundamental control 
variables, such as market-to-book, leverage, ROA, and CAPEX. I also include CEO characteristics in 
regression analyses (see e.g. Yim, 2013), such as CEO age, tenure and whether the executive has been 
an insider before the appointment.  
I have also used non-standard control variables, which regard the payment components of CEO 
compensation. Total payment, salary, bonus and equity-based compensation may have conflicting 
effects on acquisition performance. For instance, Cai and Vijh (2007) suggest overvalued acquirers 
with higher CEO ownership tend to perform more deals in an attempt to take advantage of the relative 
overvaluation. Thus, higher levels of equity compensation in the year before the deal may result in 
lower announcement returns (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Grinstein and Hribar (2004) highlight the 
non-significant connection between cash bonuses pertaining to acquisitions and the respective deal 
performance. In essence, the type and magnitude of compensation relate to the incentives literature, 
                                                          
54 Descriptive statistics include Total Assets and Sales as alternative measures of size. The regression analysis 
has been performed with Total Assets and Sales. Untabulated results show that all types of bidder-size proxies 
lead to similar results. 
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connecting executive performance with performance-based compensation.55 The extended definitions 
of all variables can be found in Appendix. 
 
                                                          
55 Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide a theoretical approach on the incentive alignment capabilities of 
performance-based compensation (see also Smith and Stulz, 1985). Morgan and Poulsen (2001) provide 
empirical support for Jensen and Meckling’s claims. 
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4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Sample Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics 
The targets in the 3,785 deals are divided into 957 public, 1,445 private and 1,383 subsidiary firms. 
The majority of targets are local to acquirers, as 2,974 are U.S. companies and the remaining 811 are 
overseas. Figure 4.1 provides information on the number and total value of deals per year. The 
columns show the number of deals per year, segmented by target public status, and the line shows the 
total annual deal value in 2015 $ billions. The patterns in the frequency and value of deals in Figure 
4.1 are in accordance to the documented merger frequency (see e.g. Alexandridis et al., 2012). 
Specifically, the periods 1998-2000 and 2003-2007 display clustering of total deal value, the same 
periods when the 5th and 6th U.S. merger waves occurred. The highest total value of deals occurs in 
1998, despite not being the year with the highest deal number. This is due to the several large-sized, 
“mega” deals during the inflation of the dot-com bubble. 
Figure 4.2 displays the mean deal value per year. The trends of mean deal value seem to follow the 
pattern of total deal value in Figure 4.1. This can be attributed to the observed stagnation in deal 
activity after the 5th and 6th merger waves have been completed; acquirers lacked the liquidity and the 
stakeholder support to pursue large deals (see e.g. Harford, 1999, 2005). 
This study uses CEO turnovers as reference points in measuring deal experience. Figure 4.3 shows the 
number of appointments per year. Heightened turnover activity can be identified in the years 2000, 
2001, 2007 and 2008. Incidentally, these are the concluding years of the two recent U.S. merger 
waves, which were also accompanied by stock market crises. The sample is not as populated in the 
early and late years, because, first, Execucomp provided CEO data starting in 1992 and, second, if a 
company does not perform a deal after the CEO appointment, it will not be included in the sample. 
[Insert Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3] 
The breakdown of the firms and deals per industry for both targets and acquirers is provided in Table 
4.2. I use the 10-industry classification provided in Kenneth French’s website.56 The highest 
concentration of acquirers and targets is in the industries of Business Development, and 
Manufacturing, with about half of all companies registering in one of the two industries. The same 
holds for same-industry deals, which have the acquirer and target being in the same industry. 
 [Insert Table 4.2] 
Table 4.3 reports descriptive statistics for the sample. The table has been segmented into three panels, 
displaying information on deal, acquiring CEO, and acquirer characteristics. The information is also 
                                                          
56Details on the classification can be found here: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_10_ind_port.html 
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provided for various levels of pre-appointment CEO deal experience. Column (1) reports the statistics 
for the whole sample. Columns (2) and (3) display the sample statistics for CEOs without (3,538 
deals) and with (247 deals) deal experience respectively. The sample of deals with experienced CEO 
is further segmented into two subsamples. Column (4) reports on deals where the CEO has 1 or 2 
deals as experience (145 deals), and column (5) reports on deals, where the CEO has experience of 
more than 2 deals (102 deals). Columns (6) to (8) display the differences between the variable values 
among subgroups of experience, as well as the statistical significance of these differences based on T-
tests on means and Wilcoxon tests on medians. Specifically, column (6) compares deals with 
experienced versus inexperienced CEOs; column (7) compares deals with highly experienced versus 
modestly experienced CEOs; column (8) compares deals with highly experienced versus 
inexperienced CEOs.  
[Insert Table 4.3] 
Panel A reports on the deals characteristics of the full and partitioned subsamples. The value of 
experienced-CEO deals are larger than the deals of the inexperienced CEOs, as the average deal is 
larger by $1.3 bil for the experienced executives. However, the median deal values are not statistically 
different among the subgroups, therefore the significant mean difference should be attributed to few 
sizeable deals performed by the experienced subgroup. The deal relative size figures do not display 
statistically significant discrepancies on either mean or median values, except for the median of highly 
experienced CEOs (4.58%) being less than their modestly experienced peers (6.85%) by 2.28%. 
Financing methods seem comparable among the subgroups, as 6%-8% and 35-43% of deals are fully 
financed with equity and cash respectively. About a quarter of deals among all subgroups have public 
targets, approximately the same percentage of diversifying deals in each sample. The only exception 
is the sample of modestly experienced CEOs, whose percentage of diversifying deals is 33.1%, 
marginally higher than their more experienced peers. Highly experienced CEOs perform slightly 
fewer tender offers (2.94%) compared to their inexperienced peers (6.36%). Highly experienced 
CEOs also perform fewer hostile bids, even though the concentration in the general sample is only 
0.34%. Cross-border deals reflect about a fifth to a quarter of each sample without any notable 
difference among subsamples.  
On average, deals are completed within 76 days after their announcement in the general sample, and, 
although there is no significant difference between experienced and inexperienced CEO, it appears 
that highly experienced CEOs consummate the deals at an average of 29 days faster than their 
modestly experienced peers. Serial acquirers show a strong presence across all subsamples, as they 
perform between 44% and 47% of deals. These figures are in accordance to literature, attributing a 
significant share of deal activity to the most frequent acquirers (see e.g. Golubov et al., 2015). The 
last statistic on deal characteristics regards the 4-week premium paid to the target shareholders, 
ranging between 36% and 44% across all subsamples.  
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Panel B of Table 4.3 displays statistics on CEO characteristics. CEOs in the general sample have had 
an average experience of 1.54 years in CEO positions before being appointed in the current firm. The 
figures are significantly higher for the experienced sample, with highly and slightly deal- experienced 
CEOs having spent 5.4 to 6.9 years in CEO positions. The differences are more striking for CEO-
position experience in public firms: deal-inexperienced CEOs hold zero position experience as public-
firm CEOs, while deal-experienced CEOs hold more than 3 years of experience in any of the 
subsamples. Highly experienced CEOs have more years of experience in both public and general CEO 
positions. These differences are not surprising, as CEOs with more time in prior CEO positions would 
have more time to perform acquisitions during their tenure. 
Inexperienced CEOs have on average 4.44 years in their position when attempting the deal, while 
experienced CEOs have less than 4 years, down to 3 years for the highly experienced subsample. 
These differences, along with the slightly higher age of the experienced CEOs versus their peers, are 
suggestive of the more educated, even assertive approach of experienced CEOs when it comes to 
restructuring. Their significantly higher experience in deals, and on the job in general, equips them 
with knowledge and confidence towards the pursuit of deals sooner in the new job. This is apparent in 
the significantly higher percentage of experienced CEOs performing deals during the first year of 
their tenure (21.5% for all experienced, 23.5% for highly experienced) when compared to the 
inexperienced subsample (15.9%). Furthermore, inexperienced CEOs are significantly more likely to 
be top executives or members in the board of directors before their appointment when compared to 
their experienced peers (71.6% of versus 44.5%). This discrepancy could have a dual interpretation. 
First, insider CEOs are executives who have spent their better part of the decade before the 
appointment in non-CEO positions, therefore it would be impossible to have assumed deal experience 
according to the accepted definition. Second, the hiring of outsider CEOs could be stimulated not only 
by a need for fresh general knowledge and approach, but also the need for acquisition experience. The 
two explanations are not mutually exclusive and bear no absolute explanatory power over the 
observed statistics. 
The next set of variables on CEO characteristics regard payment components. Experienced CEOs are 
generally, and usually significantly, paid more than inexperienced CEOs, though this may reflect the 
differences in the larger size of their companies, as can be seen in Panel C of Table 4.3. Company size 
has been reported to increase the level of CEO compensation (see e.g. Yim, 2013). The last variable in 
Panel B regards whether CEOs can be classified as hubristic according to Malmendier and Tate’s 
(2008) measure. About a quarter to a third of CEOs display hubristic behaviour among the different 
subsamples, suggesting conventional measures do not label more experienced CEOs as more 
overconfident than their less experienced peers.  
Panel C of Table 4.3 reports on acquirer characteristics. Differences in the means of statistics suggest 
that CEO deal experience puts executives at the lead position of larger firms. Market capitalisation of 
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30 days before the announcement, as well as the total assets and sales components of the previous 
fiscal year suggest immense differences in mean company size. Experienced CEOs lead firms which 
are on average larger by roughly $10.4 bil in market cap., $24.7 bil in total assets, and $7.0 bil in sales 
than inexperienced CEOs. However, the median values do not highlight significant differences in 
acquirer sizes, indicating the more accentuated size differences at the high end of the distributions. 
Differences in means show higher figures for experienced acquirers in capital expenditure, cash, net 
income, and total debt. Market-to-book ratio is approximately 3 for all subsamples, while 
performance ratios (ROA, Net Margin) are significantly lower for experienced CEOs. It also appears 
that experienced CEOs are more comfortable with assuming relatively more debt in their capital 
structure, as they have on average 37.3% leverage, about 4% higher than their inexperienced peers. 
Overall, Table 4.3 attests to a few differences between experienced and inexperienced CEOs. The 
distinctive differences between the groups are not focused on deal characteristics and attitude, but 
mostly on the more sizeable nature of experienced-CEO acquirers, along with the superior job 
experience and compensation of the corresponding CEOs. Experienced CEOs tend to perform deals 
sooner in their tenure, especially during their first year on the new job. This observed behavioural 
pattern could be instigated by the knowledge and confidence they gained during their previous CEO 
experiences. An alternative, but not mutually exclusive explanation of this pattern could be the riskier 
attitude of experienced individuals, as it may be inferred by the higher leverage ratios in experienced-
CEO firms. Nevertheless, the purpose of this study is not to construct a thorough personality profile of 
experienced CEOs, but identify the value of their experience to acquirer shareholders, as measured by 
short-term and long-term stock performance. 
Table 4.4 shows the descriptive statistics of several stock performance indicators for the same 
subsamples presented in Table 4.3. The investigation of several CAR windows and the annual BHAR 
aims to capture the full spectrum of investor reactions towards the deal announcement, ranging from 
information leak during the run-up to more informed and composed reaction several days after the 
announcement. The mean and median performance measures for all subsamples are fairly close to 
zero, although CARs of different windows provide contrasting inferences. Short windows of 3 and 11 
days show positive and significant announcement returns for the samples of all and inexperienced 
CEOs while the longer window of 61 days suggest a negative and significant abnormal return. The 
result on the shorter windows are in contrast with the literature, which has suggested zero or negative 
returns for acquirers (see e.g. Moeller et al., 2005; Andrade et al., 2001). I attribute this difference to 
sample discrepancies with previous studies. For instance, deals paid exclusively with stock in the 
current study are less than 8% for the whole sample, while previous studies have the respective 
figures up to 23% (Moeller et al., 2005) and 46% (Andrade et al., 2001). Equity consideration has 
been shown to have adverse results on acquirer performance (see e.g. Travlos, 1987), therefore this 
can be one of the reasons for the discrepancies in reported CAR. BHAR are negative and statistically 
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significant at both mean and median levels for all and inexperienced-CEO deals. As for the rest of the 
subsamples, deal experience does not seem to affect announcement or long run returns. A negative 
median BHAR of 5.08 is also not statistically significant from zero, indicating the high BHAR 
volatility within the highly experienced subsample. 
[Insert Table 4.4] 
The T-tests and Wilcoxon tests in columns (6) to (8) suggest no distinct performance relative to deal 
experience. This is an early indication contrary to the expectations in this study. However, the results 
in Table 4.4 do not account for several sources of wealth creation during acquisitions, as well as for 
the non-linear relationship between experience and performance, as it has been documented in the 
literature (see e.g. Hayward, 2002). A more refined analysis is provided in the next section, where a 
variety of factors and measures of experience is investigated. 
Table 4.5 reports the correlation coefficients for the variables used in the study. High correlation 
coefficients, i.e. above 0.7 in absolute terms, are contained within sets of related variables, such as 
deal-experience measures, compensation components, and accounting variables. I follow the 
indications of the correlation matrix and, therefore, I do not include highly correlated variables in the 
regression models in order to avoid multicollinearity issues. 
[Insert Table 4.5] 
4.5.2. Regression Analysis 
The descriptive statistics presented in the previous section provide evidence against this study’s 
expectations: CEO deal experience from previous CEO positions seem to be unrelated to deal 
performance in the new firm. In order to perform a more rigorous analysis than the univariate T-tests 
and Wilcoxon Tests, I employ Ordinary Linear Square regressions. Specifically, I regress the 
announcement CARs (-1, +1) and BHARs (0, +11) against CEO deal experience measures and 
standard control variables. Table 4.6 shows regressions on CAR (-1, +1) with the intent to answer the 
aforementioned Hypothesis 1, i.e. whether general CEO deal experience affects the acquirer deal 
performance. The analysis has been performed for the full sample – in columns (1) to (4) - and the 
sub-sample of acquisitions performed by CEOs with prior experience in CEO positions – in columns 
(5) to (8).57  
[Insert Table 4.6] 
The experience measures are included in both level and square values; the squared component aims to 
identify non-linear relationships between experience and performance (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 
                                                          
57 Most of the model variables have considered adjustment for industry average or conditions. Therefore, the 
inclusion of industry fixed effects would be excessive. 
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1999; Hayward, 2002). In all models the coefficients of Deal Experience and its squared term are 
statistically insignificant. 58 In models (2) and (6), I regress the same deal experience measures, along 
with control variables, against deal announcement performance. The insignificant effect of “Position 
Experience”, i.e. the number of years spent as CEO before the appointment, is in accordance with 
some of the extant studies; CEO experience in past positions does not seem to affect company 
performance (see e.g. Bragaw and Misangyi, 2013). I have also included a variable counting the 
number of deals since the CEO’s appointment, “Deal Order”, and it also appears to be ineffective in 
explaining CAR performance.  
Models (3) and (7) have a slightly different measure of deal experience: instead of having the pre-
appointment CEO deal experience and the post-appointment deal order as separate variables, I 
combine them in order to create a variable named “CEO Deal Order.” The latter measure accounts for 
a broader definition of CEO deal experience. The combined pre- and post-appointment experience 
displays statistically insignificant coefficients, suggesting a negligible effect of CEO deal experience 
on performance.  
Models (4) and (8) are the same with (2) and (6) with the addition of the indicator of hubris in the 
control variables. Billet and Qian (2008) have attributed the negative effect of experience on 
performance to CEO overconfidence after incidents of positive deal performance in the past. Since the 
research structure of the current study is different than theirs, I control for overconfidence with a 
measure inspired by Malmendier and Tate (2008). The coefficient of the dummy variable is positive 
and significant, a counter-intuitive result according to the literature (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
Nevertheless, its inclusion does not seem to affect materially the coefficients of experience measures. 
The main inference from the analysis so far is that the quantity of general experience of the CEO is of 
no consequence when it comes to deal performance around the announcement. The null hypothesis 
corresponding to Hypothesis 1 has not been rejected in the context of short-term performance. 
Overall, the inclusion of control variables improves the model’s Goodness of Fit, as the Adjusted R-
square measure improves from below 1% for the simple models to approximately 4.9% for the full 
sample and 5.4% for the seasoned-CEOs sample. Only few of the control variables in the sample 
display statistical significance. A positive and marginally significant effect is attributed to the 
acquirer’s ROA in the full-sample regressions, but not in the models on seasoned-CEO samples. The 
relative value between the target and the acquirer has a positive and highly statistically significant 
effect on announcement CARs, but, again, only for the full-sample regressions. The coefficient and its 
significance are in accordance to the findings of Alexandridis et al. (2013). The “All cash” dummy 
variable is positive and statistically significant, verifying the documented effect of cash consideration 
on announcement returns (see e.g. Schwert, 1999; Yook, 2003). In the models using the whole 
                                                          
58 The coefficients remain insignificant when I do not include the squared term of deal experience. 
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sample, the presence of only cash in the deal payment increase announcement returns by 
approximately 0.5%-0.6%. The equivalent effect for the sample of seasoned CEOs in columns (7) and 
(8) is of similar magnitude, but not statistically significant. 
The status of the target company results in a distinct effect on announcement returns as well. I find a 
negative and significant CAR effect for acquisitions of public targets, as it is frequently reported in 
the literature (Chang, 1998; Draper and Paudyal, 2006; Fuller et al., 2002). The diversification 
dummy variable is statistically insignificant across all models, which stands in contrast to the 
literature (see e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lamont and Polk, 2001).59 
The regressions on the subsamples displayed in columns (5) to (8) show slight differences with the 
models on the full sample. Specifically, the “Insider CEO dummy” variable, even though it is 
negative in both sample configurations, appears to be statistically significant only in the seasoned-
CEOs subsample. The observed significance of the estimate suggests an adverse effect on the CEO’s 
pre-appointment relationship only when she has experience on the position of the top executive. In 
addition, the market capitalisation variable becomes statistically significant with a negative effect on 
CARs in models (6) and (7), while the relative size variable loses its statistical significance.  
The overall conclusion of Table 4.6 on the relationship between CEO experience and deal 
performance fails to identify the significant relationships reported in the literature. The announcement 
performance in the samples sample is not explained by either inappropriate generalisation (Haleblian 
and Finkelstein, 1999) or hubristic behaviour (Billet and Qian, 2008). The results, so far, are 
consistent with the studies reporting no effect of institutional deal experience on performance (see e.g. 
Kroll et al., 1997; Wright et al, 2002).  
The analysis so far has attempted to shed light on Hypothesis 1, i.e. whether generic deal experience 
has a positive effect on acquisition performance. The results stemming from the OLS models do not 
indicate a significant relationship. The next step is to focus on related CEO deal experience and study 
its effects on performance. 
Table 4.7 displays the regression results on the related CEO deal experience. Models (1) to (5) regard 
the full sample, and models (6) to (10) include the seasoned-CEOs sample. Models (1) and (6) review 
the effect of industry-related CEO experience.60 Models (2) and (7) report on the effect of CEO 
experience on targets with similar public status as the present target. Models (3) and (8) report on the 
deals with CEO-experience on deals in the same target nation as the one at hand. Models (4) and (9) 
account for CEO experience in deals of similar size. Models (5) and (10) account for deal experience 
                                                          
59 The diversification dummy variable becomes negative and statistically significant at 10% confidence level 
only for the full sample, when the industry classification is shifted to Fama-French 48 Industry Classification. I 
retain the results with the 10-industry classification, as the main variables are not affected by changes in 
industry classification. 
60 I have not included the variable on CEO overconfidence in Table 4.7 in order to avoid decreasing the sample 
size. Its inclusion does not affect inferences drawn by the deal experience coefficients and significance levels. 
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that is related to the present deal in any of the aforementioned elements. Despite the variety of 
measures, as well as the flexibility of allowing for any similarity, the specific experience measures 
collectively fail to affect announcement performance. The only exception is the squared term of “Deal 
experience – status”, which shows marginal significance for the squared term. However, the level 
term is insignificant, and it remains insignificant when I remove the squared term in untabulated 
results. Under these circumstances, the marginal significance of the variable does not constitute strong 
evidence on the importance of such related experience. Hypothesis 2, i.e. the expectation of (positive) 
effects occasioned by related CEO deal experience (see e.g. Hayward, 2002), finds no support at this 
point. 
[Insert Table 4.7] 
Tables 6 and 7 have made apparent that the contribution of CEO deal experience during deal 
announcements is negligible at best; investors do not seem to take the CEO’s experience into 
consideration when deciding to evaluate the strategic move and, subsequently, follow up on the their 
opinion by either selling or buying the company’s stock. However, reliance on short-term measures of 
value creation does not come without caveats. Shareholder reaction around the announcement bears, 
at best, all publicly and privately available information about the deal, but lacks full insight on the 
actual factors that may affect the overall deal performance. It is possible that these factors are not 
revealed soon after the deal announcement, and only time will reveal the important deal specifications 
driving acquirer performance. Complementary, investors may have yet to identify the factors that 
seem to yield a significant effect on deals in the long-run. These factors, although elusive and obscure 
near the event date, will more likely be revealed when the initial hype accompanying the deal has 
settled, and when investor perception catches up with the developments pertaining to the deal. 
In order to investigate whether deal experience indeed affects deal performance over and above the 
initial investor reaction, I run regressions on the 1-year Buy-and-Hold Abnormal returns. Table 4.8 
shows the BHAR regressions on the full sample.61 I have included regressions with the level term and 
the pair of level and squared terms separately in order to highlight the discrepancy between the 
assumptions of linear and non-linear effects.6263 
[Insert Table 4.8] 
The results reveal a reality vastly different to the one inferred by CAR regressions. After controlling 
for an extensive array of control variables, general and related experience seems to affect the long-run 
                                                          
61 In untabulated analysis, I perform the regressions on the seasoned CEO sample. The results show qualitatively 
identical patterns. 
62 The adjustment of the company annual returns is based on returns of Size-B/M portfolios. Arguably, the 
variables reflecting size and B/M may affect the inference drawn from the regression model. However, the 
results remain qualitatively identical after excluding the respective variables. 
63 The results remain qualitatively the same when the benchmark portfolios are value-weighted, instead of 
equally weighted. 
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performance of deals significantly. Specifically, general, target industry, target nation, and generally 
related experience variables have statistically significant coefficients for both level and squared terms. 
The level term coefficients are positive and of relatively high magnitude, while the ones for squared 
terms are negative and smaller in absolute terms, indicating an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
experience and performance. This pattern is similar to the one reported by Hayward (2002). The net 
effect of acquisition experience has impressive impact on the overall acquisition performance. For 
instance, for model (2), the aggregate effect of 4 deals in the CEO’s pre-appointment record is a 
positive 6.966% effect on annual BHAR. In contrast, 8 deals of experience lead to an aggregate effect 
of -2.744%.  
A noteworthy feature of Table 4.8 is the performance of the experience variable on similar deal value. 
The coefficients bear marginal statistical significance, and we can attribute the results to the low 
number of occasions in the sample, i.e. only 38 deals, out of which 33 occasions have a value of 1 and 
5 cases have a value of 2; the latter 5 observations do not have data on the hubristic CEO indicator, 
therefore I had to exclude it in order to show the effect of the square term. Overall, due to lack of 
variation in the value of similar deals, the inferences from the specific regression are not 
generalizable. 
Regarding the rest of the analysis, it is important to note the immensely disparate inferences drawn 
when only the level term is included versus when the squared term is included as well. In the 
respective models including general, target industry, target nation, and generally related experience 
measures, the level terms on their own show negative and significant effects, a pattern consistent with 
the overconfidence explanation provided by Billet and Qian (2008). However, when the squared term 
is included, the relationship transforms to an inverse U-shaped pattern, which contributes to the 
explanation of performance as can be seen by the increases in adj. R2.  
Hayward (2002) suggested that the inverse U-shaped relationship can be explained by the 
opportunities the company misses after deciding to focus almost exclusive on targets of a single 
industry and becoming incapable of detecting opportunities in other industries. In Table 4.8, similar 
inverse U-shaped patterns are observed not only for related experience (industry, nation, general 
similarity), but also for general CEO deal experience. However, Hayward was referring to 
organisational focus on a single industry; whether the CEO follows the pre-turnover strategic path or 
not does not relate to the reason higher CEO deal experience in related deal attributes leads to 
exponentially adverse results. Therefore, Hayward’s (2002) framework is inadequate in collectively 
explaining the patterns presented in this study. 
The theoretical framework of CEO overconfidence explains my results in more appropriate fashion. 
Similarly to Billet and Qian (2008), I find that a linear approach of the relationship between 
experience and performance points to monotonically decreasing performance as organisation 
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experience increases. However, when I include the squared term of the respective experience 
component, the relationship becomes non-monotonic, showing beneficial effects of low-magnitude 
experience, with the exception of target status related experience. The pattern is in accordance to 
arguments of overconfidence. CEOs are less likely to become overconfident in deal-making after 
consummating only few deals. However, after assuming a lot of experience, either general or related, 
their performance drops by accelerating steps. Higher experience had led them to perform deals that 
are increasingly value-destroying in the year following the acquisitions. This is an indicator of CEO 
behaviour on issues such as integration and other developments that cannot be foreseen near the 
announcement date.64 The positive and significant coefficient of the overconfidence indicator is 
opposite to the finding of Malmendier and Tate (2008), which could be attributed to sampling 
differences, such as the type of firms and the time period studied.65  
The current study extends the inferences of Billet and Qian (2008) to CEO-specific deal experience, 
suggesting that overconfidence becomes value-destroying when experience has surpassed an 
inflection point. Before that threshold is reached, deal experience bears impressive advantages for 
acquirer shareholders. These outcomes manifest over and above the CEO’s experience in past CEO 
positions and within the acquiring firm. In the next section I discuss the implications and limitations 
of the current study.  
Furthermore, the fact that the inverse U-shaped relationship persists despite the inclusion of the 
hubristic CEO variable is suggestive of the different shades of overconfidence permeating CEOs. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) created the hubristic indicator having in mind that CEOs believe they 
can perform better than their peers, which comprise the target management in the context of 
acquisitions. In the current study, the observed hubristic behaviour is more likely to be attributed to 
the increasing confidence of CEOs in their existing knowledge to substitute their lack of effort; the 
existence and benefits of effort can be observed in cases where the CEOs have not assumed enough 
experience to turn confident in their track record. 
                                                          
64 BHARs are estimated starting the month of the deal announcement. As the average time to completion is less 
than 3 months on average, BHAR spans over a period of about 7 months after the average deal has been 
completed. 
65 Malmendier and Tate (2008) study the period 1980-1994, which has minor overlap with the period 1990-2014 
investigated in the current study. 
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4.6. Discussion and Limitations 
4.6.1. Discussion and Implications 
The current study offers support to contrasting arguments in the literature of deal experience and 
performance. The inverse U-shaped relationship in general and related experience is in accordance 
with the explanation of overconfidence leading to value-destroying acquisitions (Billet and Qian, 
2008), but the positive segment of the relationship supports the argument that experience indeed 
benefits acquirers (Fowler and Schmidt, 1989). It is important to note that most studies in the 
literature have focused on firm-specific experience, while the current study focuses on CEO 
experience at the time of the appointment. A corollary of this distinction suggests that the benefits of 
experience and the harm of overconfidence are not only developed during the previous tenures of the 
incumbent CEO, but they can also be imported to the firm during managerial shifts. This finding bears 
implications for the fiduciary function of the board as agents of shareholders and monitors of upper 
management. CEOs who have accumulated plenty of deal experience before the appointment may not 
necessarily destroy value during deals in the new firm, but they are statistically more likely to display 
reckless or hubristic behaviour, which could hurt shareholder wealth. Directors must be cautious of 
the connection between prior experience and subsequent deal performance not only during the hiring 
process, but also in the design of performance incentives, and the screening process of major 
investments such as acquisitions. 
The finding of the inverse U-shaped relationship also contributes to the academic strand suggesting 
CEO style and attributes are critical for corporate performance (see e.g. Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; 
Weisbach, 1995). CEO experience in past positions has been shown to improve performance in the 
new firm (Alexandridis et al., 2015) and, now, we know that deal experience in modest quantity can 
be an asset for an incoming CEO. Even in the cases of CEO overconfidence due to excessive deal 
experience, the adverse outcome is still a testimony to the importance of CEOs in affecting stock 
performance.  
A surprising finding in the current study is the lack of experience effects around the announcement, 
while the annual performance of the firm is significantly affected by the CEO’s deal record. The 
arguments of market efficiency (Fama, 1965, 1998) suggest that all publicly or privately available 
information should be incorporated in company share prices. However, the current study shows that 
the effect of experience has been affecting the 1-year stock performance for the period of 1990-2012, 
and investors have yet to adjust their reaction to the CEO’s past experience. A simple explanation on 
this discrepancy is found in the nature of the experience measurement: investors, similar to 
academics, may focus on the recent past of the CEO than the aggregate career path, as well as on past 
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performance than the quantity of experience. My expectation is for the market to eventually identify 
this CEO attribute as a source of risk and incorporate it in their deal announcement reactions. 
4.6.2. Limitations 
The research structure of this study allowed for a refined and more focused investigation of the 
relationship between experience and performance. Nevertheless, there are several aspects of the 
research structure which may prohibit the advancement of its inferences into a solid and generalizable 
theory. These restrictions appear mostly in the implicit assumptions of the study. 
First, there are certain criteria which allowed for acquisition experience to be registered for each CEO. 
For instance, her experience must have been gained while she held a CEO position before her 
appointment in the current firm. The underlying assumption in this definition is that only executives 
holding the position of the CEO gain experience from acquisitions. Similarly, I have implicitly 
assumed that only CEOs are able to offer their insight on deals during acquisitions. Consequently, the 
current study is based on the premise that, on behalf of top management, only CEO experience and 
input may affect deal performance. It could justifiably be argued that this approach underestimates the 
experiential and learning capabilities of non-CEO executives, as well as their contribution during 
acquisitions. It would not be an exaggeration to assume that all top executives participating in deals 
gain experience, and that these executives will be able to apply the acquired lessons for the benefit of 
their firm. Thus, seasoned and well-informed investors may consider not only the head of the firm, but 
also the top executives who will contribute to strategic planning and implement the tactical decisions 
in a deal. The experience proxies used in the current study cannot capture the investors’ view on the 
top management team as a whole. It could be argued that a set of aggregate measures on managerial 
experience will offer an enriched view on the experience-performance relationship.  
Taking this argument a step further, an ideal framework would also consider the experience held by 
the members of the board of directors. The chairman and directors of S&P 1500 firms are usually 
experienced in CEO or top executive positions in other prominent corporations. Their collective 
knowledge could be an asset to the CEO during the acquisition design and deliberations. 
Unfortunately, the consideration of both top management and director experience is constrained by 
data availability. 
In detail, during the manual collection of data for CEOs, I realised that the search for non-CEO 
executive and director experience proves severely problematic from several standpoints. The most 
apparent obstacle stems from data accessibility. The online sources of information do not offer a 
historical account on the job experience for most top executives and directors. The databases used for 
this study (EDGAR, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, LinkedIn.com, nndb.com) are adequately detailed on 
executives that have held a CEO position in the past, and they are much less informative on the career 
Chapter 4 CEO Deal Experience 
115 
 
records of other executives. Thus, we cannot come to trust the currently available evidence on non-
CEO executives or directors held on these databases due to inconsistent depth of information.  
Career data availability is not the only concern. Even if the data were available, we would not be able 
to know the extent and quality of experience gained by each executive or director in a particular deal. 
It would be a logical jump to assume that more experienced and proven executives are more engaged 
in deals. Acquisitions may lead to shifts in power or budgetary allocations among divisions, thus 
powerful, self-serving executives may have personal incentives to impair the deal. Even if we were to 
ignore the crippling effect of internal corporate politics, we have to accept the fact that the company 
depends on undisturbed operations even during deal negotiations. Therefore, some of the executives 
will shoulder more responsibility of running the acquiring firm, while the rest of the executive team is 
occupied with pursuing the deal. In that case, we could assume that the people with increased 
administrative responsibilities do not gain as much of acquisition experience as their more engaged 
colleagues, which adds more obscurity to how much deal experience is gained or how much of the 
pre-existing experience is utilised by the management team during deals. In other words, even if we 
had information about the job positions of non-CEO executives during acquisitions of previous places 
of employment, we would not be able to systematically identify whose experience increased or 
mattered during the event. 
The restrictions on data availability, as well as the uncertainty on who actually learns or contributes to 
the process, force the research framework to focus on the single person who is supposed to be fully 
committed to significant investments, and that is the CEO.  
An additional limitation in this study originates in the various definitions of deal experience. The core 
measure of experience is the number of deals performed by the CEO when working in previous CEO 
positions within a decade before the appointment in the acquiring firm. I have accounted for general 
and related deal experience by counting all or related deals in the CEO’s past, respectively. 
Nevertheless, these metrics focus on the quantity of experience, ignoring the critical issue of 
performance and the quality of learning. We would expect that investors would react more positively 
to acquisitions performed by CEOs with a track record of positive performance. Regrettably, only 61 
deals in my sample have CEOs with prior deal experience in public acquirers, and thus historical 
information of past acquisition performance. A regression model aspiring to capture the importance of 
past performance on current announcement CARs would include only deals with public-acquirer-
experienced CEOs, thus the model, in the current study, would be supported by a rather limited 
sample. An alternative solution would be to include the experience CEOs obtained even after their 
appointment in the respective S&P 1500 firm, but this would impede the distinctive advantage of this 
study, which is the disentanglement of organisational and CEO-specific experience. 
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Another restriction transpires from the definitions of experience relatedness. In the specifications of 
related deal experience, I have considered target industry, public status, nation, and deal value. This 
list of potential similarities cannot be considered exhaustive, as firms are defined by more than just 
these characteristics. For instance, CEOs with experience in hostile deals could have an advantage 
when pursuing hostile deals in their new firm. Unfortunately, the full sample used in this study 
includes only 13 hostile deals, since the number of such deals has declined in the U.S. after the 4th 
merger wave in the late 1980s (see e.g. Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). The friendliness of the 
acquisition bid is only one of many potential sources of experience relevance. Additional research and 
data are needed in order to identify other references of experience relevance that could lead to better 
prediction of announcement CARs. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have employed a comprehensive set of deal experience metrics in order identify the 
effects of acquiring CEO experience on company performance. I isolate CEO-specific from 
organisational deal experience and I create measures of general and related deal experience. All CEO 
deal experience measures prove to be unrelated to deal announcement performance for the acquirer, 
but the effects on 1-year BHAR returns follow an inverse U-shaped pattern. This suggests the 
inability of investors to identify the non-linear effect experience has on company performance after 
the initial hype of the announcement settles. The outcome in the current study suggests that deal 
experience in the CEO’s record has positive effects when the quantity of experience is modest, while 
high magnitude order of deal experience tends to turn the CEOs hubristic. This is in partial agreement 
with existing literature, which suggests positive effects of deal experience (Fowler and Schmidt, 
1989) and adverse effects of deal experience due to overconfidence (Billet and Qian, 2008).  
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5. Smart Mega Deals: Value Creation on a Massive Scale66 
5.1. Introduction 
One of the most stylized facts in the corporate finance literature is that mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) tend to destroy value for acquiring firm shareholders more often than they create. During the 
previous two decades this empirical observation has been recurrently highlighted by the business 
press as well as market and academic research.67 This tendency of M&As to fail is more accentuated 
among large acquisitions with a number of recent studies pointing out that “mega-deals” priced over 
$500mil or $1bil end up costing shareholders since they tend to destroy value on a significant scale.68 
A plethora of sizeable mergers and acquisitions, from the frequently quoted landmark deals of AOL-
Time Warner, Daimler- Chrysler and HP-Compaq to more recent ones such as Rio-Tinto-Alcan, Bank 
of America-Countrywide, eBay- Skype and Kmart-Sears to name a few, have all been branded as 
failures since they have resulted in sizeable write-offs and shareholder losses.  
Several explanations have been put forward for why large deals fail to pay off more frequently, with 
the most prevalent ones being overpayment (Loderer and Martin, 1990) emanating from hefty private 
benefits (Jensen, 1986, Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007) or adverse managerial traits 
such us overestimation of the top executives’ ability to extract acquisition gains (Roll, 1986; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2008) and integration complexity, including cultural incompatibility, which can 
hamper post-merger integration (Shrivastava, 1986; Hayward, 2002; Ahern, 2010; Alexandridis et al. 
2013).69 Considering that large M&A deals are typically subject to extensive publicity and investor 
scrutiny, and that their high failure likelihood and associated challenges have been so extensively 
documented and deliberated, it is undeniably surprising that they still fail to create shareholder value 
at such rate and that top executives and corporate boards get it wrong so often. Notwithstanding the 
historical tendency of large deals to end up in disaster, there is good reason to believe that value 
creation in M&As has recently reached a pivotal milestone.  
                                                          
66 This chapter draws heavily from a working paper with George Alexandridis and Nickolaos Travlos. 
67 See for example Mueller (1997), Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001), Damodaran (2005), Bruner (2002), 
Moeller et al. (2005), Boston Consulting Group (2007), Betton et al. (2008), among others.  
68 A report by the Boston Consulting Group  (2007)  shows that “mega-deals” with a value of more than $1 
billion destroy nearly twice as much value as smaller deals, while BusinessWeek (2002) reports that 61% of 
merger deals worth at least $500 million end up costing shareholders. In a more recent study McKinsey (2012) 
finds that only large deals are on average subject to negative abnormal returns, especially among faster growing 
sectors. The Financial Times (2015) also posit that expensive mega-deals are damaging for everyone, except for 
top executives and financial advisors. Alexandridis et.al (2013) report a striking $518 mil loss for acquiring 
shareholders in the average large deal between 1990 and 2007. 
69
 Given the well documented adverse effects of acquirer size on acquisition gains (Moeller et al., 2004), it is 
also possible that sizeable deals are less likely to succeed merely because they are carried out by larger 
acquiring companies.  
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One of the consequences of the worst financial crisis in recent history is that it put internal control 
mechanisms, corporate cultures, executive compensation, and risk management processes on the 
spotlight (see e.g. Gupta and Leech, 2015; Ittner and Keusch, 2015). Accordingly, its aftermath has 
seen an unprecedented regulatory overhaul, a surge in shareholder activism and litigation cases, as 
well as government-driven reform efforts, initially focused on financial institutions, fuelling revisions 
targeted at all listed U.S. companies.70 In addition, the on-going evolution in corporate governance in 
the post-financial crisis era is not merely confined to mandatory reforms but characterised by a more 
pervasive shift towards the voluntary adoption of practices (e.g. more efficient incentive structures, 
greater director specialisation and diversity, increased emphasis on the risks associated with strategic 
goals, the rise of “stakeholder democracy”, and information technology governance) that aim to 
enhance the value creation mechanism and convey more confidence to the public. Such extraordinary 
developments have the potential to positively influence the quality of corporate investment decision 
making associated with inorganic growth and, in particular, the strategic selection, synergy 
justification, deal implementation, and post-merger integration processes, implying the need for a 
thorough investigation of acquisition investments post-2009. Since mega-merger deals have been 
responsible for massive-scale value destruction for shareholders in the past, they should have been 
especially affected by this new environment, making them a natural starting point for our 
examination.   
To that end, we study the characteristics and performance of M&As during this previously unexplored 
recent period and draw important comparisons with the two decades of the 90s and 00s. Our primary 
focus is on a sample of 3,150 completed M&A deals valued at least $500mil (henceforth “mega-
deals”) and carried out by U.S. acquiring firms between 1990 and 2015.71 During the last 25 years 
mega-deals comprised more than 85% of the total US M&A market value. Mega-deal activity 
remained upbeat during the post-financial crisis recovery with a new wave of deals emerging after 
2009 and peaking in 2015, a landmark year for U.S and global M&A deal volumes.72 Such mega-
deals represent the bulk of corporate investment and are an important part of the economy (more than 
5% of U.S. GDP in 2015). From 2010 through 2015 U.S. acquirers announced 783 mega-deals valued 
at $2.71tril, more than during the 6th merger wave of 2003-2007 documented by Alexandridis et al 
(2013). 
                                                          
70 The Dodd-Frank reform act that passed in 2010,  although aimed primarily at financial institutions, it also 
enhanced the effectiveness of monitoring and governance systems for all U.S. listed companies by introducing 
new mandatory disclosure rules, fine-tuning executive compensation, granting more powers to shareholders and 
bolstering the accountability of executives and directors.  
71 The mega-deal classification was motivated by the fact that the breakpoint for the top deal value decile of all 
US M&As during our sample period is around $500mil. It also does not affect the direction of our results or 
main conclusions which are similar when the mega-deal threshold is set to $750 mil., $1bil. or higher although 
this reduces our sample accordingly.   
72 According to Deloitte, M&A Index 2016 and the WSJ-Dealogic Investment Banking Scorecard the value of 
global and U.S. M&As surpassed $4 tril. and $2 tril respectively, the highest on record since at least 2007.   
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Our findings point to striking changes in deal attributes and quality during the most recent period. 
Most notably, acquiring firms create discernible shareholder value through mega-deals post-2009 for 
the first time. Overall, they generate gains of $42 bil or 2.5 cents per dollar spent around the 
acquisition announcement, while they lost $530 bil or 13 cents per dollar spent during the previous 
decade. This corresponds to a $62.3 mil gain to acquiring shareholders in the typical deal, a $325 mil 
improvement relative to pre-2010. The average acquirer was subject to an abnormal return of 2.54% 
around the acquisition announcement. Compared to an average loss of -0.36% recorded from 1990 
through 2009, this represents an extraordinary improvement. A compelling 62% of large deals are 
associated with positive acquirer abnormal returns compared to only 45% in the previous decade and 
49% during the 90s. By any measure acquiring firms create more value for their shareholders during 
the most recent period and the differences are both economically and statistically significant. A 
number of common firm, deal, and market characteristics identified by previous research as pivotal 
acquisition-gain determinants could be driving the recent upturn in acquisition performance. 
First, less than 40% of mega-deals involve a listed target compared to 54% in the 00s and 62% in the 
90s. This reflects a tendency for more large private deals which have been historically associated with 
higher acquirer returns (e.g. Fuller et al. 2002; Moeller et al. 2004; Faccio et al. 2006). However, large 
deals involving private targets and carried out during 2010-15 exhibit a small (0.67%), though 
statistically insignificant, improvement in acquirer gains. Instead, the bulk of the documented increase 
in acquirer returns post-2009 is attributed to the sub-set of listed target acquisitions; they are subject 
to positive abnormal returns (2.01%) and outperform those in the previous decade by a resounding 
5%. Public deals also generate similar gains to private ones, contradicting conventional wisdom that 
acquiring unlisted targets yields higher returns. Moreover, the overall synergistic gains have improved 
dramatically - more than five-fold– during the most recent period, with the average deal being subject 
to a 4.92% or $542 mil combined gain for acquiring and target companies; to our knowledge the 
highest ever documented by any previous U.S. study. We also find that along with being able to piece 
together deals with superior strategic fit, manifested in significantly higher synergy gains, acquiring 
firms have managed to capture more of this added value for their own shareholders than before. 
Studying a sample of 21,222 transactions valued below $500 mil for comparison also reveals 
improvements - albeit less pronounced - in acquirer and synergy gains post-2009 for the sub-set of 
public acquisitions. Conversely, small private deals consummated between 2010 and 2015 fare no 
better for acquiring shareholders. This additional analysis advocates that the documented upturn in 
acquisition performance is not confined only to mega-deals but it applies to all public acquisitions, a 
deal type primarily linked to large scale losses for acquiring shareholders by existing literature, and 
where a great deal of reputational exposure for firms, top executives, and the board of directors is at 
stake.  
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Second, acquirers have steered clear from equity financing with only 5.5% of large acquisitions (12% 
in public deals) being paid entirely with stock and less than 15% of the average offer value being 
equity consideration. This comes in stark contrast to the previous two decades where the practice of 
employing stock financing was notably more widespread. Since the equity issues encapsulated in 
stock offers have been linked to overvaluation signalling (Travlos, 1987) and the agency costs of 
overvalued equity (Jensen 2005), the dearth of stock-financed deals, coupled with the more extensive 
use of cash offers capitalising on cheap borrowing post-financial crisis, may have induced more 
positive acquirer returns. However, acquisition gain differences remain robust after controlling for the 
medium of exchange. In particular, public deals financed entirely with cash generate positive and 
statistically significant returns (2.15%) for acquiring companies while those paid only with equity, 
although only 29, were also subject to positive abnormal returns (1.01%). Again, this is the first time 
that a study documents non-value-destroying stock-for-stock deals for acquirers for a sample of U.S. 
acquisitions.  
Third, the 2010-2015 period is characterised by a strong bull-market rally (the S&P500 recorded all 
an all-time high in 2015) while the 90s and 00s decades encompassed both high and low market 
valuation periods. Since booming markets have been linked to superior acquisition returns (Bouwman 
et al. 2009) the documented improvement may be merely a manifestation of our sample split. Yet, the 
superior returns in the most recent period persist after accounting for aggregate market valuations; the 
significant differentials remain when comparing the recent period with other high valuation periods 
that coincide with merger wave peaks such as 1998-99 and 2005-2007.  
Controlling for a number of additional acquirer-return determinants, as well as industry and company 
fixed effects, acquiring firms completing mega-deals consummated in 2010-2015 still outperform 
those in previous periods by a thumping 2.40%, while the associated synergy gains are around 2.00% 
higher. Propensity score matching (PSM) pairing acquiring firms post-2009 with their pre-2010 
counterparts based on a number of deal characteristics also corroborates the large divergence in inter-
period deal performance.  
Since mega-deals tend to attract media attention, they can take on an artificial lustre driving up the 
share-price of acquiring companies without good reason, especially during a period of sizeable stock 
market appreciation. Nonetheless, large scale transactions come with significant implementation 
challenges that often emerge long after the initial hype, having a protracted impact on the value of the 
acquiring company. To address this, we also examine acquirer returns over longer term windows 
subject to data availability for the latter part of our sample. We find that the large return differential 
documented for post-2009 deals persists up to at least 30 days following the acquisition 
announcement and in fact further increases, indicating that the documented value creation is unlikely 
to be due to short-term market overreaction. Moreover, one-year post-acquisition buy-and-hold and 
calendar time portfolios’ alphas during the most recent period are also positive and statistically 
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significant compared to negative in the previous decades. The superior long-run performance of 
acquirers post-2009 is indicative of more enduring value creation that might stem from possible 
improvements in deal implementation and integration practices post-2009 in addition to superior 
acquisition decisions.  
Our results are consistent with a recent structural shift in the quality and drivers of M&A deals and 
point to value creation from large M&As on a massive scale, contradicting the status quo that such 
type of acquisitions destroy value more often than they create. A number of indicators suggest that 
this remarkable improvement in acquisition quality is concurrent to a more general change in the 
investment behaviour of firms and corporate executives. A measure of CEO over-optimism based on 
executive stock options exercise in acquiring firms, which has previously been associated with value-
destroying acquisition investments (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), indicates that hubristic behaviour 
has diminished dramatically during the last few years. The fundamental change in M&A drivers and 
motives, as well as how top executives view acquisitions, is also evident from the fact that synergistic 
benefits are quoted by acquirers as part of M&A announcements more than twice as often relative to 
the past. Finally, a measure of overall investment efficiency that takes into account acquisitions, 
CAPEX, R&D, and asset disposals based on Richardson (2006) shows that the extent of over- and 
under-investment has significantly receded post-2009. This implies that corporate decision makers 
have aimed towards more optimal investment allocation in recent years, which bonds well with our 
main findings on value creation from M&As. 
The fact that the documented improvement in corporate investment behaviour and quality occurred in 
the aftermath of the worse financial crisis since 1929 implies that our results are most likely triggered 
by this hefty shock. Ensuing changes at the corporate internal control and monitoring levels in 
response to the emerging more shareholder-centric environment deserve special attention. Although 
some anecdotally reported developments (e.g. greater focus on director specialisation and experience, 
strategic risk management, and value creation) are not directly quantifiable due to the limited 
availability of information at the firm level, we consider the impact of more conventional dimensions 
of corporate governance that are likely to capture any broad trend for change.  
We document surges in acquiring companies’ board independence, the ownership of independent 
directors and equity based compensation of their top executives, along with a decline in anti-takeover 
provisions since the previous decade. To investigate whether the superior gains post-2009 can be 
attributed to improvements in the quality of corporate governance we isolate its exogenous pre-to-post 
financial crisis variation, by utilising a two-stage instrumental variable approach. The evidence is 
consistent with the conjecture that our 2010-15 time indicator is a strong predictor of changes in 
corporate governance, which, in turn, can explain acquirer returns. Thus, developments in observable 
dimensions of corporate governance appear to play a pivotal role in the improvement of acquisition 
quality. It is therefore possible that the documented developments at the corporate board level have 
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fostered more accountability and restraint in the executive suite, leading to superior acquisition 
decisions that deliver larger synergistic benefits and also cater for more of the gains to be channelled 
to acquiring shareholders. Yet, concluding unreservedly that better refined governance systems 
singlehandedly drive the recent upsurge in M&A gains would be possibly arbitrary since our time 
indicator can in practice capture other shockwaves of the crisis, such as changes in the psychology of 
corporate leaders due to a sense of enhanced visibility that might reinforce restraint, expedite learning 
from prior mistakes, and foster a focus towards value creation.73  
Our study marks a milestone for research on mergers and acquisitions, as well as the effects of the 
2008 financial crisis on corporate decision making. The documented findings pose a challenge to the 
status quo in the acquisition gains literature and are consistent with a structural shift in the quality and 
efficacy of corporate investment, manifested in M&A decisions that deliver higher returns to 
shareholders than ever before. From the seminal work of Travlos (1987) and Loderer and Martin 
(1990) to the more recent evidence provided by Fuller et al. (2002), Moeller et al. (2004, 2005), 
Betton, et al. (2008) and Alexandridis et al. (2013), the general consensus has been that public 
acquisitions, and particularly large ones, destroyed value for acquiring shareholders more often than 
they created for more than 30 years. Our work brings to light for the first time that this trend may have 
come to an end and that acquiring firms consummating public acquisitions more recently increase 
shareholder value on a ubiquitous scale, in accordance with the predictions of the neoclassical theory 
of M&As (Ahern and Weston, 2007).74 Moreover, to the extent that the documented improvement in 
acquisition gains is associated with the recent developments in internal control mechanisms, our study 
offers significant contribution to existing literature on the quality-enhancing role of corporate 
governance in acquisition decisions (Masulis et al. 2007; Golubov, et al. 2016). To the best of our 
knowledge, it is also the first to provide evidence of the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis on 
corporate investments, which leads up to a broader intuition; large-scale financial shocks can 
ultimately have favourable ripple effects on focal aspects of corporate decision making, bolstering the 
value creation mechanism. The latter notion is consistent to the stylised argument on the benefits of 
“creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942), which highlights the ability of modern economic systems 
to reconfigure themselves via extraordinary events, so that value-destroying ventures and practises are 
abandoned in favour of novel, wealth-increasing ones. 
                                                          
73 It is important to note that although we also observe improvements (albeit of lesser magnitude) in 
conventional corporate governance variables between the 90s and 00s decades, acquisition returns did not 
improve to in this case. This might suggest that either governance has more recently reached a certain focal 
threshold beyond which it makes more of a difference or that there are concurrent changes in other dimensions 
of governance not captured by our conventional measures or in forces entirely unrelated to it that drive our 
results. 
74 Along similar lines, some recent studies have also found evidence pointing to significant net economic 
benefits from M&As using non- traditional measures of value improvement (see Bhagat et al, 2005 and 
Humphery-Jenner et al, 2016). 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data used and sample statistics. 
Section 3 reports the main empirical results. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper. 
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5.2. Data and Summary Statistics 
The sample of mergers and acquisitions is from Thomson SDC and includes completed and 
withdrawn deals announced between 1990 and 2015. We exclude repurchases, recapitalisations, self-
tenders, and exchange offers, acquisitions of remaining interest, minority stake purchases and intra-
corporate restructurings.75 Deals have an inflation adjusted value of at least $5 mil in 2015 dollar 
terms, the transaction relative size is at least 1% and the acquirer owns no more than 20% of the target 
prior to the acquisition announcement and seeks to end up with more than 50% following completion. 
Acquiring firms are U.S. companies listed in NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with data on CRSP. 
Targets are public or private firms. There are 26,076 deals that satisfy these criteria, out of which 
3,604 were worth $500mil or more and are classified as mega-deals.76  
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 show the distribution of deals over time. Mega-deals comprise more than 
85% of the total dollar value spent for M&As by U.S. acquirers during the last 26 years ($14.6 tril) 
and 94% in 2015 ($946.3 mil). Mega-deal activity decelerated in 2008 as a result of the financial 
crisis that brought the sixth merger wave to an end (see Alexandridis, et. al 2012) but recovered again 
in 2010 and has remained upbeat until at least 2015, which is the last year in our sample. The value of 
mega deals announced in 2015 reached $891 bil, which is only comparable to M&A activity during 
the peak of the fifth merger wave in 1998-2000. Annual mega-deal activity during 2010-2015 was 
generally similar to that recorded during the previous merger wave. To the contrary, both the number 
and value of smaller deals (Rest of Deals) for each year during the same period were consistently 
below the levels seen in the 2000s. This indicates a tendency towards larger acquisitions during the 
most recent period. Among them, a number of prominent transactions such as AT&Ts $48.1 bil 
acquisition of Direct TV, the $25 bil Kinder Morgan and El Paso deal as well as the $22 bil 
Facebook-WhatsApp acquisition (See Appendix 2).  
The analysis in the paper is based on a sample split in three sub-periods; the 90s decade, the millennia 
decade, and the most recent and yet unexplored 2010-2015 period. This partition is prompted by the 
fact that the fifth and sixth merger waves took place during the 90s and 00s respectively while the 
latter came to an end as a result of the financial crisis in 2008-09. The post-2009 period thus 
encompasses the recovery in the M&A market documented in Figure 5.1. Alternative untabulated 
sample specifications or partitions (e.g. comparing 2010-15 with other high market valuation periods 
                                                          
75 As part of the intra-corporate restructuring exclusion, we omit transactions where the acquirer and target have 
the same name or ultimate parent.  
76 The criteria are different from Chapters 3 and 4 in order to facilitate the special requirements of this chapter. 
The deal-value threshold has increased in order to include larger deals, mainly in order to avoid confounding the 
“Rest of deals” results with unaccounted size effects. Also, the ownership criteria have been relaxed in order to 
allow for market-expectant deals. The results are similar with the sampling criteria of Chapters 3 and 4. 
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such as 1998-99 and 2005-07 or including year 2009 in the most recent period) are also explored for 
robustness and do not alter our main results and conclusions.  
[Insert Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 here] 
Table 5.2 reports the distribution of deals by period and the target’s business sector based on the Fama 
and French 12-industry classification. Although the differentials in the sectorial composition of targets 
between the three periods appear to be generally trivial in most cases, some patterns stand out. The 
share of financial mega-deals has declined through time, down to 10.1% in 2010-15 from 21.1% in 
the 90s. Since acquisition activity within a given sector tends to respond to industry specific shocks 
(Harford, 2005) or growth opportunities (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002), the outbreak of the 
financial crisis in 2008 can explain this pattern; the extensive losses incurred by financial institutions 
put a halt on significant investment projects. To the contrary, acquisition activity in the finance sector 
among smaller deals does not appear to have been affected. Another noteworthy change is the 
increase in acquisitiveness within the healthcare and the pharmaceuticals segment, which is more 
pronounced among mega-deals. This can be to a great extent attributed to the fact that large 
pharmaceutical companies struggled to cope with expiring patents on a number of key drugs (“patent 
cliff”), thus turning their attention to M&As in order to meet investor growth expectations (Fortune, 
2015).77 The ultimately withdrawn $160 bil Pfizer-Alergan deal in 2015 was the largest ever 
announced within the sector. Finally, the utilities and telecom industries have also recorded slight 
declines in mega-deal activity through time, which is not surprising given that they have progressively 
become more mature and saturated.  
[Insert Table 5.2 here] 
Table 5.3 reports the acquisition sample’s summary statistics for the three periods under investigation 
as well as differentials between these periods. Statistics are segregated for acquirer, target, and deal 
specific characteristics. Accounting ratios are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level where 
relevant. Acquiring firm size has generally increased through time although firms carrying out mega 
deals in 2010-2015 have similar market capitalisation with those in the 2000-2009 decade. The size of 
target firms and deal size among periods is also comparable in mega-deals although they have both 
increased for smaller deals. The target-to-acquirer relative size has decreased significantly pointing to 
smaller deals during the most recent period. This may be explained by the decline in the share of 
listed target acquisitions during the 2010-15 period which is more pronounced in larger deals. More 
than 60% of mega-deals were for private companies compared to around 46% in the previous decade 
and 38% in the 90s which indicates a trend towards larger private deals. 
Both acquirers and targets (to a lesser extent) are subject to lower valuations post-2009 as proxied by 
the market-to-book ratio. Given the evidence on the relation between firm valuation and payment 
                                                          
77 “The real reasons for the pharma merger boom”, July 2015, Fortune. 
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method (see for example Dong at al., 2006; Faccio and Masulis, 2005), this may also partly explain 
the plunge in both pure stock-for-stock deals and share of equity consideration in acquisition offers 
during this period. Only around 5.5% of mega-deals in 2010-2015 are financed entirely with stock-
swaps, which represents a remarkable decline from the 19% and 35% recorded in 00s and 90s 
respectively. The documented scarcity of equity financing during the most recent period can also be 
attributed to the availability of ample corporate liquidity bolstered by healthy profitability as well as 
the historic lows in interest rates which facilitated access to debt financing. The combination of these 
factors led to a dazzling increase in the cash component of acquisition offers during the most recent 
period, where the median mega-deal comprises of 88% cash financing.  
[Insert Table 5.3 here] 
Though the percentage of diversified deals has remained similar over time, cross-border deals have 
increased. This is not unexpected given the race for globalisation as well as the tendency of U.S. 
companies to expand more in emerging markets in order to enhance their growth prospects. Another 
important observation is that there are fewer failed deals during the more recent M&A period. Only 
7.2% of mega-deals have been withdrawn following their announcement relative to 9.6% and 15% in 
the two previous decades respectively. Considering the more stringent regulatory environment 
affecting M&As, and in particular competition policy (Moshirian, 2011), one would have expected to 
see more deal cancellations during 2010-15. The lower withdrawal rate documented may relate to 
more efficient selection and planning of M&A deals or to more reluctance in cancelling announced 
transactions in order to avoid incurring hefty break-up fees (FT, 2016).78 Alternatively, it may be 
attributed to the larger share of less complex private deals in the mix during the most recent period, 
which can also explain the fact that time to deal completion has somewhat diminished.  
Information on deal motives available on SDC (deal purpose description) suggests that M&A drivers 
have evolved significantly post-2009. More specifically, synergistic benefits are mentioned as part of 
the deal announcement in more than 63% of mega-deals, relative to 25% during 2000-2009. If this 
trend reflects a genuine change in acquisition decision drivers then it should translate to greater 
benefits for shareholders. Along these lines, there is some evidence that target shareholders in mega-
deals receive higher premia post-2009 than in the past, although only median differences are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. So if anything, target shareholders do not appear to be 
getting the lion’s share of any additional synergistic value.   
Several statistics point to sizeable improvements in acquiring firm attributes at the C-suite and 
corporate board level that may impact the quality of acquisition decisions. CEO overconfidence, a 
well-documented managerial trait responsible for value-destroying acquisitions (Malmendier and 
                                                          
78 Officer (2003) finds that the presence of a termination fee payable by the target increases the probability of 
deal completion by 20%. The probability of completion may be higher in recent years, as the typical termination 
fee of around 3% before the 2008 crisis has more than doubled after the crisis (Financial Times, 2016).  
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Tate, 2008; Billett and Qian, 2008), appears to be less of a problem for acquiring companies during 
the most recent period. An overconfidence measure based on the timing of stock options exercise 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005) reflects significantly lower levels of managerial hubris post-2009, with 
less than 35% of CEOs that carry out mega-deals failing to exercise their options twice during their 
tenure, although they are 67% in the money. Improvements in corporate governance are also quite 
compelling. The representation of independent directors on the board of the average acquiring firm 
has reached 82% in 2010-2015 relative to around 70% in the 00s and 62% in the 90s.79 This signifies 
a remarkable milestone in the board independence regime; nearly the entire board is now typically 
comprised of independent directors, which is about as optimal as it can get. Moreover, the share of 
equity based compensation (EBC) (Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001) in the top executive’s salary has 
increased significantly. Since EBC and acquisition performance tend to be positively associated 
(Datta et al. 2001), one might expect that the documented increase in EBC might have led to deals of 
superior quality.80 Finally, the stock ownership of independent directors (IDO), one of the most 
consistent predictors of corporate performance among other corporate governance indices and 
variables (Bhagat et. al, 2008), has also increased markedly. This metric is informative since 
independent directors are not typically rewarded for effective monitoring. A rise in independent 
director connectedness to the wealth the firm generates may thus be taken to imply stronger incentives 
for effective monitoring and more effective alignment of interests between directors and shareholders. 
Overall, the trends in all conventional dimensions of corporate governance are consistent with 
remarkable improvements in internal control and incentive alignment mechanisms post-financial 
crisis. Such significant developments, along with the fundamental differences in M&A characteristics 
between the most recent period and the previous two decades, are likely to influence the quality of 
corporate investment decisions and value creation potential.  
 
                                                          
79 Data on the representation of independent directors is from ISS (ex-Risk Metrics). 
80 The percentage of equity in managerial compensation increased from about 20% in early 1990s to about 60% 
in 2010s (Denning, 2014). Some research has also argued that equity based compensation can in fact lead to 
corporate short-termism if it counteracts the effect of stock price performance on executive compensation 
(Bolton et al., 2006).  
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5.3. Empirical Results 
5.3.1. Univariate analysis of acquisition gains 
As a first step in the analysis of acquisition gains we study a comprehensive set of value creation 
metrics. Table 5.4 reports the univariate results partitioned by sample sub-periods and target type 
(public or private), along with the respective differentials. Although the focus of the paper is on 3,150 
mega-deals, results are also reported for the remaining 21,222 deals with acquirer return data in Panel 
B for comparison purposes. ACAR3 is the acquirer cumulative abnormal return for a 3-day (-1,+1) 
announcement window based on the Brown and Warner (1985) market model, which is estimated 
over the window (-301, -46) relative to the acquisition announcement day. For mega-deals, although 
acquirer returns are typically negative and significant, or at best zero, during the previous two 
decades, this appears to have changed profoundly post-2009. The mean (median) ACAR3 in 2010-15 
is a resounding 2.54% (1.34%); an increase of 2.90 (1.72) percentage points relative 1990-2009.81 The 
outperformance of acquirers in 2010-15 can be attributed to the fact that there are more deals with 
positive ACARs (WINNERS3) recently (61.54%) relative to the past (47.01%) and the difference is 
statistically significant. The observation that more than half of large M&A deals fail to create value 
for acquiring companies during the 90s and 00s appears to no longer apply for the most recent period 
where a large majority of acquirers are actually subject to positive abnormal returns. This represents a 
fundamental shift in the status quo.82 
[Insert Table 5.4 here] 
Dollar gains ($GAIN3), computed as the abnormal dollar increase in the market capitalisation of the 
acquiring firm, are also in the same direction. Post-2009, the median acquirer in mega deals realises a 
gain of $86.71 mil in the three days surrounding the acquisition announcement. Prior to this, the 
equivalent loss reported was $16.42 mil. This attests to a compelling improvement in acquiring firm 
shareholder gains during the most recent period. At the aggregate level acquiring firms generated 
gains of $42 bil or 2.5 cents per dollar spent around the acquisition announcement from 2010 through 
2015 whereas they lost $530 bil or 13 cents per dollar spent during the previous decade.  
The fact that acquirers carried out more private deals and used significantly less stock financing in 
public acquisitions during the most recent period may be driving our results. For this reason the table 
also reports abnormal returns separately for public and private deals and also differentiates between 
                                                          
81 In unreported tests we also estimate ACAR32 for a (-30,+1) announcement window to capture part of the pre-
announcement, opaque “merger talks” period. This measure of acquirer returns yields very similar results with 
ACAR3. 
82 Appendix 2 reports details of the 10 largest deals for each of the three periods examined. Six out of ten deals 
in 2010-15 are subject to positive announcement CAR compared to zero out of ten in 00s and four out of ten in 
the 90s. 
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different considerations offered. The bulk of the improvement in acquisition performance appears to 
be stemming from acquisition of listed targets. Private mega-deals also yield higher abnormal returns 
but the difference is not as pronounced or statistically significant. The ACAR3 mean differential for 
public deals between 2010-2015 and 1990-2009 has reached a remarkable 4.45%. More importantly, 
public acquisitions during the post-2009 period are subject to positive and significant at the 1% level 
abnormal returns for acquiring companies (2.01%). In an unreported test we find that this is not 
significantly different to acquirer gains for private deals (2.84%). To the best of our knowledge this is 
the first study documenting that U.S. public acquisitions create value for acquiring shareholders to 
such extent. Moreover, the performance turnaround persists both for pure-cash and stock deals. In 
fact, stock-swap financed public acquisitions are subject to positive abnormal returns during the most 
recent period. Although this sub-set is relatively small and the positive CAR is not statistically 
significant, this is again the first time non-negative returns are reported for stock-financed public U.S. 
deals. 
 
Synergy gains for public acquisitions (SYNRGY3) are estimated as the market-value-weighted average 
of acquirer and target CARs where data for the target is available on CRSP. The improvement in 
combined gains is striking; the average SYNRGY3 for the 2010-15 period is 5.05%. Synergistic gains 
have increased by more than 5 times relative to the previous 20 years and more than 10 times from the 
previous decade (2000-2009). In dollar terms ($SYNRGY3) this corresponds to a striking $543 mil 
gain for the typical mega-deal post-2009 relative to a $173 mil loss in the previous decade. A measure 
of deal value added ($VALUE +), popularised by McKinsey (2015) and estimated as the ratio of total 
market capitalisation change for the acquirer and target around the acquisition announcement adjusted 
for market movements and scaled by the deal value, also points to large improvements in combined 
value creation during the most recent period.83 First, our findings are consistent with the surge in 
synergy related motives reported in Table 5.3 and suggest that acquirers carried out by and large 
superior deals, with better synergistic prospects during the most recent period. Secondly, since we do 
not observe a proportionally equivalent increase in acquisition premia, one might assume that a large 
part of the surge in synergistic gains is captured by acquiring companies.84  
To further explore the share of synergies we employ a measure of the division of gains between 
bidders and targets as in Ahern (2012). ∆$GAIN3 is difference in dollar gains between the target and 
bidder scaled by the sum of their market value 30 days prior to the acquisition announcement. This 
ratio indicates that during the most recent period in our sample targets gained on average 3.16 cents 
more on each dollar of total market value than acquirers as opposed to 5.13 cents more during the 
                                                          
83 “M&A 2014: Return of the big Deal”, April 2015, McKinsey&Company. 
84 Although target returns (TCAR3), have increased significantly in the post-2009 period, this may also reflect 
the higher probability of deal completion during this period considering the smaller share of failed deals.    
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previous decade. Accordingly, not only have acquirers consummated better acquisition deals post-
2009, but they have also managed to secure a larger share of the synergy pie for the benefit of their 
own shareholders. Overall these results mark a structural shift in value creation for large public 
acquisitions. The fact that this type of deals tended to more often destroy value, as widely reported in 
prior literature, is no longer true for the latest period in our sample. In the next section we attempt to 
establish whether this trend reflects genuine improvements in acquisition decisions rather than 
differences in other deal, firm, or market characteristics not accounted for in the univariate analysis.  
Finally, Table 5.4 reports acquisition gains for the sample of 21,222 non-mega deals for comparison 
purposes. The acquisition performance turnaround reported for mega-deals is not evident for this 
sample as a whole. In fact, in some cases ACARs are lower in 2010-15 relative to the previous two 
decades. However, when differentiating between public and private deals it becomes clear that 
acquirer returns have improved even for the rest of the public deals, although to a lesser extent than 
for mega-deals. To the contrary, ACARs for non-mega private deals during the most recent period are 
at best similar to the 90s and 00s and even inferior in some cases. Our results indicate that acquiring 
firms have got better in acquisitions recently, though they seem to have improved more on deals that 
were previously more likely to destroy value; that is public acquisitions and especially larger ones. 
The fact that we only document an increase in M&A gains in this case is consistent with our 
hypothesis given that the reputational exposure of acquiring firms, top executives, and directors in 
such type of deals is more pronounced. Accordingly, if the developments that occurred in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis led to better acquisition decisions, then it is not surprising that firms 
concentrated their efforts on improving in such type of deals. On the other hand, if the drivers of 
private deals and the associated benefits have been more optimal all along, then the same argument 
would not apply to the same extent, if at all, for this subset.    
Figure 5.2 depicts the evolution in acquirer CARs from 30 days prior to the acquisition announcement 
to 30 days after. The difference in pattern between the post-2009 and pre-2010 period is 
extraordinary. For the 90s and 00s returns are marginally negative or fluctuate around zero up to the 
acquisition announcement day, at which point they sharply decline to between -2.5 and -4% until day 
+30. On the contrary, for the 2010-2015 period there is a sizeable jump in CARs around the 
announcement day reaching almost 3%, down to around 2% on day +30. The implied acquisition gain 
differential 30 days following the acquisition announcement between the previous decade and 2010-
15 increased to around 6%.  
[Insert Figure 5.2 here] 
As a result, it is unlikely that the documented return differentials are associated with short-term 
market over-reaction since they but appear to persist – and in fact further increase - up to one month 
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following the acquisition announcement. In section 3.5 we conduct further tests for acquirer returns 
using an even longer window of one year.  
5.3.2. Acquirer return and synergy regressions 
In this section we examine whether the documented improvement in acquisition returns during the 
most recent, post-2009 period can be attributed to any deal, firm, or market characteristics, other than 
those accounted for in the univariate section. We perform a series of cross-sectional regressions where 
the dependent variable is ACAR3 and the main explanatory variables are indicators equal to one if the 
acquisition i) is announced between 2010-2015, ii) is a mega deal, and iii) the interaction of (i) and 
(ii). We control for key variables that have been shown to affect acquirer returns. These are: i) the 
occurrence of a public deal to account for the fact that acquisitions of listed targets tend to be 
associated with lower acquirer returns (Fuller et. al, 2002 and Faccio et. al, 2006); ii) an all-stock 
dummy to control for the negative abnormal returns associated with acquisitions of listed targets paid 
for entirely with stock (Travlos, 1987); iii) the natural logarithm of the transaction value since larger 
public deals are evidently subject to more negative abnormal returns (Alexandridis et. al, 2013);85 iv) 
the acquirer market-to-book value given the firm misvaluation implications for bidders (Moeller et. al, 
2005; Dong et. al, 2006), v) a competing bid variable to capture the potentially negative effect of 
competition on the gains to acquiring firms (Bradley et al., 1988); vi) a control for takeover hostility 
since it tends to be negatively associated with acquirer returns (Schwert, 2000); vii) a diversification 
dummy variable equal to one when the acquirer and target have different 2-digit SIC codes to account 
for the fact that diversifying acquisitions have been found to destroy shareholder value (Morck et al, 
1990); viii) a cross-border indicator equal to one when the target is outside the U.S. since higher 
announcement returns are documented for acquisitions of foreign targets (Moeller and Schlingemann, 
2005); ix) a serial acquirer control which accounts for the fact that multiple bidders tend to make 
worse acquisitions (Fuller et al, 2002; Billett and Qian, 2008); x) the acquiring firm’s leverage 
(Maloney et al., 1993) and FCF ratios (see e.g. Jensen, 1988; Lang et al., 1991); xi) a high market 
valuation indicator equal to one when the deal is announced during a month with an abnormally high 
de-trended market P/E ratio as in Bouwman et al. (2009); finally, we control for industry and 
company fixed effects where relevant. Table 5.5 reports the regression results.  
[Insert Table 5.5 here] 
                                                          
85 Due to their high correlation (up to 71%) we do not simultaneously include acquirer and target size in the 
regressions. Alexandridis et al. (2013) find that the acquirer size effect documented by Moeller et al. (2004) is in 
fact primarily driven by target size. For this reason we have opted for target size as a control variable. Although 
including both does seem to introduce multicollinearity to the regression, it still does not alter our findings and 
conclusions with regards to the improvement in acquisition returns.    
Chapter 5 Smart Mega Deals 
133 
 
In specifications 1 through 4 we run the regressions for mega deals only. The coefficient of the 2010-
15 indicator variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in regressions 1-3. In 
regression 2 deals carried out during the latest period are subject to a 1.69% higher ACAR3 after 
controlling for other known acquirer return determinants, which corroborates the recent turnaround in 
acquisition gains reported as part of the univariate findings. This superior performance can be largely 
attributed to the striking improvement (by 3.72%) in acquisitions of public targets as seen in 
regressions 3 (only public deals) and 4 (only private deals).86 In an unreported regression we re-run 
model 2 for deals consummated between 2010 and 2015 only and find that the indicator variable 
Public becomes statistically insignificant. This attests that public deals generate as much value for 
acquiring shareholders as private ones do during the most recent period, which outcome is particularly 
compelling considering existing evidence on wealth creation via M&As.  
In specifications 5-7 we run the regressions for the overall sample that includes both mega and non-
mega deals to gain insight into the relative improvement of the former relative to the latter. The 
variable of interest here is the interaction between the 2010-15 period and the mega-deal indicator 
variables. We exclude deal value since the mega-deal dummy variable already captures transaction 
size.87 In regression 5 the negative coefficient for 2010-15 suggests that, in general, acquisition 
returns were lower during this period relative to the past. Moreover, mega-deals have a negative 
influence on ACARs, which is consistent with prior literature that acquirer returns decrease with the 
size of the target. However, the 2010-15 x Mega-Deal interaction variable points to a 3.17% higher 
acquirer return for large deals carried out during the most recent period, relative to all remaining 
transactions. This result remains robust after all other control variables are introduced in regression 6. 
In specification 7 we include all deals post-2009 to examine whether mega-deals outperform the rest 
during this period and find that they do so by 1.45%, which is in line with our univariate findings. So 
it seems that not only have acquirers consummating mega-deals managed to create more value for 
their shareholders post-2009 relative to the two previous decades, but also that carrying out mega-
deals during this latest period has been more beneficial for acquiring shareholders relative to pursuing 
smaller deals. This is an important result and it is consistent with a reversal of a conventional trend 
documented in M&A literature; the negative association between deal size and shareholder gains 
(Loderer and Martin, 1990; Alexandridis et al., 2013).  
It is possible that the documented shift in the deal size - acquirer return relationship is associated with 
the fact that transactions involving listed targets are less prevalent post-2009 than in the past. Fuller et 
al. (2002) argue that a possible explanation for the positive relation between size and acquirer returns 
in private deals is the liquidity discount pertinent to unlisted target acquisitions and Officer (2007) 
                                                          
86 While the 2010-15 coefficient in specification 4 is statistically insignificant it becomes significant when 
excluding some of the control variables. Therefore, there is still some improvement for private-mega deals but 
this can be explained by other firm and deal characteristics.    
87 The correlation between the two variables is 70.5%. 
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finds evidence consistent with such discounts.88 To address this, regressions 8 and 9 examine more 
directly changes in the relationship between deal size and acquirer returns in public deals post-2009. 
The coefficient of deal size swings from negative and statistically significant pre-2010 to insignificant 
post-2009. This finding attests that larger deals no longer destroy value for acquirers during 2010-15 
which is documented for the first time and is inconsistent with the perception that large acquisitions 
are more likely to end up in disaster. It also shows that acquiring companies have recently become 
better at tackling the challenges associated with larger public acquisitions either through attaining 
more strategic combinations and/or more efficiently managing their heightened complexity and 
cumbersome integration process.  
In regressions 10 and 11 we examine whether the inclusion of company fixed effects has an impact on 
our results. Golubov et al. (2015) report that firm fixed effects alone explain at least as much of the 
variation in acquirer returns as all the firm- and deal-specific characteristics combined. Accordingly, it 
may be the case that the superior performance of acquirers post-2009 can be explained by unobserved, 
time-invariant firm characteristics. Although the inclusion of company dummy variables (1,440 
companies for (10) and 6,102 companies for (11)) results in a very significant increase in the adj. R2, 
the coefficient of the interaction variable 2010-15 x Mega Deal in regression 11 remains almost 
unchanged relative to regression 6. Further, the time-indicator 2010-15 is still significant in regression 
11, indicating that the documented turnaround in acquisition performance is not attributed to specific 
extraordinary acquiring firms.  
The univariate results presented in Table 5.4 suggest that the improvement in acquirer returns post-
2009 coincides with an unprecedented increase in synergistic gains. Acquiring firms have carried out 
deals with impressive economic benefits and also managed to channel more of the incremental 
combined value gains to their own shareholders. In this section we examine the magnitude of the 
increase in combined gains during the latest period relative to the previous two decades in a 
regression framework, whereby we include the same control variables as in Table 5.5. Table 5.6 
reports the results from the regression analysis where the dependent variable is the value-weighted 
combined SYNRGY3 to acquiring and target firms. Regressions include only acquisitions of listed 
targets since synergy gains can only be estimated for those deals.  
[Insert Table 5.6 here] 
In regression 2, mega-deals consummated in 2010-15 are subject to a 3.67% higher synergy gains 
relative to those carried out during the preceding 20 years, after controlling for a number of known 
acquisition return determinants. Considering that the typical mega-deal was subject to a combined 
gain of only 1.00% and 0.43% in 90s and 00s respectively, the recorded increase in synergies is 
                                                          
88 After running regression 6 for the sample of private deals, we also confirm that acquirer gains increase with 
the size of the deal, a relationship which is significant at 1% level (untabulated).  
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remarkable. In regressions 3 and 4 we also include non-mega deals to explore if the documented 
improvement is a more widespread phenomenon among public acquisitions. In specification 4 the 
2010-15 coefficient points to a 1.77% higher combined CAR for public deals during this period. Thus, 
acquiring firms have also got better in delivering synergistic benefits in non-mega public acquisitions 
– albeit to a lesser extent. Moreover, the mega-deal and the interaction variable 2010-15 x Mega Deal 
behave in a similar way as in the acquirer return regressions; synergy gains tend to be less in mega-
deals but this is not the case for those consummated post-2009, which generate 1.81% higher 
combined CARs relative to all remaining deals. Therefore, again, the typical mega-deal carried out 
during the latest period truly stands out. Controlling for company fixed effects (808 companies for (6) 
and 1,783 companies for (7)) in regressions 6 and 7 cause the coefficients of the time indicator and 
interaction variable to decrease somewhat, although they still remain statistically significant. Overall, 
results from the synergy regressions point to superior synergistic benefit expectations post-2009 and 
are consistent with the acquirer return findings.  
To ensure that the relationship documented in sections 3.2 and 3.3 is not driven by extreme CAR 
observations we also run quantile regressions estimated at the median and other percentiles (25th and 
75th). The analysis is repeated for all mega-deals in Table 5.7 where the dependent variable is ACAR3 
in specifications 1-3 and SYNRGY3 in specifications 4-6. The magnitude of the 2010-15 time 
indicator varies but it remains statistically significant at the 1% level in all 6 specifications, reiterating 
the superior performance of mega-deals during this period.  
[Insert Table 5.7 here] 
5.3.3. Acquisition gains based on propensity score matching  
Although the positive relationship between the 2010-15 time indicator appears to be robust to a 
number of firm and deal-level return determinants, we also employ a propensity score matching 
(PSM) technique which can control more directly for observable differences in the deal characteristics 
between mega-deals consummated during the most recent sub-period and prior to this. Essentially, 
this approach produces close matches of post-2009 deals to pre-2010 counterpart transactions on the 
basis of their similarity and then compares their gains. As a first step we use a logit model to estimate 
the impact of all firm and deal characteristics we utilised in Tables 5-7 on the likelihood of a deal 
being part of the post-2009 sub-set. Panel A of Table 5.8 reports the regression results for the sample 
of 2,939 and 1,316 mega-deals for the CAR3 and SYNRGY3 samples used in Tables 5 and 6. Several 
variables appear to be important in differentiating 2010-15 deals from their counterparts. For instance, 
post-2009 deals are less likely to be public and financed entirely with equity as seen in specification 1. 
They also tend to be associated with less hostility and competition among bidders, and are more likely 
to be consummated during high valuation months, consistent with the summary statistics reported in 
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Table 5.3. The Public coefficient in specification 1 implies that the probability of observing a public 
deal in 2010-15 is 43% less (83% less for a stock-for-stock deal). 
[Insert Table 5.8 here] 
Panel B reports the PSM results for both performance proxies (CAR3 and SYNRGY3) based on two 
different techniques: i) the nearest-neighbor matching; and ii) the Gaussian kernel matching. 
Propensity scores are estimated from regressions 1 and 2 respectively. Deals are matched on the basis 
of their nearest (one-to-one), thirty, and fifty neighbors. Treated sample CAR3 corresponds to post-
2009 CARs and Control CAR3 to the matched deals’ CARs. Both acquirer and synergy gains for the 
treated samples are higher than the control sample ones, and the differentials range from 2.3-3% for 
CAR3 and from 3.6% to 3.8% for SYNRGY3, all significant at the 1% level. Overall, our results on 
alternative nearest predicted probability matching approaches corroborate that mega-deals completed 
during the latest sample period outperform very similar deals from the previous two decades. So 
unless, there are important characteristics not captured in the first step of the approach, the 
outperformance of more recent deals seems to be largely robust.  
 
5.3.4. Do developments in corporate governance drive the results? 
Although we have reported a compelling pattern in the data pointing to unprecedented improvements 
in the quality of mega-mergers following the 2008 financial crisis, the ultimate driving force(s) that 
induced such a sharp structural shift on M&A decisions remain unclear. Our main hypothesis predicts 
that the developments that occurred in response to the crisis at the corporate governance level can 
potentially affect how directors and executives approach the selection and implementation of 
acquisition opportunities, as well as the degree of their accountability toward shareholders in carrying 
out value-increasing investments. The widespread collapse of trust among capital providers, the 
government, and the general public regarding the operation of financial institutions had ripple effects 
for non-financial institutions, putting corporate governance for all listed companies on the spotlight. 
The ensuing reforms, as part of the Dodd-Frank act passed in 2010, introduced new mandatory 
disclosure rules, re-aligned executive compensation, bolstered the accountability of corporate top 
executives and granted more powers to shareholders. However, these mandatory reforms, can account 
for less than half the story, with anecdotal evidence attesting to a much deeper and ubiquitous urge for 
change among listed companies, especially the most sizeable ones.  
Accordingly, the aftermath of the crisis has seen a shift towards the voluntary adoption of practices 
such as more efficient incentive structures, greater director specialisation and diversity, increased 
emphasis on the risks associated with strategic goals and operations as well as the rise of “stakeholder 
democracy” and information technology governance, all aiming to enhance the value creation 
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mechanism and convey more confidence to the public. Such profound changes in internal control 
mechanisms can potentially induce more shareholder-centric decision-making and - in view of the 
role corporate boards play in M&A decisions (Deutsch et al., 2007; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001) - 
exert a positive influence on the selection and justification of acquisition investments as well as the 
deal implementation and post-merger integration processes, thereby justifying the widespread 
improvements in acquisition gains we document in this study. Since some of the aforementioned 
developments in corporate governance are not directly measurable or quantifiable due to the limited 
availability of information at the firm level, we focus on some more conventional dimensions that are 
nonetheless likely to capture any broad trend for change. These are board independence (Shivdasani 
and Yermack, 1999), the stock ownership of independent directors (Bhagat et. al, 2008), and the BCF 
anti-takeover provisions index (Bebchuck et al., 2009). 89 
To examine whether the hefty improvements in corporate governance documented in Table 5.3 are to 
any extent associated with the positive relationship between acquisition gains and our post-financial-
crisis indicator, we employ a two-stage regression approach as in Golubov et al., (2016). Although the 
crisis in itself may be seen as an exogenous source of variation in corporate governance, partly 
addressing potential endogeneity concerns, the two-stage approach is necessary in order to isolate the 
effect of this exogenous component and determine whether the ultimate source of acquisition gains is 
associated with the pre-to-post crisis variation in corporate governance. Table 5.9 presents the results 
from the instrumental variable estimation. 
[Insert Table 5.9 here] 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the post-2009 indicator in the first stage 
regressions suggests that this period is linked to higher independent director representation and stock 
ownership as well as less anti-takeover provisions among acquiring firms (regressions 1, 3 and 5 
respectively), after controlling for the same set of deal characteristics as in our main regressions.90 We 
can also deduce that our 2010-15 variable is a credible instrument for the corporate governance 
variables employed, and especially the degree of board independence. The BI coefficient in the first 
stage implies a higher representation of independent directors on the board of acquiring companies by 
14% (so about one additional independent director on a 7-seat board). In the second stage OLS where 
the dependent variable is ACAR3, we omit the time indicator and the corporate governance variables 
are based on their expected values from stage one. The results here indicate that variations in all three 
governance proxies are significant determinants of acquirer abnormal returns, confirming that the 
                                                          
89 Although our board independence variable is continuous, in unreported tests we have also used an indicator 
equal to 1 when independent directors comprise more than 50% of the board as in Masulis et al. (2007) and 
obtain similar results. Alternative board independence thresholds, for instance 60%, also produce similar results. 
90 Since our time indicator 2010-15 captures the difference in corporate governance between a 6-year period 
(2010-15) and a 20-year period (1990-2009) we re-run the test for the sub-sample starting in 2004 and obtain 
similar results.  
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post-2009 turnaround in acquisition performance can be linked to improvements in corporate 
governance. In unreported tests we also repeat the same regressions using synergy gains instead of 
ACAR3 and find similar results. 
There are of course other concurrent developments emerging at the same time which might be 
captured by our time indicator in the regressions. For instance, changes in the psychology of corporate 
leaders due to a sense of enhanced visibility that might reinforce restraint, expedite learning from 
prior mistakes, and foster a focus towards value creation, along with a surge in shareholder activism 
and litigation associated with mergers and acquisitions, can all impinge on the quality of investment 
decisions.91 Although these drivers may be seen as directly or indirectly related with the governance 
regime change discussed above, we recognise that if acquirer returns are affected by the time-
indicator other than through its effect on governance then the exclusion restriction in our two-stage 
approach is violated. Consequently, our results on the effect of corporate governance need to be 
interpreted with caution.  
To more directly quantify the impact of a change in board independence – our main governance proxy 
– on acquisition gains we employ a diff-in-diff approach for a sub-sample of 172 acquirers that have 
consummated at least one mega-deal both pre-2010 and post-2009. We rank these acquirers on the 
basis of their change in board independence from the fiscal year end prior to the year of their last deal 
in the pre-2010 period to the fiscal year end prior to the year of their first deal in 2010-15 (∆BI). Then 
we also estimate a corresponding ∆CAR3 for each pair. Acquirers in the top ∆BI quintile are subject to 
an average (median) increase in CAR3 of 3.03% (1.89%) and those in the bottom quintile experience a 
decrease in abnormal returns -2.03% (-2.47%), with the differences being significant at the 1% level. 
We can therefore conclude that firms with the highest increases in the representation of independent 
directors on their boards manage to improve their deal making. Conversely, those that experience no 
or small improvement in corporate governance make more value-destroying deals than before. The 
direction of our findings is also similar for the other two measures of corporate governance, IDO and 
BCF.  
5.3.5. Do the gains persist in the long-run? 
Our analysis so far suggests that the market is more optimistic about the announcement of mega-deals 
taking place during the latest period in our sample. Although the price reaction around a deal proposal 
tends to provide a good approximation of the actual value creation for shareholders, the question of 
                                                          
91 The probability of directors being sued by investors for a major merger decision they made has reached 90% 
in the recent period (Lajoux, 2015), while about 97% of all deals larger than $100 mil result in litigation battles 
(Gregory, 2014). Therefore, directors are more incentivised to perform their fiduciary duties to the best of their 
abilities, to avoid the negative publicity and other repercussions of an adverse decision in the court of law.  
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whether the superior expectations documented are eventually attained is equally important, especially 
in large transactions that entail a high degree of complexity. In addition, if acquirers have got better at 
carrying out acquisition investments because focal aspects of the M&A process, including 
implementation and integration, have improved, then this would show up primarily in long-term post-
acquisition value creation metrics. Since the latest sub-set of our sample comprises of deals 
announced between 2010 and 2015, it is not currently possible to assess the long-term impact of the 
majority of these deals using stock return or operating performance measures estimated over extensive 
post-acquisition windows. Since operating performance changes tend to be meaningful over at least 3-
years (Barber and Lyon, 1996; Mikkelson et al., 1997, Eberhart et al., 2004) we have opted for stock 
returns.92 
[Insert Table 5.10 here] 
We employ two different measures to estimate long-run post acquisition stock performance; i) buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) using the Fama and French 25-Size and book-to-market portfolios 
and ii) calendar time portfolio regressions (CTPR) using the Fama and French three factors model 
augmented with Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor.  
Table 5.10 presents the results. In accordance with the announcement-window findings, acquirers 
carrying out mega-deals in 2010-15 fare better in terms of abnormal returns. The average acquirer is 
subject to a 4.42% BHAR in the 12-months following the acquisition announcement, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the mean BHAR for all previous periods is 
negative and significant, suggesting that the majority of mega-deals have ultimately been value-
destroying for acquirers prior to 2010. We also run a cross-sectional regression of the BHAR on the 
2010-15 time indicator and other control variables utilised in our ACAR analysis.93 Accounting for 
other return determinants the coefficient of the indicator implies a 3.5% higher BHAR for post-2009 
deals. The CTPR results are similar with only the 2010-15 sub-set showing signs of value creation; the 
monthly 4-factor regression alpha of 0.36% for this period corresponds to a 4.5% 12-month abnormal 
return. Conversely, the CTPR alpha is negative for the 90s and 00s. These findings provide support to 
the argument that acquirers have carried out superior acquisition investments during the latest sample 
period that delivered long-term benefits to their shareholders. 
5.3.6. Has overall investment efficiency improved? 
                                                          
92  We still lose 394 mega-deal observations and 4,863 non-mega deal ones in our long-run stock return analysis 
due to lack of data in Compustat (for the purpose of matching with size and B/M portfolios) or the 
announcement date being in 2015.  
93 We exclude acquirer M/B from the control variables since the dependent variable (BHAR) is already adjusted 
using the Fama and French firm size and book-to-market portfolios. We still include deal value since it is quite 
different from acquirer market value.  
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Our analysis so far has focused on the effects of M&As on share prices. Although this is a standard 
approach for assessing value creation from acquisitions, it offers little information on how efficiently 
firms allocate funds to M&A investment opportunities relative to their growth prospects. More 
importantly, if firms make better acquisition decisions they should have also become more efficient in 
other investments, such as CAPEX and R&D. To that end, we employ a measure of acquiring firms’ 
residual investment, RESINV, which captures the investment that diverges from the expected level of 
investment, given a set of factors that have been shown to predict the optimal investment level (see 
e.g. Richardson, 2006; Biddle and Hilary, 2006). Specifically, we run the following regression for 
20,970 acquiring firm-year observations for the entire sample period:94 
 
INVi,t = α + βi Qi,t-1 + Leveragei, t-1 +Cashi,t-1 + Company Agei, t-1 + Sizei, t-1 + Stock Returni, t-1 + INVi, t-
1 + FE + εi, 
 
Following Richardson (2006) INVi,t is the sum of capital, R&D, plus acquisition expenditures minus 
sales of PPE and necessary maintenance for assets in place for firm i in year t from Compustat, scaled 
by prior-year book value of total assets. The independent variables are estimated at the end of the 
previous fiscal year t-1. Q is the market value of the firm (market value of equity and book value of 
debt) over total asset value. Leverage is the ratio of total debt over book value of equity. Cash is the 
log of total value of cash and equivalents. The company age is in logarithmic form and it is calculated 
by the incorporation date as displayed in Compustat. Size is the log of total asset value. Stock Return 
is the percentage change in the market value of equity for the past year. We also include the previous 
year’s INV term. FE corresponds to industry fixed effects. The absolute value of the residual from the 
investment efficiency equation, εi, is the residual investment measure, RESINV, and it reflects the 
extent of managerial investment inefficiency. 
[Insert Table 5.11 here] 
A lower value of RESINV for acquiring companies post-2009 would provide a strong indication that 
firms have become more meticulous in the allocation of capital to investment opportunities. Table 
5.11, Panel A shows the regression results and Panel B provides the univariate values of RESINV pre- 
and post-2010 as well as their differentials. The extent of investment inefficiency is significantly less 
post-2009 suggesting that corporate leaders have consistently aimed towards more optimal investment 
allocation in recent years. The turn towards more efficient investment strategies may have potentially 
                                                          
94 INV and all explanatory variables are estimated for each acquiring firm-year in our sample period. So a bidder 
completing a mega-deal in 2004 will be included in the regression for all 26 years subject to data availability. 
This is because the purpose of this test is to examine the efficiency of all firm’s investments not just M&As. In 
addition focusing on M&A years only would produce inflated investment figures. Nonetheless, including 
acquiring firms in the test only once, at their acquisition announcement year, still produces similar results.    
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laid the foundation for the documented improvement in acquisition performance and together attest to 
a structural shift in corporate decision making towards more value enhancing investment. 
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5.4. Conclusion  
One of the most reiterated facts in the M&A literature is the tendency of acquiring firms to destroy 
value for their shareholders, especially when consummating large deals, which comprise the bulk of 
M&A activity. In stark contrast with the status quo, we show that this trend has been largely reversed 
for the first time post-2009. Acquisition gains during 2010-15 show signs of staggering improvement 
on a broad set of conventional measures, both around the deal announcement and in the long-run. The 
value creation turnaround documented is more pronounced among public deals which are generally 
known for destroying shareholder value. During the most recent period acquisitions of listed targets 
generate positive abnormal returns for acquiring shareholders, even in stock-for-stock deals, and as a 
result, they no longer fare worse than private deals. The associated synergistic gains have also 
increased dramatically, indicating overall value creation from M&As on a massive scale and acquirers 
have been able to secure more of those gains for their own shareholders. We also provide evidence of 
acquiring firms employing more efficient investment allocation strategies during the most recent 
period, manifested in lower degrees of over- and under-investment. These changes in the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis coincided with significant developments in the corporate governance 
environment, which have the potential to foster increasingly optimal investment decisions that cater 
for shareholder value creation more than ever before. Although the rather abrupt turnaround in 
acquisition performance may be also be driven by other unobserved changes that occurred as a result 
of the financial crisis, our evidence suggests that it can be at least partly explained by the variation in 
conventional governance characteristics. 
The documented findings mark a milestone in existing knowledge about gains from acquisitions and, 
in accordance with the neoclassical theory of M&As, challenge conventional wisdom that acquiring 
firms destroy shareholder value more often than they create. They also imply that a financial crisis of 
grand scale and its after-effects can ultimately contribute towards the more effective monitoring of 
corporate investment decisions as well as the associated implementation process, bringing sizeable 
gains to shareholders. Since some of the shockwaves associated with such crises tend to dissipate with 
time it remains to be seen if the trends we report in this study persists in the future.  
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Part III 
Conclusion to the Thesis 
 Bibliography 
144 
 
6. Conclusion 
6.1. Summary and concluding remarks 
This thesis has been a treatise on the corporate finance strand of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). 
Its purpose has been to investigate unexplored or neglected nooks in the area of deal-making and 
elucidate the findings with structured argumentation and intuition. This endeavour has manifested 
throughout 3 empirical chapters, which are dedicated to conventionally independent areas within the 
field of M&As. Therefore, Chapter 2, which was a standalone account on literature developments, has 
covered a broad range of the topics in M&As. It is a crucial reading for the unfamiliar reader and a 
useful reminder for the specialist; in both cases, a general framework regarding M&As is built, paving 
the way to the empirical segments, creating or recalling a mind-set for M&As. The empirical chapters, 
when appropriate, fared their own ad hoc literature review sections, which aimed to narrow the 
reader’s focus on the subject of the respective segment. 
The first concept empirically investigated was the ability to timely and accurately predict which 
publicly listed companies will become targets of acquisition bids, having in mind the wealth-creating 
opportunities for investors who can reap the benefits of deal premia, as well as the management teams 
who seek to position their firm as an acquisition target so that their shareholders can earn significant 
stock returns. The results suggested that the model cannot satisfy both stakeholder groups, since the 
superior performance achieved by investing prospective targets is not associated with similarly high 
accuracy in identifying the actual targets. This discrepancy may be attributed to the difference 
between a firm having all the designated characteristics to become a target and actually receiving a 
bid. 
The study, as well as the proliferation of the overall literature strand in Acquisition Target Prediction 
(ATP), has been inspired by the seminal study of Palepu, who attempted the first structured 
formulation of hypotheses, in addition to addressing methodological issues of previous studies. The 
majority of studies in this field, including Palepu’s, have been unable to detect profitable investment 
opportunities by investing in expected targets. However, more recent studies (see e.g. Brar et al., 
2009; Cremers et al., 2008) have reported impressive investment performance for their respective 
portfolios. Chapter 3 has incorporated new predictive factors, as well as methodological adjustments, 
and it sided with the latter body of work, highlighting that the long-run performance of expected 
targets was close to the actual target performance, although the volatility in their annual returns has 
been more accentuated.  
The long-run performance of predicted targets portfolios has been based on the rolling estimation of 
the model, which has not been reported in the ATP literature before. The aim of adopting a multi-
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period framework has been the assessment of the model’s intertemporality in terms of both accuracy 
and investment performance. The result has revealed the fragile nature of the model, as the 
significance of predicting factors varies over time, and so does accuracy and investment performance. 
Nevertheless, the model performs better than the average study in the ATP literature for most 
individual iterations. These results bear significant implications for both practitioners and academics. 
First, investment managers can benefit from this study by acknowledging the profitable opportunities 
offered in the market for corporate control. However, management teams and other stakeholders, who 
want to know which attributes they should seek in order to qualify as prospective targets, receive 
discouraging feedback from this study, since the incessant change of targetability factors does not 
allow for a static, textbook approach on the task at hand. Second, the implication on the academic 
literature concerns the revelation that one-period models may provide spurious or impractical 
suggestions; the pursuit to identify targetability factors should incorporate their tentative nature, as 
well as changes in the decision making process of acquirers. 
The next concept investigated in this thesis has been the effect of acquisition experience on the stock 
performance of acquirers. Accordingly, Chapter 4 utilised a set of manually collected data on CEOs of 
S&P1500 firms, and reported the effectiveness of their past deal experience on future acquisition 
performance. The outcome supported the existence of non-monotonic relationships between 
experience and performance, as reported in the seminal study of Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), 
although the nature of the relationship was not the previously displayed U-shaped curve, but was 
better described by an inverse U-shaped structure. While Haleblian and Finkelstein provided the 
explanation of inappropriate generalisation of experience, suggesting that CEOs apply lessons from 
deals indiscriminately, the framework better interpreting the results in the current study has been 
related to CEO hubristic behaviour. Specifically, when CEOs have experience of few deals, they 
remain alerted and vigilant in order to cope with the deal-specific intricacies, but when they have 
consummated more deals in the past, they tend to rely more on existing knowledge and their intuition, 
showcasing traits of overconfidence. This explanation has been similar to inappropriate application of 
knowledge, but the component of learning was overcome by the hubristic thinking accompanying 
sizeable experience. 
A reason for the discrepancy in the results could be attributed to several factors, such as the different 
sampling period, as well as the novel approach in measuring CEO experience. Most previous studies 
considered organisational experience, while the few studies placing the CEO as the main host of 
experience considered all deals performed during a specific time span before each respective deal. 
The latter approach has not offered insight on the importance of the experience at the time of CEO 
appointment. That framework assumed the experience acquired in new and old positions to be of 
same value, although deals performed within the new organisation may be affected by the 
organisational knowledge as well. In order to tackle the issue of confounding measures of experience, 
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I isolated the CEO deal experience gained up to 10 years before the appointment in her position, and 
subsequently considered the effect of the corresponding experience on deals occurring up to 10 years 
after the appointment. The effect proved to be insignificant for the short-run returns around the 
announcement, but it was significant for long-run returns, suggesting experience had an effect on deal 
execution and target integration. The effect was strong for general deal experience, as well as for 
experience on similar deal traits, such as target industry and nation. 
The aforementioned results yielded significant implications for academics and practitioners in the 
areas of investments and corporate governance. Investors could benefit by taking into consideration 
the acquiring CEO’s experience before the appointment, and decide on whether they want to invest in 
favour or against the respective company’s stock price in the long run. The board of directors could 
benefit by evaluating the expected benefit of the CEO’s deal experience on the company’s stock price, 
and decide accordingly on the appropriate monitoring tools and intensity, as well as the compensation 
and incentives structure to be offered. Furthermore, Chapter 4 contributed to the literature strands of 
learning and value creation in M&As. Specifically, pre-appointment CEO deal experience proved to 
be a factor for long-term wealth creation for acquirers, while the learning function documented by 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) has been questioned. 
The third and final concept investigated in this thesis was also in the area of value creation. The most 
popularised fact about acquisitions in the literature has been the negligent or negative returns for the 
acquirer in the average deal. This fact has not been verified for the deals consummated after the 
financial crisis of 2008, which has led to one the most turbulent economic conditions since the “Great 
Depression” crisis in the 1930s. Chapter 5 has been dedicated to the re-examination of the value-
destroying of deal-making for the post-crisis period. The focus of the study was on large U.S. deals, 
since sizeable deals have been reported to have contributed most to the notoriety of M&As (see e.g. 
Moeller et al., 2004, 2005). For the first time in the academic literature, the average deal in 2010-2015 
created consequential wealth for acquirer shareholders. After a series of tests, the effect has been 
attributed to major improvements in the returns of public deals, as well as negligent improvements in 
private deals. Stock deals, which have also been reported to destroy acquirer value, have improved 
dramatically. The prevalence of progress in deal-making could further be affirmed by the 
unprecedented superiority of recent deals in both short- and long-run returns. By all accounts, large 
deals, which comprise more than 85% of the M&A value in U.S. in any year of our sample, have 
started creating wealth on a massive scale. 
The financial crisis has led to a widespread re-configuration of the economic and corporate 
environment, with regulatory authorities revising the operating framework of companies in order to 
restrict future exposure to similar systemic threats. The main regulatory addition has been the “Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” (Dodd-Frank Act), which amended the 
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financial regulations, as well as transparency and corporate governance standards for non-financial 
firms. The stunning improvement in acquisition returns during 2010-2015 could be due to these 
reforms, which have instilled greater accountability and incentives for more effective monitoring of 
management by the board of directors. Indeed, Chapter 5 showed impressive improvements in several 
corporate governance metrics, which have been shown to affect deal returns. Nevertheless, the direct 
influence of regulatory changes on non-financial firms was not nearly as detailed and demanding as 
the one imposed after the “dot-com” crisis in 2001, in the outline of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This 
rationale follows that the advancements in corporate governance have not been only in the measurable 
aspects of board independence and director ownership of the firm, but also in qualitative aspects such 
as the motivation and effectiveness of monitoring. 
The newfound results on M&A wealth creation had several contributions on our knowledge regarding 
deal-making. First, the status quo of public, stock, and large deals destroying value in the aggregate 
has been reversed. This is strong evidence that value-destruction has not been an intrinsic component 
of deals with such characteristics, but it has been a lack of refinement in governance and incentive 
alignment that allowed for suboptimal deal target selection, execution, and integration. The 
replacement of CEOs and board members because of the crisis reached record levels, setting an 
example for future position holders; poor performance will be punished, and deal-making is not 
exempt from judgement. The second major implication of Chapter 5 has been highlighting the 
significance of consequential market shocks in regime shifts. The financial crisis of 2008 has not been 
the only turbulence in the recent U.S. history, since almost every decade bore witness of at least one 
major, nationwide crisis. Still, value destruction has not receded after the crises in the 90s or 00s. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the financial meltdown, as well as the centrality of the financial 
system in the modern capitalistic societies have led to striking improvements in deal-making. The 
observed advancements in performance may be bound to regress back to unexciting levels, although 
the resilience of the new status quo remains to be seen. 
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6.2. Future Research Suggestions 
Research is an ceaseless process; any academic study, no matter how much it enlightens people or 
benefits society, serves as a stepping stone for the subsequent studies trying to expand the field and, as 
a result, our understanding of reality. This thesis is no exception. In this section, I provide insights and 
suggestions on future extensions of the three empirical studies presented. 
6.2.1. Acquisition Target Prediction 
Chapter 3 attempted to identify a better model regarding the accurate and timely classification of 
prospective targets as such, in order for investors and managers to act on the information. An 
examined concept, which has not provided fruitful results, has been the consideration of the acquirer 
activity in the respective industry of the prospective target. Specifically, the argument follows that 
even if a company has high targetability, there should be a critical mass of acquirers active in 
purchasing firms in that respective industry; deals need at least two counterparts. Although the results 
of Chapter 3 do not provide support for this notion, its intuitive nature invites for additional effort in 
identifying other dimensions of latent acquisitiveness. For instance, connections between the BoDs of 
targets and acquirers has been shown to affect deal premia and returns (Cai and Sevilir, 2012). It 
could be argued that higher intercompany connectivity via the directors could result in lower 
information asymmetry for a larger number of acquirers, therefore increasing the well-informed 
acquirer base for the respective firm. If one or more of the connected, potential acquirers indeed have 
the attributes of potent acquirers, then the probability of observing an incoming bid should be 
significantly higher than in the opposite case. 
A different approach between the distinction between targetiveness and acquisitiveness could be 
performed on an intra-company basis. Firms have been alleged to perform acquisitions in order to 
avoid becoming targets of unsolicited bids (Gorton et al., 2009). These “defensive” acquisitions aim 
to increase the company’s size and complexity in order to make it less attractive or feasible target to 
potential acquirers. Accordingly, a framework capturing the dual, conflicting role of a company in the 
market for corporate control may have the capability to diminish the targetiveness of defensive 
acquirers and, consequently, refine the prediction of the model. Defensiveness of firms does not have 
to be restricted to acquisition activity, but it can also include the incumbency of existing management. 
For example, the number of directors who have formed relations to the CEO before her appointment 
to that position, and who have joined the board after her placement. While a high number of such 
connections may suggest the CEO’s intention to build a compatible team, it could also prove to be the 
modus operandi of self-serving CEOs. In this case, the market for corporate control may consider the 
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targetiveness of the respective firm increasing, as long as the incumbency is accompanied by the 
expected value-destroying behaviour. 
6.2.2. Acquisition Experience and Performance 
The main discovery of Chapter 4 has been the controversial role of CEO-specific deal experience on 
acquisition performance. CEOs with modest experience at the time of the appointment yield better 
acquisitions performance than their more experienced peers. The alertness and caution exercised by 
the less experienced executives holds for measures of both general and deal-related experience. An 
aspect of this study that could be benefited by an extension could be the definition of important 
related deal attributes. Target industry, public status, deal size, and nationality may be only a portion 
of the significant aspects in deal experience that may guide CEO behaviour on consecutive deals. The 
deal attitude, potential regulatory restrictions, or other shades of experience may also prove to verify 
or contrast the results presented in Chapter 4. 
An additional area needing further investigation is the domain of deal experience. The majority of 
studies focus on firm-specific experience, while only a small portion refers to CEOs when measuring 
deal experience. Each of the two approaches serve the purposes of, first, focusing on what is 
perceived as the key source of experience and, second, accommodate data availability issues. 
Although it is more challenging to chart the record of CEO deal-making when compared to firms, 
information on CEOs is still ample, enabling studies as the one presented in this thesis. Data 
availability is significantly inferior when the reference point of experience includes the individual 
records of top executives and directors. Although the deal decision making process may appoint the 
CEO as the leading force, since she is main instigator for the strategic action, it would be irrational to 
assume only a negligent effect from the top management, since their role is to advise the CEO, as well 
as contribute to the post-merger integration process. The rest of the management team is usually 
comprised of practitioners with valuable intuition skills. Therefore, it would only be natural to 
consider their own deal experience and its effect on acquisition performance. The availability of data 
has seen a minor improvement in the recent years due to advancements in reporting requirements by 
listed firms, and there is optimism for more detailed information provided for the rest of the C-suite 
executives, as well as the directors. 
6.2.3. New paradigm is M&A Value Creation 
The most stylised fact in the M&A literature has been the value-destroying effect on acquirer 
shareholder wealth. Chapter 5 has displayed a structural shift in the deal-making process, since the 
acquisition returns for even the notoriously value-destroying public or stock deals have turned 
positive. The main perpetrator for this change is the revamping of corporate governance prompted by 
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the financial crisis of 2008. A straightforward expansion of this study is the re-examination of wealth 
creation in M&As after a considerable amount of time in order to verify whether this change has been 
a momentary anomaly in the aftermath of the crisis or a permanent transformation in deal-making. In 
the same direction, future studies could aggregate M&A data for more countries and evaluate whether 
the global nature of the crisis has led to a global shift in M&A performance. If the results indicate a 
heterogeneous effect, then additional research may shed light on the factors allowing or hindering 
corporate governance changes to influence deal performance. 
In Chapter 5, the dimensions of corporate governance included have been popularised by the 
academic literature. It would not be absurd to argue for the imperative need to introduce novel 
indicators of governance, especially after the implications of the financial crisis. Few of the main 
regulatory requirements have been the increase in monitoring transparency and the establishment of 
risk management committees, staffed by member of the BoD. At the time of this thesis, the 
availability of information on the existence of such committees, as well as the construction of 
measures on monitoring transparency are far from satisfactory. Nevertheless, as reporting becomes 
more detailed and information-intensive, researchers will be able to tap into new pools of data and 
provide strong evidence on the significance of the new measures. 
6.3. Limitations 
Academic research faces several limitations, and this thesis has been no exception. The main source 
of limitations can be attributed to the opaqueness of business operations and the information 
asymmetry between market participants and academics. For instance, Chapter 3 suggests the 
targetiveness factors that are observable by the whole market do not materially improve prediction 
accuracy. Decision makers in acquiring firms could potentially use proprietary information, which is 
unavailable to outsiders. Similarly, as stated in Chapter 4, researchers are unable to observe which 
executives contribute more to a deal, therefore it is uncertain whose experience matters during an 
acquisition process; the focus on CEO experience aims to proxy for the experience of the management 
team, though its effectiveness could be questioned in a stricter framework. The same issue with 
transparency and information availability affects the inferences of Chapter 5. The main perpetrator of 
deal-performance improvement has been the advancements in corporate governance. However, 
several critical aspects of governance, such as risk management committees or level of accountability, 
cannot be tested directly, as the information has not yet been reported consistently in the companies’ 
proxy statements. As a result, progress in governance has been substituted with factors popular in the 
literature, which may prove to capture only portion of changes in governance. These limitations are 
expected to be alleviated in the future, as more information becomes available and researchers would 
not need to use substitutes or omit variables due to lack of data. 
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Tables and Figures 
3 Chapter 3  
Table 3.1 Sample Statistics. 
The table reports annual deal and firm frequency. Column (1) shows the year, columns (2) and (3) display the total number 
and consideration of deals. Columns (4) to (7) display the number and percentage of complete and withdrawn deals.  
Year Deals Value Completed Deals Withdrawn Deals 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 N $ bil N % N % 
1988 69 60 21 30.43 48 69.57 
1989 59 35 29 49.15 30 50.85 
1990 32 24 17 53.13 15 46.88 
1991 24 7 14 58.33 10 41.67 
1992 23 7 13 56.52 10 43.48 
1993 24 58 15 62.50 9 37.50 
1994 45 23 24 53.33 21 46.67 
1995 54 14 28 51.85 26 48.15 
1996 68 106 34 50.00 34 50.00 
1997 85 110 50 58.82 35 41.18 
1998 103 328 58 56.31 45 43.69 
1999 99 371 53 53.54 46 46.46 
2000 66 161 35 53.03 31 46.97 
2001 40 88 27 67.50 13 32.50 
2002 36 74 20 55.56 16 44.44 
2003 36 27 19 52.78 17 47.22 
2004 46 206 32 69.57 14 30.43 
2005 53 110 32 60.38 21 39.62 
2006 55 122 35 63.64 20 36.36 
2007 48 114 26 54.17 22 45.83 
2008 42 110 12 28.57 30 71.43 
2009 44 94 29 65.91 15 34.09 
2010 37 72 24 64.86 13 35.14 
2011 28 54 16 57.14 12 42.86 
2012 27 68 19 70.37 8 29.63 
Sum 1,243 2,443 682 - 561 - 
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Table 3.2. Standard Hypotheses and Respective Dummy Variables. 
The table displays the continuous variables used in prior literature and the conditions for the corresponding dummy variable 
assuming the value of 1 in the current study. The first column states the hypotheses as displayed in Palepu (1986), the second 
column matches each hypothesis to one or two continuous proxies, and the third column regards the condition on which the 
corresponding dummy variable gets the value of one. All dummy variables assume the value of 1 if the company lies in the 
bottom (or top for leverage) 25% of the industry in the year t-1. 
Hypothesis Continuous Variable Condition for Dummy=1 
Inefficient Management Net income over Total Assets Bottom 
 Sales Growth for 1 year Bottom 
Liquidity Cash and Cash Equivalents over Total Assets Bottom 
Size Log of Year-end Market Cap. Bottom 
Market-to-Book Year-end Market Cap. over BV of Assets Bottom 
Price-to-Earnings Year-end Market Cap. over Net Income Bottom 
Leverage Long-term Debt over Common Equity Top 
 
 
 
 
 
 Tables and Figures 
173 
 
Table 3.3. Summary Statistics. 
The table reports the mean and median values for all firm-year observations of target and non-target firms for the period 
1988-2012.  Column (1) and (2) display the variable name and the type of the statistic. Columns (3) and (4) report the 
statistic values for non-targets and targets respectively. Column (5) shows the differences, as well as the significance of the 
differences, between columns (3) and (4). Differences in means are tested with T-tests and differences in medians are tested 
with Wilcoxon tests. The notations *, **, *** correspond to significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Detailed 
definitions of the variables can be found in the Appendix. 
Variable Type Non-Targets Targets Differences 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) – (3) 
Market Cap. $ mil Mean 1,306.51 1,848.45 541.94*** 
 
Median 135.09 145.46 10.37*** 
 
N 58,315 4,701 
 
Market-to-Book Mean 2.98 2.94 -0.04 
 
Median 2.04 1.94 -0.10*** 
 
N 58,026 4,639 
 
Price-to-Earnings Mean 15.86 15.18 -0.69 
 
Median 13.47 11.83 -1.64*** 
 
N 58,189 4,691 
 
Return-on-Assets % Mean 0.28 -1.03 -1.31*** 
 
Median 4.32 3.39 -0.92*** 
 
N 59,119 4,829 
 
Sales Growth % Mean 15.27 12.93 -2.34*** 
 
Median 6.95 4.50 -2.45*** 
 
N 54,966 4,636 
 
Liquidity % Mean 18.63 16.79 -1.84*** 
 
Median 10.01 7.84 -2.18*** 
 
N 59,119 4,829 
 
Leverage % Mean 50.28 66.60 16.32*** 
 
Median 17.85 28.77 10.92*** 
 
N 59,109 4,823 
 
Buy-and-Hold Returns % Mean 0.40 -4.67 -5.07*** 
 
Median -8.46 -10.64 -2.18*** 
 
N 54,317 4,639 
 
Past Withdrawn Bid % Mean 0.00 4.49 4.49*** 
 
N 59,197 4,850 
 
Serial Acquirer % Mean 89.41 89.55 0.13 
 
N 59,197 4,850 
 
Industry Synergies % Mean 2.30 2.42 0.11** 
 
Median 1.93 2.07 0.14*** 
 
N 59,197 4,850 
 
Activity Concentration % Mean 2.29 2.59 0.30*** 
 
Median 1.01 1.20 0.19*** 
 
N 59,197 4,850 
 
Activity Value % Mean 14.77 16.99 2.23*** 
 
Median 9.00 10.22 1.22*** 
 
N 59,197 4,850 
 
HHI % Mean 10.25 10.39 0.14 
 
Median 7.61 7.78 0.17* 
 
N 59,197 4,850 
 
Capital Liquidity $ mil Mean 122.06 105.94 -16.12*** 
 
Median 75.98 65.75 -10.22*** 
 
N 59,197 4,850 
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Table 3.4. Acquisition Target Prediction Model. 
The table reports three logit regressions for the sample period 2007-2011. The dependent variable is the event of a company 
being targeted during a specific year. The first model includes only control variables and the respective accounting variables 
in continuous format. The second one includes only control variables as well, and the accounting variables have been 
replaced by dummies that take the value of 1 if the firm lies in the 25% of the industry-year segment with the higher 
expected targetiveness. Specifically, dummies on Return-on-Assets, Sales Growth, Market-to-Book, Price-to-Earnings, and 
Liquidity assume the value of 1 if the continuous value is in the bottom 25% of the industry-year distribution, while the 
dummy on Leverage assumes the value of 1 if the firm lies in the top 25% of the industry-year distribution. The third 
regression includes the variables in the second regression in addition to novel predictors. All regressions are performed on 
1,892 observations, of which 199 are Targets and 1,693 are Non-Targets. The notations of *, **, *** correspond to 10%, 
5%, and 1% statistical significance respectively. Detailed definitions of the variables can be found in the Appendix. 
Variable  Models 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept   -1.965*** 
 
-1.736*** 
 
-2.744*** 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns   -0.051 
 
-0.084 
 
-0.083 
Log Market Capitalization   -0.072 
 
-0.090** 
 
-0.085** 
Return-on-Assets   -0.890** 
    
Sales Growth   -0.544** 
    
Market-to-Book   0.016 
    
Price-to-Earnings   0.000 
    
Leverage   0.319 
    
Liquidity   0.009 
    
Return-on-Assets Dummy   
  
0.422* 
 
0.426* 
Sales Growth Dummy   
  
-0.076 
 
-0.070 
Market-to-Book Dummy   
  
0.372 
 
0.378 
Price-to-Earnings Dummy   
  
0.166 
 
0.132 
Leverage Dummy   
  
0.232 
 
0.242 
Liquidity Dummy   
  
-0.014 
 
0.033 
Capital Liquidity Change   
    
0.428 
Activity Concentration Change   
    
2.485** 
Activity Value Change   
    
0.021 
Serial Acquirer   
    
0.976** 
Industry Synergy Change   
    
-2.810 
HHI Change   
    
-2.945 
Past Withdrawn Bid   
    
0.372 
    
     
Pseudo R-Square 
  
0.007 
 
0.009 
 
0.016 
 
N  1,892  1,892  1,892 
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Table 3.5. In-sample Prediction Statistics per Probability Level. 
The table exhibits the prediction accuracy statistics with respect to Model 3 in Table 3.4 for different levels of cut-off 
probability. Column (1) displays different levels of probability increasing by increments of 5%. Columns (2) to (5) show the 
in-sample correctly and incorrectly classified targets and non-targets assuming the corresponding level of cut-off probability. 
Column (6) and (7) display the Sensitivity and Specificity at each level of cut-off probability. Column (8) shows the 
concentration ratio of actual targets in the horizontal sum of columns (2) and (4), which constitutes the “Predicted Targets 
Portfolio”. 
Probability Correct Prediction Incorrect Prediction Sensitivity Specificity 
Concentration 
Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(%) Targets Non-Targets Targets Non-Targets (%) (%) (%) 
5 186 90 1,603 13 93.47 5.32 10.40 
10 88 1,139 554 111 44.22 67.28 13.71 
15 37 1,501 192 162 18.59 88.66 16.16 
20 17 1,622 71 182 8.54 95.81 19.32 
25 7 1,667 26 192 3.52 98.46 21.21 
30 2 1,685 8 197 1.01 99.53 20.00 
35 1 1,689 4 198 0.50 99.76 20.00 
40 0 1,691 2 199 0.00 99.88 0.00 
45 0 1,692 1 199 0.00 99.94 0.00 
50 0 1,692 1 199 0.00 99.94 0.00 
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Table 3.6. Prediction Accuracy in Forecasting. 
The table shows the prediction statistics of the forecasting performed on data of 2012, based on the estimates of Model 3 in 
Table 3.4 and the suggested level of cut-off probability of 25% derived from information in Table 3.5. Column (1) shows the 
actual number of firms classified as targets and non-targets in 2012. Column (2) shows the number of classified targets and 
non-targets resulting from the forecasting process. Columns (3) and (4) display the number and percentage of firms correctly 
predicted as targets and non-targets in Column (2), respectively. 
 Actual 
Predicted Targets 
Portfolio 
Correctly Predicted 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Targets 27 35 3 8.6% 
Non-targets 1,430 1,422 1,366 96.1% 
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Table 3.7. Prediction Accuracy Comparison with Literature. 
The table exhibits prediction accuracy statistics for the current and previous studies. Column (2) shows the “Predicted 
Targets Portfolio”, i.e. the number of predicted Targets in the out-of-sample forecasted portfolios. Column (3) shows the 
percentage of actual targets in Column (2). Columns (4) and (5) show the Sensitivity and Specificity in the respective study. 
Column (6) displays the ratio of correctly predicted targets and non-targets over total actual targets and non-targets. 
Study 
Predicted 
Targets 
Porfolio 
Portfolio Target 
Concentration 
Sensitivity Specificity 
Overall 
Accuracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      
Current study 35 8.6% 11.1% 95.5% 94.0% 
      
Palepu (1986) 625 3.8% 80.0% 44.7% 45.7% 
      
Powell (2001) 96 2.1% 6.9% 93.3% 90.8% 
      
Powell (2004) 42 4.8% 6.9% 98.9% 96.2% 
      
Brar et al. (2009) 93 45.2% 15.7% 92.8% 71.7% 
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Table 3.8. Cumulative Portfolio Returns. 
The table reports the buy-and-hold abnormal returns of Actual and Predicted Targets and Non-Targets Portfolios for the full 
calendar year of 2012. The returns have been adjusted for market returns with the equally weighted CRSP index. According 
to the investment strategy, an investor allocates funds equally to all firms in the “Predicted Targets Portfolio”, i.e. the firms 
that are expected to receive a bid in the year 2012, on the first available trading day in January. At the end of each month, 
firms that have received a bid are removed from the portfolio and the liquidated funds are allocated equally to the rest of the 
holdings. At the last trading day of December, the remaining firms in the portfolio are liquidated and the overall returns are 
adjusted for market returns.  
 Portfolios 
 
Actual Predicted 
 
Targets Non-Targets Targets Non-Targets 
BHAR % 43.07 -3.57 4.62 -3.10 
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Table 3.9. Rolling Model Estimation. 
The table reports the logit model estimates for 18 different periods. Each period consists of 5 years and the step for each next period is 1 year. The sampling process for each model is 
independent. Each model incorporates the same predictors with Model 3 in Table 3.4. The notations of *, **, *** correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical significance respectively. Detailed 
definitions of the variables can be found in the Appendix.  
Variable Model 
 
1990-1994 1991-1995 1992-1996 1993-1997 1994-1998 1995-1999 1996-2000 1997-2001 1998-2002 
Intercept -2.336*** -2.348*** -2.483*** -2.367*** -2.208*** -2.131*** -1.924*** -2.037*** -1.798*** 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns -0.152 -0.190 -0.033 0.081 0.018 0.029 0.009 -0.079 -0.127 
Log Market Capitalization -0.171*** -0.167*** -0.107** -0.087** -0.061* -0.071** -0.050 -0.054* -0.080** 
Return-on-Assets Dummy 0.167 0.324 0.327 0.489** 0.203 0.257 0.368* 0.428** 0.295 
Sales Growth Dummy -0.465 0.369 -0.553 -0.740 -0.106 -0.167 -0.091 -0.358 -0.257 
Market-to-Book Dummy 0.113 -0.008 0.221 0.251 0.459** 0.522*** 0.263 0.113 -0.017 
Price-to-Earnings Dummy 0.265 0.084 -0.333 -0.361 -0.251 -0.236 -0.169 0.113 0.025 
Leverage Dummy 0.505** 0.352 0.017 0.215 0.283 0.205 0.285 0.245 0.091 
Liquidity Dummy 0.260 0.180 0.050 0.125 0.264 0.170 0.272 0.208 0.150 
Capital Liquidity Change 0.024 -0.087 -0.118 -0.225 -0.140 -0.019 -0.049 -0.024 0.046 
Activity Conc. Change 1.048 0.479 0.536 0.286 0.175 -0.399 -0.119 -0.002 -0.177 
Activity Value Change 1.062* 0.759 0.288 0.698 0.083 0.248 0.508 0.150 0.169 
Serial Acquirer 0.350 0.358 0.526* 0.457 0.388 0.534 0.256 0.331 0.166 
Industry Synergy Change 1.380 0.611 0.763 0.367 0.577 0.019 -0.995 -0.262 1.595 
HHI Change -1.624 -1.939 -5.597 -8.030** -7.470** 1.221 0.917 2.032 1.875 
Past Withdrawn Bid 1.239*** 1.653*** 1.334*** 1.220*** 1.061*** 0.928*** 0.589** 0.880*** 0.241 
          
Pseudo R-Square 0.023 0.025 0.016 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.011 0.012 0.009 
N 2,075 2,203 2,350 2,483 2,611 2,668 2,663 2,624 2,564 
 Tables and Figures 
180 
 
Table 3.9. Rolling Model Estimation Continued. 
Variable Model 
 
1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 2003-2007 2004-2008 2005-2009 2006-2010 2007-2011 
Intercept -2.068*** -1.942*** -1.726*** -1.801*** -3.124*** -2.498*** -2.617*** -2.744*** -2.744*** 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns -0.166* -0.121 -0.158 -0.047 -0.073 -0.141 -0.116 -0.083 -0.083 
Log Market Capitalization -0.124*** -0.084** -0.092** -0.113*** -0.034 -0.049 -0.105** -0.085** -0.085** 
Return-on-Assets Dummy 0.147 0.194 -0.029 -0.050 0.157 0.374 -0.028 0.426* 0.426* 
Sales Growth Dummy -0.415 0.037 0.148 -0.150 0.338 -0.206 0.035 -0.070 -0.070 
Market-to-Book Dummy -0.302 -0.388 -0.095 0.121 0.171 0.389 0.221 0.378 0.378 
Price-to-Earnings Dummy 0.024 -0.074 -0.102 -0.452 -0.018 -0.041 0.172 0.132 0.132 
Leverage Dummy 0.115 0.141 0.158 0.299 0.268 0.291 0.281 0.242 0.242 
Liquidity Dummy 0.365* 0.374 0.443* 0.497** 0.471** 0.188 0.097 0.033 0.033 
Capital Liquidity Change 0.032 -0.059 0.121 -0.034 0.019 0.014 0.189 0.428 0.428 
Activity Conc. Change -0.058 0.275 -0.526 0.481 0.850 0.724 2.045* 2.485** 2.485** 
Activity Value Change 0.129 0.090 -0.074 0.494 0.468 0.057 0.123 0.021 0.021 
Serial Acquirer 0.480 0.024 -0.276 0.046 0.968* 0.515 0.979** 0.976** 0.976** 
Industry Synergy Change 1.142 -0.879 -2.723* -2.801* -3.161** -3.726** -1.257 -2.810 -2.80 
HHI Change 1.989 -0.816 -9.555* -11.411** -14.268** -14.516*** -8.491* -2.945 -2.945 
Past Withdrawn Bid 0.240 0.467 0.786* 0.316 0.636 0.703* 0.718* 0.372 0.372 
          
Pseudo R-Square 0.012 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.016 
N 2,451 2,362 2,316 2,263 2,185 2,125 2,062 1,977 1,892 
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Table 3.10. Rolling Model Portfolios Performance. 
The table reports the annual buy-and-hold abnormal returns of Actual and Predicted Targets and Non-targets Portfolios. The annual returns are adjusted for the equally-weighted CRSP index. 
The portfolios of actual firms are formed with respect to the historical status of the firms as targets or non-targets during the respective year. The portfolios of predicted firms are formed by the 
forecasting process performed on the company information of the respective year. The portfolio strategy requires equally-weighted investment in all securities of the specific classification at the 
beginning of January of each year. At the end of each month, the holdings of targeted firms are liquidated and reallocated equally to the remaining stocks in the portfolio. The holdings are 
liquidated completely at the end of December of the corresponding year.  
Panel A: Buy-and- Hold Abnormal Returns %  Panel B: Forecasting Performance 
Year Actual  Actual  Predicted  Predicted  
 
Total 
Targets 
Total Non-
targets 
Predicted 
Targets 
Predicted 
Non-targets 
Correct 
Targets 
Target 
Concentrati
on (%)  
 Targets Non-Targets Targets Non-Targets        
1995 29.1 -4.8 17.6 -5.8  54 2,781 168 2,667 11 6.5 
1996 5.8 -3.1 22.6 -3.3  68 2,990 47 3,011 3 6.4 
1997 22.8 0.6 8.6 0.8  85 2,964 135 2,914 12 8.9 
1998 26.8 -0.9 30.2 -0.7  103 2,795 71 2,827 4 5.6 
1999 35.8 -10.6 29.1 -10.9  99 2,708 121 2,686 9 7.4 
2000 40.9 16.8 24.6 17.1  66 2,646 93 2,619 4 4.3 
2001 49.6 8.2 59.6 7.0  40 2,517 98 2,459 3 3.1 
2002 -6.8 -15.4 27.8 -16.9  36 2,453 103 2,386 4 3.9 
2003 -11.2 -4.1 22.1 -4.7  36 2,354 47 2,343 1 2.1 
2004 11.7 -7.0 19.3 -7.7  46 2,317 93 2,270 4 4.3 
2005 12.2 1.7 29.5 1.5  53 2,229 40 2,242 2 5.0 
2006 10.1 -0.6 2.3 -0.5  55 2,138 58 2,135 3 5.2 
2007 25.9 2.3 6.1 2.6  48 2,004 128 1,924 3 2.3 
2008 24.2 1.1 1.9 1.5  42 1,900 162 1,780 3 1.9 
2009 34.7 -0.5 132.2 -3.3  44 1,795 80 1,759 5 6.3 
2010 15.4 -6.6 25.9 -8.6  37 1,657 140 1,554 9 6.4 
2011 43.3 3.7 19.8 4.0  28 1,533 38 1,523 3 7.9 
2012 43.1 -3.6 4.6 -3.1  27 1,430 35 1,422 3 8.6 
 
 Tables and Figures 
182 
 
4 Chapter 4  
Table 4.1. Frequency of post-appointment deals. 
The table displays the breakdown of 3,785 post-appointment deals by the pre-appointment deal experience of the acquirer CEO. Column (1) counts any type of deal experience. Columns (2) to 
(5) count the past deals which share similarities with the deals performed by the CEO after the appointment. Column (2) counts the pre-appointment deals where the target was in the same 
industry as the target in the deal under investigation. Column (3) counts the deals which had targets with the same public status as in the post-appointment deal. Column (4) counts the number of 
deals which had a deal value +/- 20% of the post-appointment deal. Column (5) considers the deals which had target firms in the same industry as the deal under investigation. Column (6) 
counts all pre-appointment deals that have any similarity with the post-appointment deal, as they are presented in columns (2) to (5). The bottom row of the table shows the total number of deals 
in the respective column with at least some CEO deal experience. The figures in the parentheses indicate the percentage compared to the total experienced-CEO deals in column (2). 
Pre-appointment Deal 
Experience 
 Any Experience  Related Experience 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 Target Industry Target Public Status Deal Value Target Nation Any Similarity 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
 
  
 
          
0  3,538  3,617 3,634 3,747 3,605 3,545 
1  110  65 92 33 93 113 
2  35  27 16 5 32 36 
3  30  22 17 0 15 29 
4  26  19 10 0 14 21 
5  10  7 9 0 5 9 
6  14  13 2 0 6 15 
7  0  0 0 0 2 0 
8  4  4 0 0 4 6 
9  8  1 4 0 0 1 
13  0  0 0 0 8 0 
14  9  9 1 0 1 9 
20  1  1 0 0 0 1 
>0  247  168 (68.0%) 151 (61.1%) 38 (15.4%) 180 (72.9%) 240 (97.2%) 
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Table 4.2. Deal Breakdown by Industry.  
Columns (1) and (3) display the number of acquirers and targets, respectively, categorised by Fama-French 10-industry classification. Columns (2) and (4) show the percentage of the total 
acquirers and targets, respectively, categorised in the corresponding industry. Column (5) shows the number of deals, for which the acquirer and the target originate from the same industry. 
Finally, Column (6) shows the percentage of the target in a particular industry that were acquired by companies of the same industry. 
              
Industry Acquirers Targets 
Acquirers and Targets in the Same 
Industry 
 
# % # % # % 
       
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Business Equipment 965 25.5% 990 26.2% 743 26.3% 
Manufacturing 803 21.2% 660 17.4% 519 18.4% 
Other 716 18.9% 770 20.3% 592 21.0% 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 340 9.0% 365 9.6% 276 9.8% 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 244 6.4% 292 7.7% 173 6.1% 
Consumer Non-Durables 213 5.6% 211 5.6% 158 5.6% 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 178 4.7% 193 5.1% 155 5.5% 
Utilities 143 3.8% 111 2.9% 108 3.8% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 92 2.4% 105 2.8% 66 2.3% 
Consumer Durables 91 2.4% 88 2.3% 34 1.2% 
       
Total 3,785 100% 3,785 100% 2,824 100% 
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Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics of CEO and Acquiring Firms. 
Column (1) reports the figures for the whole sample. Columns (2) and (3) display the statistics for the instances where the CEO has or does not have any experience. Columns (4) reports the 
same figures for CEOs with 1 and 2 deals performed before the appointment in the current firm. Column (5) reports the statistics for the CEOs (and their firm) with at least 3 deals performed 
before the appointment. Columns (6) to (8) reports the T-test (means) and Wilcoxon Tests (medians) for different CEO experience group pairings. The notations of *, **, *** correspond to 
statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A : Deal Characteristics    
Variable Type Experience T-tests and Wilcoxon Tests 
              All 0 > 0 1 or 2 > 2 (3) - (2) (5) - (4) (5) - (2) 
            (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
    
        
Deal Value ($ mill.) Mean 1,252.09 1,164.82 2,502.05 2,201.54 2,929.24 1,337.22** 727.70 1,764.42 
 
Median 206.54 206.49 220.24 235.15 189.13 13.75 -46.02 -17.36 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102    
Relative size (%) Mean 16.00 15.88 17.74 17.21 18.50 1.87 1.29 2.62 
 
Median 5.86 5.85 5.97 6.85 4.58 0.11 -2.28* -1.28 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102    
All stock (%) Mean 7.95 8.06 6.48 6.90 5.88 -1.58 -1.01 -2.17 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102    
All cash (%) Mean 42.8 42.99 40.08 43.45 35.29 -2.91 -8.15 -7.70 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102    
Public target (%) Mean 25.28 25.30 25.10 23.45 27.45 -0.20 4.00 2.15 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102    
Tender offer (%) Mean 6.26 6.36 4.86 6.21 2.94 -1.50 -3.27 -3.42* 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102    
Diversification (%) Mean 25.39 25.13 29.15 33.1 23.53 4.02 -9.57* -1.60 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102    
Hostile (%) Mean 0.34 0.34 0.40 0.69 0.00 0.07 -0.69 -0.34*** 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102    
Cross-border (%) Mean 21.43 21.25 23.89 22.07 26.47 2.63 4.40 5.22 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102    
Time to completion (days) Mean 75.36 74.59 86.30 98.30 69.24 11.71 -29.07** -5.36 
 
Median 49.00 48.00 53.00 60.00 46.00 5.00 -14.00 -2.00 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102    
Serial Acquirers (%) Mean 47.13 47.26 45.34 44.14 47.06 -1.91 2.92 -0.20 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102    
Premium 4-week (%) Mean 43.35 43.57 40.33 39.58 41.19 -3.24 1.61 -2.38 
 
Median 35.57 35.81 31.01 30.29 31.72 -4.81 1.43 -4.09 
 
N 865 807 58 31 27    
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Table 4.3. Continued. 
Panel B : CEO Characteristics    
Variable Type Experience T-tests and Wilcoxon Tests 
              All 0 > 0 1 or 2 > 2 (3) - (2) (5) - (4) (5) - (2) 
          
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
    
        
Position Experience (# years) Mean 1.54 1.23 6.04 5.40 6.94 4.81*** 1.54*** 5.71*** 
 
Median 0.00 0.00 6.00 5.00 7.00 6.00*** 2.00*** 7.00*** 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102 . . . 
Public Position Experience  (# years) 
Mean 0.25 0.00 3.80 3.03 4.89 3.80*** 1.86*** 4.89*** 
Median 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 5.50 3.00*** 2.50*** 5.50*** 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102 . . . 
Tenure  (# years) 
Mean 4.37 4.44 3.48 3.76 3.08 -0.96*** -0.67* -1.35*** 
Median 3.31 3.37 2.64 3.12 2.11 -0.73*** -1.01** -1.26*** 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102 . . . 
Age (# years) Mean 55.74 55.63 57.37 56.74 58.27 1.74*** 1.53* 2.64*** 
 
Median 55.55 55.39 58.67 57.75 59.03 3.27*** 1.29** 3.64*** 
 
N 3,746 3,499 247 145 102 . . . 
First year CEO 
Mean 16.22 15.86 21.46 20.00 23.53 5.60** 3.53 7.67* 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102 . . . 
Insider (%) Mean 69.83 71.59 44.53 32.41 61.76 -27.06*** 29.35*** -9.83** 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102 . . . 
Total Pay ($ mill.) Mean 7.35 7.23 9.29 8.53 10.34 2.06** 1.81 3.11** 
 
Median 4.83 4.80 5.25 4.98 6.1 0.45** 1.12 1.30 
 
N 2,759 2,590 169 98 71 . . . 
Salary ($ mill.) Mean 0.95 0.94 1.07 1.03 1.13 0.13** 0.10 0.19* 
 
Median 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.85 0.01 -0.08 -0.04 
 
N 2,770 2,601 169 98 71 . . . 
Bonus ($ mill.) Mean 0.82 0.81 0.97 0.95 1.00 0.16 0.06 0.20 
 
Median 0.26 0.26 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.13* 0.00 0.13 
 
N 2,770 2,601 169 98 71 . . . 
Equity-based compensation ($ mill.) Mean 4.42 4.34 5.60 4.74 6.79 1.26* 2.05 2.45** 
 
Median 2.35 2.33 2.77 2.71 3.77 0.43 1.06 1.44* 
 
N 2,770 2,601 169 98 71 . . . 
Hubristic CEO Mean 29.49 29.58 27.98 26.73 29.85 -1.61 3.12 0.27 
 
N 2,933 2,765 168 101 67 . . . 
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Table 4.3 Continued. 
Panel C : Acquirer Characteristics    
Variable Type Experience T-tests and Wilcoxon Tests 
              All 0 > 0 1 or 2 > 2 (3) - (2) (5) - (4) (5) - (2) 
          
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
    
        
Market Capitalisation ($ mill.) Mean 11,446.35 10,766.72 21,181.15 14,452.38 30,746.55 10,414.43*** 16,294.17** 19,979.83*** 
 
Median 2,987.55 2,994.39 2,560.94 3,097.28 2,444.48 -433.44 -652.81 -549.91 
 
N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102 . . . 
Market-to-Book Mean 3.03 3.02 3.18 3.03 3.40 0.16 0.36 0.37 
 
Median 2.32 2.32 2.32 2.41 2.25 -0.01 -0.15 -0.07 
 
N 3,765 3,521 244 143 101 . . . 
Total Assets ($mil) Mean 20,460.5 18,854.47 43,567.74 16,043.17 82,156.12 24,713.28** 66,112.96*** 63,301.65*** 
 
Median 2,933.45 2,951.87 2,506.83 2,506.83 2,614.50 -445.03 107.66 -337.37 
Sales ($ mill.) Mean 8,256.61 7,799.29 14,836.47 11,846.49 19,028.30 7,037.18*** 7,181.8 11,229.01*** 
 
Median 2,215.51 2,235.76 1,859.49 1,859.09 2,375.32 -376.27 516.23 139.56 
Capital Expenditure ($ mill.) Mean 425.64 383.72 1,028.73 907.18 1,199.15 645.01*** 291.97 815.42** 
 
Median 74.89 73.40 84.18 87.46 68.69 10.78 -18.77 -4.70 
Cash and Cash Equivalents ($ mill.) Mean 2,404.27 2,258.44 4,502.40 1,267.66 9,037.39 2,243.97* 7,769.73** 6,778.95** 
 
Median 220.51 220.91 214.14 200.56 288.11 -6.77 87.56* 67.20 
Net Income ($ mill.) Mean 608.27 574.39 1,095.71 778.53 1,540.39 521.32** 761.85* 965.99** 
 
Median 135.13 136.03 90.64 118.48 69.38 -45.39 -49.10 -66.65 
 
N 3,770 3525 245 143 102 . . . 
Total Debt ($ mill.) Mean 3,394.67 3,196.66 6,243.58 3,622.30 9,918.52 3,046.92*** 6,296.23*** 6,721.86*** 
 
Median 578.29 576.46 615.15 597.07 842.2 38.70 245.13 265.74* 
 
N 3,770 3,525 245 143 102 . . . 
ROA (%) Mean 9.34 9.48 7.42 8.20 6.31 -2.06*** -1.89 -3.16*** 
 
Median 9.11 9.17 7.74 8.69 6.13 -1.43*** -2.55** -3.04*** 
 
N 3,770 3,525 245 143 102 . . . 
ROE (%) Mean 11.37 11.21 13.73 18.11 7.59 2.52 -10.51 -3.61 
 
Median 12.50 12.6 11.09 12.23 9.33 -1.51 -2.89*** -3.26*** 
 
N 3,770 3,525 245 143 102 . . . 
Net Margin (%) Mean 6.10 6.30 3.14 3.24 2.99 -3.17*** -0.25 -3.31** 
 
Median 6.58 6.60 5.85 6.29 5.26 -0.75** -1.03 -1.34** 
 
N 3,769 3,524 245 143 102 . . . 
Leverage (%) Mean 33.23 32.95 37.26 34.81 40.7 4.31** 5.89* 7.75*** 
 
Median 32.35 32.06 37.98 34.66 41.86 5.91** 7.20* 9.80*** 
 
N 3,770 3,525 245 143 102 . . . 
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Table 4.4. Announcement CARs of Experience Subsamples. 
Column (1) reports the CAR and BHAR figures for the whole sample. Columns (3) and (2) display the statistics for the instances where the CEO has or does not have any experience. Columns 
(4) reports the same figures for CEOs with 1 and 2 deals performed before the appointment in the current firm. Column (5) reports the statistics for the CEOs (and their firm) with at least 3 deals 
performed before the appointment. Columns (6) to (8) reports the T-test (means) and Wilcoxon Tests (medians) for different CEO experience group pairings. The notations of *, **, *** 
correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 Type Experience T-tests and Wilcoxon Tests 
    
  
All 0 > 0 1 or 2 > 2 (3) - (2) (5) - (4) (5) - (2) 
 
 
        
 Panel A: CAR (%) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
         
(-1, +1) Mean 0.33*** 0.36*** -0.14 -0.22 -0.03 -0.5 0.19 -0.38 
  Median 0.22*** 0.25*** -0.12 -0.19 0.09 -0.37 0.27 -0.17 
(-5, +5) Mean 0.39*** 0.44*** -0.3 -0.11 -0.57 -0.74 -0.46 -1.01 
  Median 0.27*** 0.31*** -0.81 -0.44 -0.98 -1.12* -0.53 -1.29 
(-20, +1) Mean 0.21 0.20 0.33 -0.24 1.14 0.13 1.37 0.94 
  Median -0.05 -0.03 -0.15 -0.16 0.06 -0.13 0.21 0.08 
(-30, +1) Mean 0.11 0.07 0.63 -0.23 1.84 0.56 2.07 1.77 
  Median -0.14 -0.13 -0.47 -0.79 -0.04 -0.34 0.75 0.09 
(-30, 30) Mean -0.6** -0.66** 0.19 -0.8 1.61 0.85 2.41 2.27 
  Median -0.56** -0.55* -0.67 -1.39 -0.18 -0.12 1.22 0.37 
  N 3,785 3,538 247 145 102    
          
Panel B: BHAR (%)         
          
(0, +11) Mean -0.97* -0.95* -1.36 0.3 -3.77 -0.42 -4.08 -2.83 
 Median -3.43*** -3.31*** -4.84 -4.33 -5.08 -1.53 -0.75 -1.77 
 N 3,731 3,486 245 145 100    
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Table 4.5.  Correlation Matrix. 
The table shows the correlation coefficients among pairs of variables used in the analysis. 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Deal Experience (1) 1.00         
Deal Experience - Industry (2) 0.88 1.00        
Deal Experience - Status (3) 0.80 0.73 1.00       
Deal Experience - Value (4) 0.23 0.12 0.23 1.00      
Deal Experience - Target Nation (5) 0.89 0.88 0.71 0.17 1.00     
Deal Experience - Any Similarity (6) 0.96 0.94 0.82 0.22 0.94 1.00    
CAR (-1, +1) (7) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 1.00   
BHAR (0, +11) (8) -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.21 1.00  
Deal Value (9) 0.09 0.10 0.07 -0.02 0.08 0.09 -0.08 0.00 1.00 
All cash (10) -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.11 
Public target (11) -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.14 -0.04 0.25 
Tender offer (12) -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 
Diversifying Deals (13) 0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.06 
Hostile Deals (14) 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Position Experience (15) 0.30 0.24 0.28 0.15 0.23 0.29 0.01 0.00 0.04 
Public Position Experience (16) 0.57 0.45 0.49 0.31 0.48 0.55 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
Tenure  at the time of the deal (17) -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.01 
Age at the time of the deal (18) 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.07 
First year CEO (19) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.04 
Insider CEOs (20) -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.10 -0.11 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 
Total Pay (21) 0.09 0.08 0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.08 -0.07 0.00 0.25 
Salary (22) 0.07 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.21 
Bonus (23) 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.15 
Equity-based compensation (24) 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.10 -0.06 0.00 0.21 
Hubristic CEO (25) 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.11 0.08 -0.04 
Market Capitalisation (26) 0.11 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.07 -0.01 0.41 
Acquirer Assets (27) 0.09 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.34 
Sales (28) 0.10 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.31 
Capital Expenditure (29) 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04 -0.06 -0.02 0.28 
Cash and Cash Equivalents (30) 0.07 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.30 
Net Income (31) 0.10 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.42 
Total Debt (32) 0.11 0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.36 
Market-to-Book (33) 0.10 0.11 0.04 -0.04 0.11 0.10 -0.03 -0.03 0.09 
ROA (34) -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04 
ROE (35) 0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.05 
Net Margin (36) -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.08 
Leverage (37) 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.13 
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Table 4.5. Correlation Matrix Continued 
 
Variable  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Public target (11) 1.00         
Tender offer (12) 0.45 1.00        
Diversifying Deals (13) -0.10 -0.01 1.00       
Hostile Deals (14) 0.11 0.22 0.01 1.00      
Position Experience (15) 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 1.00     
Public Position Experience (16) -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.41 1.00    
Tenure  at the time of the deal (17) -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 1.00   
Age at the time of the deal (18) 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.39 1.00  
First year CEO (19) -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.10 -0.22 -0.09 1.00 
Insider CEOs (20) -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.20 -0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.04 
Total Pay (21) 0.18 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.08 -0.01 
Salary (22) 0.16 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.12 0.20 -0.08 
Bonus (23) 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.10 -0.02 -0.07 0.08 -0.01 
Equity-based compensation (24) 0.16 0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 
Hubristic CEO (25) -0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
Market Capitalisation (26) 0.19 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.07 0.00 
Acquirer Assets (27) 0.09 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.01 
Sales (28) 0.17 0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.02 
Capital Expenditure (29) 0.12 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.02 
Cash and Cash Equivalents (30) 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 
Net Income (31) 0.15 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.01 
Total Debt (32) 0.14 0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.09 0.01 
Market-to-Book (33) 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 
ROA (34) -0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.01 -0.11 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
ROE (35) 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
Net Margin (36) 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.04 
Leverage (37) 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 
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Table 4.5. Correlation Matrix Continued 
 
Variable  (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
Insider CEOs (20) 1.00         
Total Pay (21) -0.01 1.00        
Salry (22) 0.02 0.57 1.00       
Bonus (23) 0.00 0.47 0.59 1.00      
Equity-based compensation (24) -0.03 0.95 0.39 0.28 1.00     
Hubristic CEO (25) -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 1.00    
Market Capitalisation (26) 0.08 0.39 0.39 0.26 0.30 -0.08 1.00   
Acquirer Assets (27) 0.06 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.18 -0.08 0.57 1.00  
Sales (28) 0.08 0.36 0.42 0.28 0.25 -0.10 0.72 0.48 1.00 
Capital Expenditure (29) 0.08 0.25 0.36 0.19 0.17 -0.07 0.65 0.31 0.71 
Cash and Cash Equivalents (30) 0.04 0.23 0.15 0.29 0.17 -0.05 0.47 0.91 0.39 
Net Income (31) 0.08 0.30 0.31 0.21 0.21 -0.08 0.85 0.63 0.78 
Total Debt (32) 0.08 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.23 -0.10 0.57 0.77 0.52 
Market-to-Book (33) 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.06 0.15 -0.05 0.00 
ROA (34) 0.08 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.13 0.02 
ROE (35) 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Net Margin (36) 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.14 0.08 0.01 
Leverage (37) 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.23 0.12 
           Variable  (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) 
Capital Expenditure (29) 1.00         
Cash and Cash Equivalents (30) 0.16 1.00        
Net Income (31) 0.64 0.56 1.00       
Total Debt (32) 0.48 0.67 0.57 1.00      
Market-to-Book (33) 0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 1.00     
ROA (34) 0.01 -0.10 0.09 -0.18 0.27 1.00    
ROE (35) 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.16 1.00   
Net Margin (36) 0.04 0.09 0.23 0.10 0.07 0.45 0.28 1.00  
Leverage (37) 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.41 0.14 -0.13 0.04 -0.01 1.00 
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Table 4.6.  Regressions of Acquirer Announcement CAR on Deal Experience. 
The table shows regressions of the deal announcement CAR (-1, +1) on deal-experience measures and other control variables. Columns (1) to (4) display regressions on the full sample of CEOs. 
Columns (5) to (8) display regressions on the sample of CEOs with job experience in CEO positions prior to their appointment in the firm at hand. For detailed variable description, see 
Appendix. The notations of *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant -0.206 1.219 1.209 0.613 0.162 5.545** 5.463** 4.013 
Deal Experience -0.204 -0.138 
 
0.012 -0.228 -0.132 
 
0.088 
Deal Experience Square 0.019 0.010 
 
-0.009 0.020 0.010 
 
-0.018 
Deal Order 
 
0.077 
 
0.056 
 
0.000 
 
0.055 
Deal Order Square 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
0.003 
 
0.000 
CEO Deal Order 
  
0.084 
   
0.020 
 
CEO Deal Order Square 
  
-0.002 
   
0.001 
 
Position Experience 
 
-0.044 -0.049 -0.099 
    
Position Experience Square 
 
0.011 0.010 0.016 
    
Salary 
 
-0.320 -0.379 -0.414 
 
-0.108 -0.204 -0.450 
Bonus 
 
-0.218 -0.211 -0.302 
 
0.342 0.347 -0.067 
Equity-based compensation  
 
-0.152 -0.150 -0.153 
 
-0.377 -0.381 -0.263 
Insider  
 
-0.164 -0.160 -0.324 
 
-0.751* -0.722* -1.009** 
CEO Age 
 
-0.015 -0.016 -0.013 
 
-0.054 -0.056 -0.039 
Tenure  
 
0.037 0.044 0.035 
 
0.039 0.067 -0.021 
Market Cap. 
 
-0.138 -0.132 -0.144 
 
-0.340 -0.322 -0.319 
CAPEX 
 
0.036 0.032 0.091 
 
0.039 0.026 0.091 
Market-to-Book 
 
-0.014 -0.015 -0.059 
 
0.018 0.018 -0.066 
ROA 
 
2.768 2.852 3.647* 
 
-3.590 -3.363 -3.449 
Leverage 
 
0.681 0.672 0.902 
 
1.476 1.399 2.088** 
Relative Size 
 
1.919* 1.896* 1.986* 
 
1.336 1.296 0.813 
All cash 
 
0.499** 0.501** 0.614*** 
 
0.426 0.426 0.435 
Public Target 
 
-1.789*** -1.779*** -1.591*** 
 
-1.197** -1.184** -0.633 
Tender Offer 
 
0.347 0.349 0.212 
 
0.075 0.074 0.052 
Diversification 
 
-0.173 -0.173 -0.116 
 
0.056 0.053 0.136 
Hostile Bid 
 
0.579 0.540 0.555 
 
-4.914*** -5.033*** -5.325*** 
Hubristic CEO 
   
0.984*** 
   
1.236*** 
         
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-square (%) 0.765 3.438 3.482 4.865 0.668 2.862 2.969 5.369 
N 3,785 2,740 2,740 2,355 1,163 799 799 662 
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Table 4.7. Regressions of Acquirer Announcement CAR on Related Experience. 
The table shows regressions of the deal announcement CAR (-1, +1) on related deal-experience measures and other control variables. Columns (1) to (4) display regressions on the full sample of 
CEOs. Columns (5) to (8) display regressions on the sample of CEOs with job experience in CEO positions prior to their appointment in the firm at hand. For detailed variable description, see 
Appendix. The notations of *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant 1.282 1.252 1.225 1.295 1.273 5.240** 5.139** 5.126** 5.318** 5.203** 
Deal Experience - Industry -0.167     -0.172     
Deal Experience - Industry Square 0.012     0.013     
Deal Experience - Status  -0.414     -0.407    
Deal Experience - Status Square  0.052*     0.056*    
Deal Experience - Value   0.371     0.371   
Deal Experience - Value Square   0.569     0.617   
Deal Experience - Target Nation    -0.043     -0.062  
Deal Experience - Target Nation Square    -0.001     0.000  
Deal Experience - Any Similarity     -0.180     -0.178 
Deal Experience - Any Similarity Square     0.013     0.013 
Position Experience -0.030 -0.022 -0.038 -0.03 -0.024      
Position Experience Square 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009      
Salary -0.375 -0.348 -0.393 -0.376 -0.351 -0.247 -0.204 -0.295 -0.265 -0.200 
Bonus -0.202 -0.197 -0.191 -0.199 -0.202 0.354 0.370 0.372 0.354 0.356 
Equity-based compensation  -0.145 -0.144 -0.152 -0.142 -0.146 -0.383 -0.382 -0.404 -0.373 -0.386 
Insider  -0.162 -0.165 -0.170 -0.165 -0.162 -0.702* -0.716* -0.725* -0.715* -0.703* 
CEO Age -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.052 -0.050 -0.054 -0.054 -0.051 
Tenure  0.065* 0.065** 0.068** 0.066** 0.065** 0.081 0.081 0.092 0.084 0.080 
Market Cap. -0.124 -0.125 -0.118 -0.126 -0.125 -0.316 -0.316 -0.301 -0.319 -0.318 
CAPEX 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.020 0.019 0.027 0.029 0.022 
Market-to-Book -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 0.019 0.022 0.025 0.023 0.019 
ROA 2.847 2.851 2.977 2.880 2.842 -3.434 -3.46 -2.992 -3.336 -3.464 
Leverage 0.713 0.736 0.718 0.720 0.721 1.437 1.505 1.415 1.456 1.462 
Relative Size 1.889*** 1.879* 1.911* 1.881* 1.885* 1.334 1.305 1.394 1.309 1.318 
All cash 0.503** 0.503** 0.505*** 0.498** 0.500** 0.432 0.437 0.432 0.409 0.427 
Public Target -1.795*** -1.803*** -1.787*** -1.795*** -1.797*** -1.183** -1.213** -1.180** -1.198** -1.190** 
Tender Offer 0.357 0.367 0.350 0.360 0.361 0.049 0.086 0.045 0.070 0.062 
Diversification -0.161 -0.145 -0.158 -0.154 -0.150 0.037 0.090 0.042 0.063 0.073 
Hostile Bid 0.580 0.569 0.572 0.581 0.590 -5.004*** -5.014*** -4.98*** -4.927*** -4.855*** 
           
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-square 3.442 3.485 3.484 3.432 3.449 2.993 3.169 3.155 2.961 3.012 
N 2,740 2,740 2,740 2,740 2,740 799 799 799 799 799 
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Table 4.8. BHAR Regressions on General and Related Deal Experience. 
The table shows regressions of the annual BHAR (0, +11) on deal-experience measures and other control variables. All 
regressions are performed on the full sample of acquisitions.  Columns with odd numbers include only the level of the 
respective experience variable. Columns with even numbers include both the level and the squared terms of the respective 
experience variable. For detailed variable description, see Appendix. The notations of *, **, *** correspond to statistical 
significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -0.017 -1.418 0.334 -0.436 0.504 0.127 
Deal Experience -1.414* 3.841**     
Deal Experience Square  -0.523***     
Deal Order -0.163 0.344     
Deal Order Square  -0.029     
Deal Experience - Industry   -2.037** 3.778*   
Deal Experience - Industry Square    -0.537***   
Deal Experience - Status     -0.880 1.449 
Deal Experience - Status Square      -0.429 
Position Experience -0.006 0.579 -0.016 0.527 -0.129 0.377 
Position Experience Square  -0.117  -0.106  -0.073 
Salary -5.71 -7.132 -6.548 -6.939 -5.809 -6.304 
Bonus 0.700 0.620 0.645 0.666 0.695 0.662 
Equity-based compensation  1.343 1.287 1.393 1.370 1.307 1.205 
Insider  -3.150** -3.331** -3.266** -3.439** -3.062* -3.010* 
CEO Age 0.024 0.024 0.028 0.033 0.024 0.021 
Tenure  0.001 -0.042 -0.079 -0.077 -0.059 -0.061 
Market Cap. -0.287 -0.207 -0.312 -0.334 -0.276 -0.210 
CAPEX 0.208 0.333 0.251 0.375 0.189 0.217 
Market-to-Book -0.826*** -0.762*** -0.789*** -0.739** -0.853*** -0.870*** 
ROA 39.954*** 40.729*** 39.800*** 40.411*** 39.986*** 40.418*** 
Leverage 7.219* 7.333* 6.981* 7.391* 6.761 6.868* 
Relative Size 9.660* 9.660* 9.867* 9.800* 9.507* 9.564* 
All cash 1.330 1.141 1.306 1.140 1.348 1.310 
Public Target -3.874** -3.614* -3.821** -3.676** -3.796** -3.699** 
Tender Offer 0.730 0.347 0.655 0.530 0.724 0.602 
Diversification 0.597 0.354 0.302 0.473 0.482 0.449 
Hostile Bid 0.391 -0.345 0.177 0.114 0.078 0.133 
Hubristic CEO 4.781*** 4.611*** 4.498*** 4.430*** 4.681*** 4.684*** 
       
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-square 1.649 2.061 1.800 2.146 1.504 1.467 
N 2,322 2,322 2,322 2,322 2,322 2,322 
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Table 4.8. Regressions on General and Related Deal Experience Continued. 
 
Variable (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Constant 8.123 7.846 0.687 -0.622 0.244 -0.307 
Deal Experience - Value 1.316 29.576*     
Deal Experience - Value Square  -20.411     
Deal Experience - Target Nation   -1.929** 5.022**   
Deal Experience - Target Nation Square    -0.692***   
Deal Experience - Any Similarity     -1.737** 3.553* 
Deal Experience - Any Similarity Square      -0.512*** 
Position Experience -0.065 0.275 -0.038 0.468 0.001 0.455 
Position Experience Square  -0.047  -0.103  -0.100 
Salary -8.632* -8.687* -6.124 -7.063 -6.014 -7.176 
Bonus 2.144 2.073 0.673 0.607 0.635 0.629 
Equity-based compensation  1.821* 1.796* 1.329 1.365 1.359 1.355 
Insider  -0.779 -0.714 -3.250** -3.427** -3.234** -3.417** 
CEO Age -0.071 -0.073 0.022 0.032 0.029 0.027 
Tenure  0.360* 0.351* -0.070 -0.069 -0.078 -0.070 
Market Cap. -0.777 -0.705 -0.326 -0.298 -0.328 -0.289 
CAPEX 0.131 0.101 0.264 0.356 0.247 0.364 
Market-to-Book -0.666** -0.668** -0.792*** -0.748** -0.799*** -0.748** 
ROA 32.302*** 32.429*** 39.678*** 40.814*** 39.851*** 40.442*** 
Leverage 8.556** 8.391** 7.010* 7.382* 7.047* 7.318* 
Relative Size 6.376 6.523* 9.765* 9.673* 9.750* 9.838* 
All cash 0.866 0.835 1.264 1.127 1.270 1.150 
Public Target -3.412* -3.359* -3.825** -3.644** -3.846** -3.659* 
Tender Offer 0.895 0.765 0.722 0.419 0.725 0.433 
Diversification -0.157 -0.188 0.481 0.263 0.483 0.325 
Hostile Bid 0.342 0.455 0.264 -0.168 0.274 -0.067 
Hubristic CEO   4.530*** 4.408*** 4.539*** 4.441*** 
       
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-square 0.998 1.043 1.732 2.176 1.736 2.118 
N 2,702 2,702 2,322 2,322 2,322 2,322 
 Tables and Figures 
195 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Number and Total Value of Deals per Year. 
The number of deals is separated according to Target Public Status (left vertical axis). The deal values have been 
transformed in 2014 dollar terms (right vertical axis). 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Number of Deals and Total Deal Value per Year
Public Private Subsidiary Total Deal Value ($ bil)
 Tables and Figures 
196 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean Deal Value per Year. 
The graph shows the average deal value for the S&P1500 deals per year. The deal values have been transformed in 2015 
dollar terms. 
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Figure 4.3. Number of CEO Appointments per Year. 
The graph shows the number of CEO appointments in the final sample of S&P 1500 firms. 
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5 Chapter 5  
Table 5.1. Sample distribution. 
The table shows the annual number of deals and total consideration offered for mega and non-mega deals for 3,604 mega-deals and 
22,472 non-mega deals. The sample is from SDC and includes completed and withdrawn deals announced between 1990 and 2015. 
Repurchases, recapitalisations, self-tenders, exchange offers, acquisitions of remaining interest, minority-stake purchases and intra-
corporate restructuring are excluded. Transactions have an inflation-adjusted value of at least $5 mil and the target-to-acquirer 
relative size is at least 1%. The acquirer owns no more than 20% of the target prior to the announcement and seeks to own more than 
50% following completion. Acquiring firms are U.S companies listed in NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with data on CRSP. Targets are 
public or private firms. 
Year Mega Deals (n) 
Total Value  
Mega Deals ($bil) 
Rest of Deals (n) 
Total Value               
Non-mega Deals 
($bil) 
1990 39 91.66 464 34.53 
1991 45 56.65 502 38.08 
1992 53 72.17 730 50.61 
1993 72 203.29 945 62.36 
1994 101 166.88 1164 84.84 
1995 120 323.31 1220 96.36 
1996 174 480.63 1494 122.99 
1997 259 698.93 1807 159.18 
1998 265 1358.90 1900 164.34 
1999 292 1468.96 1388 138.06 
2000 295 1105.90 1159 116.06 
2001 150 590.16 849 86.21 
2002 94 214.20 782 68.50 
2003 101 203.75 731 70.66 
2004 116 360.51 880 81.97 
2005 135 528.87 847 82.43 
2006 166 611.48 820 86.54 
2007 166 454.19 791 82.36 
2008 102 380.96 582 56.34 
2009 76 386.90 391 39.80 
2010 125 255.64 474 55.32 
2011 111 396.32 520 63.61 
2012 139 261.25 555 60.65 
2013 115 261.30 466 56.23 
2014 128 644.88 564 71.19 
2015 165 891.44 447 54.81 
All 3,604 12,469.10 22,472 2,084.00 
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Table 5.2. Deal distribution by industry sector and time period.  
The table reports the breakdown of deals by the industry classification of the target firm and the time period for the sample of mega-
deals (Panel A) and non-mega deals (Panel B). The industry split follows Kenneth French’s 12 industry classification. The 
percentage of the overall corresponding sample is displayed in parentheses next to the number of deals pertaining to each sector.  
Industry of Target Firm All 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2015 
         Panel A - Mega Deals 
        
         Business Equipment 633 (17.6%) 196 (13.8%) 305 (21.8%) 132 (16.9%) 
Chemicals and Allied Products 107 (3.0%) 47 (3.3%) 25 (1.8%) 35 (4.5%) 
Consumer Durables 58 (1.6%) 28 (2.0%) 20 (1.4%) 10 (1.3%) 
Consumer Non-Durables 214 (5.9%) 83 (5.8%) 77 (5.5%) 54 (6.9%) 
Finance 584 (16.2%) 299 (21.1%) 206 (14.7%) 79 (10.1%) 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 387 (10.7%) 117 (8.2%) 140 (10.0%) 130 (16.6%) 
Manufacturing 307 (8.5%) 111 (7.8%) 122 (8.7%) 74 (9.5%) 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 232 (6.4%) 57 (4.0%) 119 (8.5%) 56 (7.2%) 
Telephone and Television Transmission 289 (8.0%) 141 (9.9%) 100 (7.1%) 48 (6.1%) 
Utilities 197 (5.5%) 87 (6.1%) 74 (5.3%) 36 (4.6%) 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 216 (6.0%) 97 (6.8%) 69 (4.9%) 50 (6.4%) 
Other 380 (10.5%) 157 (11.1%) 144 (10.3%) 79 (10.1%) 
         Panel B – Non-mega deals 
        
         Business Equipment 5,220 (23.2%) 2,113 (18.2%) 2,351 (30.0%) 756 (25.0%) 
Chemicals and Allied Products 349 (1.6%) 179 (1.5%) 108 (1.4%) 62 (2.0%) 
Consumer Durables 391 (1.7%) 212 (1.8%) 121 (1.5%) 58 (1.9%) 
Consumer Non-Durables 854 (3.8%) 450 (3.9%) 301 (3.8%) 103 (3.4%) 
Finance 3,982 (17.7%) 2,260 (19.5%) 1,195 (15.3%) 527 (17.4%) 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 2,079 (9.3%) 964 (8.3%) 772 (9.9%) 343 (11.3%) 
Manufacturing 1,973 (8.8%) 1,069 (9.2%) 602 (7.7%) 302 (10.0%) 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 990 (4.4%) 548 (4.7%) 330 (4.2%) 112 (3.7%) 
Telephone and Television Transmission 1,029 (4.6%) 619 (5.3%) 321 (4.1%) 89 (2.9%) 
Utilities 195 (0.9%) 101 (0.9%) 67 (0.9%) 27 (0.9%) 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 1,864 (8.3%) 1,184 (10.2%) 526 (6.7%) 154 (5.1%) 
Other 3,546 (15.8%) 1,915 (16.5%) 1,138 (14.5%) 493 (16.3%) 
         
 
Table 5.3. Summary statistics.  
The table presents means, medians, and sample size for a number of firm and deal characteristics for mega and non-mega deals and different sample periods along with differentials between sub-periods. The variable 
descriptions are reported in the Appendix. The notation *, **, *** corresponds to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
    Mega Deals   Non-mega Deals 
  
1990-99 2000-09 2010-15 Differences 
 
1990-99 2000-09 2010-15 Differences 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) - (2) (3) - (1) (2) - (1)   (4) (5) (6) (6) - (5) (6) - (4) (5) - (4) 
Acquirer characteristics         
      
 
        
      Acquirer Market Cap ($mil) mean 14,229.35 24,888.78 23,762.13 -1126.65 9,532.78*** 10,659.43***  1,219.48 1,812.56 2340.29 527.72*** 1,120.81*** 593.08*** 
 median 4,641.4 7,890.57 8051.26 160.68 3,409.86*** 3,249.18***  357.79 637.36 863.98 226.62*** 506.19*** 279.57*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727     11,614 7,832 2,920    
Acquirer Assets ($mil) mean 22,532.33 46,900.90 35,853.50 -11,047.4 13,321.18**
* 
24,368.57**
* 
 3,260 2,823.55 3,190.63 367.08* -69.44 -436.52** 
 median 5,650.84 6,883.43 8,619.31 1,735.88*** 2,968.47*** 1,232.59***  415.66 694.90 1,011.34 316.43*** 595.68*** 279.24*** 
 n 1,294 1,300 715     8,879 6,735 2,807    
Acquirer Market-to-Book mean 4.62 4.89 3.67 -1.23*** -0.96*** 0.27  4.27 3.51 2.88 -0.63*** -1.39*** -0.76*** 
 median 2.64 2.60 2.35 -0.26*** -0.30*** -0.04  2.31 2.22 1.93 -0.28*** -0.38*** -0.09*** 
 n 1,292 1,301 715     8,805 6,738 2,806    
Acquirer FCF-to-Assets mean 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.02*** 0.02**  0.08 0.08 0.10 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.00 
 median 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.00** 0.03*** 0.03***  0.06 0.08 0.09 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 n 1,292 1,300 715     8,773 6,735 2,806    
Acquirer Leverage mean 25.62 24.73 27.26 2.53*** 1.65* -0.89  22.02 19.34 19.55 0.22 -2.47*** -2.69*** 
 median 23.57 22.25 22.85 0.60** -0.72 -1.31  16.59 15.17 14.51 -0.67 -2.09*** -1.42*** 
 n 1,292 1,300 715     8,773 6,735 2,806    
Serial Acquirer % mean 38.94 48.75 39.48 -9.27*** 0.53 9.81***  23.95 30.09 29.86 -0.23 5.92*** 6.15*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727     11,614 7,832 2,920    
Acquirer Hubris % mean 46.85 41.50 34.55 -6.95** -12.30*** -5.35**  47.01 47.38 42.37 -5.02*** -4.65** 0.37 
 n 762 853 382     2,008 2,503 930    
EBC %  mean 39.37 45.76 55.82 10.07*** 16.45*** 6.39***  36.56 42.29 47.31 5.03*** 10.76*** 5.73*** 
 median 38.37 51.24 59.65 8.41*** 21.28*** 12.87***  34.03 44.74 51.32 6.58*** 17.29*** 10.71*** 
 n 465 682 425     987 1,809 1,073 . . . 
BCF Antitakeover Index mean 1.49 2.15 1.58 -0.56*** 0.09 0.65***  1.62 2.22 1.84 -0.37*** 0.23*** 0.60*** 
 median 1.00 2.00 1.00 -1.00*** 0.00 1.00***  2.00 2.00 2.00 -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 n 372 687 379     1,270 1,956 943    
Board Independence % mean 62.81 69.30 81.82 12.52*** 19.01*** 6.49***  58.67 67.11 78.44 11.33*** 19.77*** 8.44*** 
 median 66.67 72.73 85.71 12.99*** 19.05*** 6.06***  60.00 70.00 80.00 10.00*** 20.00*** 10.00*** 
 n 451 943 477     852 2,557 1,182    
Ind. Directors Ownership % mean  0.57 0.76 0.19*     1.02 1.25 0.23***   
 median  0.15 0.19 0.04***     0.40 0.53 0.13***   
 n  935 472      2,552 1,182    
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Table 5.3. Continued. 
    Mega Deals   Non-mega Deals 
  
1990-99 2000-09 2010-15 Differences 
 
1990-99 2000-09 2010-15 Differences 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) - (2) (3) - (1) (2) - (1)  (4) (5) (6) (6) - (5) (6) - (4) (5) - (4) 
Target characteristics               
Target Market Cap ($mil) mean 3,166.10 3,596.53 3,279.55 -316.98 113.45 430.42  108.66 115.49 133.37 17.88** 24.71*** 6.83 
 median 878.03 1,212.37 1,428.81 216.44 550.78*** 334.34***  76.48 86.14 109.78 23.64*** 33.30*** 9.66 
 n 793 634 235     1,502 806 207    
Target Assets ($mil) mean 6,098.26 8,446.73 3,862.66 -4,584.07*** -2,235.60** 2,348.47  284.57 312.95 289.79 -23.16 5.22 28.38 
 median 1,193.57 1,013.18 1,238.88 225.7 45.3 -180.4  81.82 60.73 72.95 12.22** -8.87 -21.09*** 
 n 981 877 357     4,091 2,131 713    
Target Market-to-Book mean 3.67 3.79 2.98 -0.80** -0.69* 0.12  2.38 1.94 1.89 -0.05 -0.49* -0.43*** 
 median 2.31 2.38 2.19 -0.19** -0.12* 0.07  1.45 1.38 1.11 -0.27*** -0.34*** -0.08** 
 n 791 706 244     1,473 1,037 276    
Deal characteristics 
 
             
Deal Value ($mil) mean 3,465.76 3,452.47 2,974.76 -477.71 -490.99 -13.29  81.91 98.42 118.58 20.15*** 36.67*** 16.51*** 
 median 1,135.70 1,230.31 1,291.31 61.00 155.61** 94.61**  37.81 51.74 66.78 15.04*** 28.97*** 13.93*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727     11,614 7,832 2,920    
Relative Size mean 59.79 50.53 41.43 -9.10*** -18.36*** -9.26***  29.37 21.20 17.67 -3.53*** -11.70*** -8.17*** 
 median 32.82 20.48 20.88 0.40 -11.93*** -12.34***  10.56 7.78 6.89 -0.89*** -3.68*** -2.78*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727     11,614 7,832 2,920    
All Stock % mean 35.21 18.99 5.50 -13.48*** -29.71*** -16.22***  28.27 12.18 5.62 -6.56*** -22.65*** -16.09*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727     11,614 7,832 2,920    
Stock Consideration % mean 47.61 32.79 14.76 -18.03*** -32.85*** -14.82***  36.39 22.04 12.86 -9.18*** -23.53*** -14.35*** 
 median 44.56 0.00 0.00 0.00*** -44.56*** -44.56***  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727     11,614 7,832 2,920    
All Cash % mean 18.66 30.48 45.94 15.46*** 27.28*** 11.82***  19.63 33.06 39.18 6.12*** 19.55*** 13.43*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727     11,614 7,832 2,920    
Cash Consideration % mean 29.93 45.55 65.13 19.58*** 35.20*** 15.62***  29.85 47.76 53.86 6.10*** 24.01*** 17.91*** 
 median 0.00 38.22 88.22 50.00*** 88.22*** 38.22***  0.00 46.42 66.18 19.76*** 66.18*** 46.42*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727     11,614 7,832 2,920    
Synergy Motive % mean 14.29 25.22 63.73 38.50*** 49.44** 10.94  4.76 8.16 31.00 22.84*** 26.24*** 3.39 
 n 7.00 1,237 714     21.00 5,052 2,413    
Competition % mean 8.80 7.14 4.13 -3.01*** -4.68*** -1.67  1.52 1.23 0.65 -0.58*** -0.87*** -0.30* 
 n 1,420 1,401 727     11,614 7,832 2,920    
Public % mean 62.18 53.60 39.20 -14.40*** -22.98*** -8.58***  18.03 15.93 12.77 -3.16*** -5.26*** -2.10*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727     11,614 7,832 2,920    
Hostile % mean 5.00 1.78 0.83 -0.96** -4.17*** -3.22***  0.62 0.15 0.10 -0.05 -0.52*** -0.47*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727     11,614 7,832 2,920    
Withdrawn % mean 15.00 9.56 7.15 -2.41* -7.85*** -5.44***  6.44 4.32 1.95 -2.36*** -4.49*** -2.12*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727     11,614 7,832 2,920    
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Table 5.3. Continued. 
    Mega Deals   Non-mega Deals 
 
 1990-99 2000-09 2010-15 Differences 
 
1990-99 2000-09 2010-15 Differences 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) - (2) (3) - (1) (2) - (1)   (4) (5) (6) (6) - (5) (6) - (4) (5) - (4) 
                             
Toehold  % mean 1.34 0.86 1.10 0.24 -0.24 -0.48 
 
0.53 0.52 0.31 -0.22 -0.22* 0.00 
 n 1,420 1,401 727    
 
11,614 7,832 2,920    
Diversified % mean 32.04 33.69 32.87 -0.82 0.83 1.65 
 
37.83 37.69 37.81 0.12 -0.03 -0.14 
 n 1,420 1,401 727    
 
11,614 7,832 2,920    
Cross Border % mean 10.21 16.20 19.39 3.19* 9.18*** 5.99*** 
 
10.13 14.85 20.55 5.70*** 10.42*** 4.72*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727    
 
11,614 7,832 2,920    
Time to Completion mean 133.19 117.44 115.56 -1.87 -17.63*** -15.76*** 
 
82.51 59.06 51.40 -7.66*** -31.11*** -23.45*** 
 median 112.00 92.00 86.00 -6.00** -26.00*** -20.00*** 
 
52.00 34.00 25.50 -8.50*** -26.50*** -18.00*** 
 n 1,408 1,398 724    
 
11,590 7,823 2,914    
Premium TCAR (-63,+126) % mean 32.26 32.18 34.64 2.46 2.38 -0.08 
 
37.23 46.16 38.58 -7.58** 1.36 8.93*** 
 median 23.25 21.90 28.34 6.44** 5.09* -1.35 
 
25.97 32.76 31.28 -1.48 5.32** 6.79*** 
 n 811 650 239    
 
1,513 812 210    
Premium 4-week % mean 42.80 38.27 40.99 2.71 -1.81 -4.53*** 
 
49.33 48.75 52.50 3.75 3.18 -0.58 
 median 36.90 31.62 34.48 2.86* -2.41 -5.27*** 
 
39.53 37.61 43.74 6.13** 4.20* -1.92 
 n 798 703 273    
 
1,439 1,029 312    
High Market Valuation % mean 59.58 25.27 48.14 22.88*** -11.43*** -34.31*** 
 
59.65 30.78 50.31 19.52*** -9.34*** -28.87*** 
 n 1,420 1,401 727    
 
11,614 7,832 2,920    
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Table 5.4. Acquisition Gains.  
The table reports mean and median values on value-related measures for acquirer and target shareholders in a sample of completed acquisitions. Panels A through C report the results for 
mega-deals and Panel B. Variable definitions are reported in the Appendix. Differentials are based on t-tests for means and Wilcoxon test for medians. The indicators *, **, *** correspond to 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
    All                     
(1) 
1990-2009 
(2) 
1990-1999 
(3) 
2000-2009 
(4) 
2010-2015 
(5) (5) - (2) (5) - (4) (5) - (3) (4) - (3) 
Panel A: Mega Deals            
All           
ACAR3 mean 0.26* -0.36** -0.11 -0.60*** 2.54*** 2.90*** 3.14*** 2.65*** -0.49 
 
median 0.03 -0.38*** -0.14 -0.64*** 1.34*** 1.72*** 1.98*** 1.48*** -0.51* 
WINNERS3 mean 50.13*** 47.01*** 49.21*** 44.91*** 61.54*** 14.53*** 16.63*** 12.33*** -4.30** 
$GAIN3 mean -193.00*** -262.77*** -99.57** -418.24*** 62.32 325.09*** 480.56*** 161.89** -318.67*** 
 
median 0.80* -16.42*** -4.56** -30.63*** 86.71*** 103.13*** 117.34*** 91.27*** -26.07** 
LARGE LOSS mean 9.84*** 10.79*** 7.46*** 13.97*** 6.36*** -4.43*** -7.61*** -1.10 6.51*** 
 
n 3150 2474 1207 1267 676     
Private           
ACAR3 mean 2.36*** 2.17*** 2.51*** 1.91*** 2.84*** 0.67 0.93* 0.33 -0.6 
 median 1.14*** 1.03*** 1.18*** 0.92*** 1.52*** 0.49 0.60* 0.35 -0.26 
 n 1,542 1,112 491 621 430     
Public           
ACAR3           
All mean -1.75*** -2.43*** -1.91*** -3.02*** 2.01*** 4.45*** 5.03*** 3.92*** -1.11*** 
 median -1.16*** -1.69*** -1.13*** -2.32*** 0.82*** 2.51*** 3.14*** 1.95*** -1.19*** 
 n 1,608 1,362 716 646 246     
Cash mean 0.60** -0.01 0.67 -0.34 2.15*** 2.16*** 2.49*** 1.48* -1.02 
 median 0.40** 0.27 0.93* -0.03 0.66*** 0.39*** 0.69*** -0.27 -0.96* 
 n 388 278 92 186 110     
Stock mean -3.50*** -3.75*** -3.01*** -5.41*** 1.01 4.76*** 6.42*** 4.02** -2.40*** 
 median -3.16*** -3.22*** -2.47*** -4.88*** 1.84 5.06*** 6.72*** 4.31** -2.40*** 
 n 556 527 363 164 29     
Mixed mean -1.66*** -2.39*** -1.28*** -3.37*** 2.15** 4.54*** 5.52*** 3.43*** -2.09*** 
 median -1.49*** -2.15*** -0.77*** -3.17*** 0.97*** 3.13*** 4.15*** 1.74*** -2.40*** 
 n 664 557 261 296 107     
  
204 
 
Table 5.4. Continued. 
    All                     
(1) 
1990-2009 
(2) 
1990-1999 
(3) 
2000-2009 
(4) 
2010-2015 
(5) 
(5) - (2) (5) - (4) (5) - (3) (4) - (3) 
Public – Synergy Gains           
TCAR3 mean 19.93*** 19.08*** 17.77*** 20.61*** 24.87*** 5.78*** 4.25*** 7.10*** 2.85*** 
 
median 17.39*** 15.89*** 14.66*** 16.81*** 23.72*** 7.84*** 6.91*** 9.06*** 2.15** 
 
n 1436 1226 658 568 210 . . . . 
SYNRGY3 mean 1.37*** 0.74*** 1.00*** 0.43 5.05*** 4.31*** 4.62*** 4.05*** -0.57 
 
median 0.87*** 0.42*** 0.90*** -0.03 2.61*** 2.19*** 2.63*** 1.71*** -0.92** 
$SYNRGY3 mean 15.15 -75.65 8.04 -172.87 542.69*** 618.34*** 715.55*** 534.64*** -180.91 
 median 59.61*** 31.77 50.95*** -0.29 253.97*** 222.21*** 254.26*** 203.02*** -51.24* 
$VALUE+ mean -3.38 -7.05** -2.85 -11.94** 18.21*** 25.26*** 30.16*** 21.06*** -9.09 
 median -0.28 -3.32*** -0.06 -6.74*** 21.79*** 25.11*** 28.53*** 21.85*** -6.68** 
∆$GAIN3 mean 4.49*** 4.72*** 4.37*** 5.13*** 3.16*** -1.56*** -1.97*** -1.21** 0.76** 
 median 3.52*** 3.68*** 3.56*** 4.03*** 1.99*** -1.69*** -2.04*** -1.57** 0.47* 
 n 1,396 1,191 640 551 205 . . . . 
           
Panel B: Non Mega-Deals           
All            
ACAR3 mean 1.38*** 1.42*** 1.68*** 1.03*** 1.16*** -0.26** 0.12 -0.53*** -0.65*** 
 median 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.63*** 0.38*** 0.58*** 0.06 0.20** -0.06 -0.25*** 
 n 21,222 18,360 10,866 7,494 2,862     
Public            
ACAR3 mean -0.35*** -0.43*** -0.27* -0.68*** 0.34 0.77** 1.02** 0.61 -0.41 
 median -0.45*** -0.53*** -0.49*** -0.58*** 0.03 0.56** 0.62*** 0.52* -0.09 
 n 3,165 2,832 1,764 1,068 333     
SYNRGY3 mean 1.85*** 1.65*** 1.53*** 1.88*** 3.90*** 2.24*** 2.02*** 2.37*** 0.35 
 median 1.04*** 0.90*** 0.77*** 1.12*** 2.87*** 1.96*** 1.75*** 2.10*** 0.35* 
Private            
ACAR3 mean 1.68*** 1.75*** 2.06*** 1.32*** 1.26*** -0.49*** -0.06 -0.80*** -0.74*** 
 median 0.73*** 0.74*** 0.89*** 0.58*** 0.68*** -0.07 0.1 -0.21*** -0.31*** 
 n 18,057 15,528 9,102 6,426 2,529     
           
 
  
205 
 
Table 5.5. Acquirer return regressions.  
The table reports OLS regression coefficient estimates of ACAR3 on the 2010-1015 dummy variable, the mega-deal indicator variable, their interaction, and other control variables. The 2010-2015 
variable takes the value of 1 if the deal was announced during the years 2010-2015 and 0 otherwise. The Mega Deal variable takes the value of 1 if the deal value is at least $500 mil in 2015 terms 
and 0 otherwise. For sample criteria see Table 5.1 description. Detailed variable definitions are reported in the Appendix. Regressions (1)-(4) and (10) utilise the sample of mega-deals. Regressions 
(5)-(9) and (11) are performed on the sample of all deals (mega and non-mega). Regressions (8)-(9) examine the deal size effect, regressions (10) and (11) include company fixed effects, 1,439 and 
6,101 additional variables respectively. The notation of *, **, *** corresponds to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. For detailed variable descriptions see Appendix. 
 
  
  
   
 Deal Size Effect  Company FE 
  Mega Deals   All Deals   All Public Deals  Mega Deals All Deals 
  
All All Public Private  All All 2010-15  1990-2009 2010-15   
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9)  (10) (11) 
Intercept  -0.362** 5.897*** 2.520* 4.970**  1.417*** 2.262*** 2.337***  3.001*** 3.594*  4.587 2.915 
2010 - 2015  2.902*** 1.691*** 3.724*** 0.395  -0.262* -0.136      1.010** -0.182 
Mega Deal  
 
    -1.779*** -0.505*** 1.448***      -0.181 
2010-15 x Mega Deal  
 
    3.170*** 2.385***       2.396*** 
Public  
 
-3.019***    
 
-2.252*** -0.670**     -2.184*** -2.068*** 
All Stock  
 
-1.553*** -1.535*** -0.146  
 
-0.439*** -0.727  -1.614*** -0.774  -0.774 -0.285 
Log Deal Value  
 
-0.432*** -0.568*** -0.161  
 
   -0.668*** -0.08  -0.418**  
Acquirer M/B  
 
-0.009 -0.024 -0.027  
 
-0.022*** -0.030  -0.023 -0.038  -0.006 -0.024** 
Competition  
 
-1.154 -1.377* -0.851  
 
1.537*** -0.401  -0.079 -0.020  0.317 0.415 
Hostile  
 
0.903 0.635   
 
0.043 1.582  0.377 1.897  0.501 -0.301 
Diversification  
 
-0.951*** -0.086 -1.631***  
 
-0.038 -0.395*  -0.016 -0.85  -1.151** -0.296** 
Cross Border  
 
-0.356 1.089* -0.891*  
 
-0.341** -0.239  0.509 0.868  0.478 -0.011 
Serial Acquirer  
 
-0.703** -0.177 -1.062**  
 
-0.859*** -0.840***  0.106 -0.489  -0.658 -0.794*** 
Acquirer Leverage  
 
0.023*** 0.033*** 0.021*  
 
0.008*** 0.022***  0.026*** 0.043**  0.001 -0.004 
High Market Valuation   
 
0.395 0.705* 0.164  
 
0.200** -0.378*  0.458** -1.454**  0.335 0.251** 
Acquirer FCF  
 
-0.851 1.627 -2.774*  
 
-1.110*** -1.629**  2.221*** 4.557**  -0.568 0.143 
  
    
 
   
 
  
  
 Industry FE  No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 (%)  2.141 9.641 9.326 1.519  0.546 2.939 2.370  5.326 4.849  32.160 17.049 
N  3,150 2,939 1,512 1,427  24,372 20,505 3,418  3,636 565  2,939 20,505 
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Table 5.6. Synergy gain regressions.  
The table reports OLS regression coefficient estimates of SYNRGY3 on the 2010-1015 dummy variable, the mega-deal indicator variable, their 
interaction, and other control variables. Synergy gains are estimated as the market capitalisation weighted ACAR (-1,+1) of acquirer and target firms. The 
2010-2015 variable takes the value of 1 if the deal was announced during the years 2010-2015 and 0 otherwise. The Mega Deal variable takes the value of 
1 if the deal value is at least $500 mil in 2015 terms and 0 otherwise. For sample criteria see Table 5.1 description. Detailed variable definitions are 
provided in the Appendix. Regressions (1)-(2) and (6) utilise the sample of mega-deals. Regressions (3)-(5) and (7) are performed on the sample of all 
deals (mega and non-mega). Regressions (6) and (7) include company fixed effects, 807 and 1,782 additional variables respectively. The notation of *, **, 
*** corresponds to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
         Company FE 
  
Mega Public  All Public   Mega Deals All Public 
 
   1990-2015 1990-2015 2010-2015   
  
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
 
   
 
  
      
Intercept 0.738*** 2.273  1.655*** 3.250*** 4.550**  5.822 6.376 
2010 - 2015  4.315*** 3.673***  2.243*** 1.766***   1.579** 0.796 
Mega Deal     -0.917*** -0.952*** 0.842   0.150 
2010-2015 x Mega Deal     2.072*** 1.806**    2.004** 
All Stock   -1.559***   -1.867*** 0.298  -0.767 -0.647* 
Log Deal Value   -0.033      0.139  
Acquirer M/B   -0.042   -0.077*** -0.120  -0.036 -0.055* 
Competition   -1.197   -0.031 0.518  1.267 0.502 
Hostile   2.933**   2.776** 0.000  2.007 2.453* 
Diversification   -0.204   -0.387 -1.131  -0.064 -0.040 
Cross Border   -1.389   -1.125 -1.285  -0.654 -2.266** 
Serial Acquirer   -0.615   -0.933*** -1.575*   -0.440 
Acquirer Leverage   0.040***   0.029*** 0.063**  -0.007 -0.003 
High Market Val    -0.005   -0.342 -0.383  0.488 -0.014 
Acquirer FCF   1.653   1.308 2.246  3.060 3.019 
           
Industry FE  No Yes  No Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 (%)  4.242 11.493  2.260 8.204 3.915  46.699 43.235 
N   1,396 1,316  3,500 3,130 379  1,316 3,130 
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Table 5.7. Quantile Regressions. 
The table reports quantile regression coefficient estimates of ACAR3 and SYNERGY3 on a 2010-1015 indicator and other 
control variables for the sample of mega-deals. The quantile regressions are performed on the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles 
corresponding to specification 2 in Tables 5 and 6 where the dependent variable is ACAR3 and SYNRGY3 respectively. For 
sample criteria see Table 5.1 description. The goodness of fit statistic for quantile regressions is the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). For detailed variable descriptions see Appendix. The notation of *, **, *** corresponds to statistical 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
   ACAR3    SYNRGY3  
   Quantile    Quantile  
  
25th  50th  75th   25th  50th  75th  
 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept  3.947*** 5.975*** 7.428***  -0.852 3.574*** 8.321*** 
2010 - 2015  1.401*** 1.061*** 1.238***  1.875*** 2.014*** 3.766*** 
Public  -1.941*** -1.520*** -2.015***  
   All Stock  -3.096*** -1.633*** -0.840***  -1.398*** -0.932*** -1.239*** 
Log Deal Value  -0.907*** -0.587*** -0.131  -0.087 -0.220 -0.031 
Acquirer M/B  -1.521 -0.511 -0.456  -1.413 -1.279** -0.493 
Competition  -0.093*** -0.017 0.012  -0.164*** -0.081** -0.053 
Hostile  2.387*** -0.080 -0.863  1.925 0.776 1.045 
Diversification  -0.239 -0.875*** -1.790***  0.397 -0.549** -1.078*** 
Cross Border  0.220 -0.181 -0.730  -1.305 -0.301 -2.602** 
Serial Acquirer  0.240 -0.174 -0.967***  0.022 -0.392 -1.180*** 
Acquirer Leverage  0.005 0.0250*** 0.034***  0.018 0.033*** 0.044*** 
High Market Val  0.886*** 0.325 0.243  0.888*** 0.204 -0.430 
Acquirer FCF  2.410*** 0.186 -3.200***  5.500*** 0.434 -2.608 
  
   
 
   Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AIC  4456.46 5799.94 4982.56  1753.45 2406.75 1970.80 
N  2,939 2,939 2,939  1,316 1,316 1,316 
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Table 5.8. Propensity Score Matching Adjusted Gains. 
The table reports acquisition performance using propensity scores that are estimated from logit regressions of post-2009 deal 
occurrence on deal and firm-level characteristics. Panel A reports results from the logit estimation where the dependent variable 
equals 1 if the deal was announced during the 2010-15 period and 0 otherwise. Panel B reports CAR3 and SYNRGY3 gains for 
2010-15 deals (Treated sample) and propensity score matched returns from pre-2010 deals (Control sample). Difference is the 
return differential between the Control and Treated samples. N is the number of observations and pseudo R2 (%) is the pseudo R-
square. P-values are reported below regression estimates. For Panel B statistical significance is reported only for difference 
estimates. The notation of *, **, *** corresponds to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Logit estimation results 
   CAR3 SYNRGY3   
Post-2009=1   (1) (2)   
Intercept   -2.019*** -2.258***   
Public   -0.559***    
AllStock   -1.777*** -1.604   
Log Deal Value   0.172*** 0.201***   
Acquirer M/B   -0.011 -0.029   
Competition   -1.002*** -0.686*   
Hostile   -2.065** -14.499   
Diversification   -0.058 -0.45**   
Cross Border   0.162 0.189   
Serial Acquirer   -0.270*** -0.205   
Acquirer leverage   0.003 0.001   
High Market Val   0.308*** 0.246   
Acquirer FCF   -0.026 0.217   
Industry FE   Yes Yes   
N   2,939 1,316   
Pseudo R2 (%)   10.30 8.94   
Panel B: Adjusted post-2009 CARs based on PSM  
   One-to-one 30 Nearest 50 Nearest Gaussian Kernel 
CAR3 Treated  mean 2.457 2.457 2.457 2.457 
 Control mean 0.192 -0.004 -0.205 -0.579 
 Difference  2.265*** 2.461*** 2.662*** 3.036*** 
SYNRGY3 Treated mean 5.062 5.062 5.062 5.062 
 Control  mean 1.245 1.434 1.389 1.295 
 Difference  3.818*** 3.628*** 3.674*** 3.768*** 
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Table 5.9. Corporate Governance two stage regressions. 
The table reports coefficients from 2-stage instrumental variable OLS regressions. In first stage regressions, the dependent 
variable in specifications 1,3 and 5 is the percentage of independent directors in the board (BI), the independent directors’ share 
of ownership (IDO), and the index of antitakeover provisions (BCF), respectively. The main explanatory variable in a time 
indicator for deals occurring from 2010 through 2015. The dependent variable in the second stage regression is the acquirer 
cumulative abnormal return for a 3-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement (ACAR3). BI, IDO, and BCF 
correspond to predicted corporate governance values from stage-one. For detailed variable definitions see Appendix 1. The 
notation of *, **, *** corresponds to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
  1st Stage 2nd Stage  1st Stage 2nd Stage  1st Stage 2nd Stage 
 
 
BI CAR  IDO CAR  BCF CAR 
 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Intercept   61.752*** 0.338  1.494**
* 
-4.097  2.693*** 12.677*** 
2010 - 2015  13.985*** 
 
 0.276** 
 
 -0.372*** 
 
Public  0.071 -2.256***  -0.080 -1.790***  -0.090 -2.340*** 
All Stock  -2.727** -1.384***  0.143 -2.519***  -0.133 -2.623*** 
Log Deal Value  0.894** -1.028***  -0.121** 0.091  -0.070* -0.697*** 
Acquirer M/B  -0.091 0.008  -0.008 0.048  -0.029*** -0.069 
Competition  0.145 -0.441  0.073 -1.271  -0.145 -1.901 
Hostile  -5.321 1.935  0.136 0.614  -0.376 -0.034 
Diversification  1.256 -1.362***  -0.091 -0.476  -0.066 -0.855** 
Cross Border  0.585 -0.733  -0.056 -0.243  -0.034 -0.006 
Serial Acquirer  -0.684 0.038  -0.186* 1.607***  0.056 -0.207 
Acquirer Leverage  -0.059** 0.022*  0.010**
* 
-0.067***  -0.005* 0.021 
High Market Val   -1.554* 0.318  -0.003 -0.385  -0.270*** 0.004 
Acquirer FCF  3.207 0.248  -0.131 2.483*  0.383 2.554 
BI   0.130***       
IDO      7.959***    
BCF         -2.594** 
  
  
 
  
 
  
Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 (%)  16.800 10.704  1.808 10.552  6.667 9.941 
N  1,619 1,619  1,388 1,388  1,236 1,236 
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Table 5.10. Acquirer long-run returns.  
The table reports long-run abnormal returns to acquiring firms consummating mega-deals for different sample periods. BHAR is the 1-year acquirer buy-and-hold 
monthly return adjusted for the corresponding “25 Size-B/M” portfolio (Loughran, 1997), starting at the month of the deal announcement. For any missing data, the 
abnormal return is replaced by that of the corresponding “25 Size-B/M” portfolio. For CTPR, the monthly alpha is estimated from a calendar time portfolio regression 
of the equally weighted monthly excess return as in Mitchell and Stafford (2000), on the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 4 factors, BHAR differences are 
estimated using T-tests for means and Wilcoxon tests for medians. The indicators of *, **, *** correspond to significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
  All  
(1) 
1990-2009 
 (2) 
1990-1999 
(3) 
2000-2009  
(4) 
2010-2015  
(5) 
(5) - (2) (5) - (4) (5) - (3) (4) - (3) 
           BHAR  mean -0.096 -1.241 -1.346 -1.143 4.424*** 5.665**
* 
5.567**
* 
5.770**
* 
0.203 
(25 Size-B/M) median -3.150*** -4.839*** -7.075*** -2.873*** 1.877** 6.715**
* 
4.749**
* 
8.952**
* 
4.203** 
 n 2,754 2,197 1,062 1,135 557 . . . . 
           
           BHAR  2010-15 indicator 3.520*         
Regression Control variables Yes         
 Adj. R2 (%) 1.230         
 n 2,754         
           
CTPR alpha 0.025 -0.075 -0.02 -0.063 0.364***     
(4-factor model) Rm - Rf 1.146*** 1.172*** 1.120*** 1.217*** 1.065***     
 SMB 0.283*** 0.284*** 0.323*** 0.261*** 0.403***     
 HML 0.018 0.050 0.187*** -0.058 -0.125     
 MOM -0.059** -0.035 0.069 -0.087** -0.154***     
            n-months 307 235 115 120 72     
 Adj. R2 (%) 92.01 91.59 88.68 93.57 94.95     
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Table 5.11. Acquirer Investment Efficiency. 
The table reports estimates of investment inefficiency based on Richardson (2006) for acquiring firms. In Panel A, the 
coefficients are from a regression of Total New Investment, INVi,t, which is the sum of capital expenditures, R&D 
expenditures, and acquisitions minus sales of PPE and necessary maintenance for assets in place for firm i in year t 
from Compustat, scaled by total assets. Qi, t-1 is the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity divided by book value of total assets for firm i in year t-. Leveragei, t-1 is calculated as total debt 
over common equity for firm i in year t-1. Cashi, t-1 is the logarithmic transformation of 1 plus the ratio cash and cash 
equivalents over total assets for firm i in year t-1. Agei, t-1 is the log of the difference between the year of the 
observation and the incorporate date for firm i in year t-1. Sizei, t-1 is the logarithmic transformation of total assets for 
firm i in year t-1. INVi, t-1 is the lagged term of the dependent variable. Stock Returni, t-1 is the total annual change in 
the market capitalization of firm i in the year t-1. We trace each acquirer’s investment for the entire sample period 
(1990-2015). Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% to remove outliers. Industry fixed effects are included in 
specification 2. Panel B reports mean and median residual investment (RESINV) which is the absolute value of the 
residuals from regression (2) in Panel A. n is the number of firm-year observations and Adj. R2 (%) is the adjusted R-
square. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Total new investment regressions (INVi ,t ) 
  
(1) (2) 
Intercept 
 
0.206*** 0.219*** 
Q (t-1) 
 
0.021*** 0.020*** 
Leverage (t-1) 
 
-0.002*** -0.001*** 
Cash (t-1) 
 
0.008*** 0.007*** 
Age (t-1) 
 
-0.005*** -0.006*** 
Size (t-1) 
 
-0.024*** -0.022*** 
INV (t-1) 
 
0.119*** 0.090*** 
Stock Return (t-1) 
 
0.012*** 0.013*** 
Industry FE 
 
No Yes 
Adj R2 (%) 
 
16.075 18,021 
n 
 
20,970 20,908 
    
Panel B: Residual Investment (RESINV) 
 
1990-2009 2010-2015 Diff. 
 
   
mean 0.095 0.074 -0.021*** 
median 0.055 0.044 -0.011*** 
n 15,904 5,005  
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Figure 5.1. Deal Activity through time. 
The figure shows the annual number of transactions and total consideration offered for the sample of acquisitions described in Table 
5.1.  
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Figure 5.2. Acquirer CAR evolution around the announcement.  
The figure shows the progression of CARs around the acquisition announcement for the three periods in our sample: 
1990-1999, 2000-2009, and 2010-2015. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1. Variable Definitions for Chapter 3. 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Target Characteristics 
Buy-and-Hold Returns The annually accumulated monthly returns of the firm starting in January and ending 
in December of the calendar year t-1. The returns are adjusted for the equally-
weighted CRSP index. 
Leverage Total Debt over Book Value of Common Equity of the firm in the fiscal year t-1. 
Leverage Dummy Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm’s Leverage is in the top 25% of the 
industry in the year t-1. The industry classification follows Fama-French 49 industries. 
Liquidity Total Cash and Cash Equivalents over Total Assets of the firm in the fiscal year t-1. 
Liquidity Dummy Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm’s Liquidity is in the bottom 25% of 
the industry in the year t-1. The industry classification follows Fama-French 49 
industries. 
Market Capitalisation  Year-end Market Capitalisation of the firm in the year t-1. The values are denominated 
in 2014 dollar terms. 
Market-to-Book Year-end market capitalisation of the firm in the calendar year t-1 over the total book 
value of the firm in the fiscal year t-1. 
Market-to-Book Dummy Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm’s Market-to-Book is in the bottom 
25% of the industry in the year t-1. The industry classification follows Fama-French 
49 industries. 
Past Completed Bid Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company has been the target of a 
successful bid in the three years before year t and 0 otherwise. 
Past Withdrawn Bid Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company has been the target of a 
withdrawn bid in the three years before year t and 0 otherwise. 
Price-to-Earnings Share price of the firm at the year-end of year t-1 over the annual earnings-per-share 
figure of the fiscal year t-1. 
Price-to-Earnings Dummy Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm’s Price-to-Earnings is in the bottom 
25% of the industry in the year t-1. The industry classification follows Fama-French 
49 industries. 
Return-on-Assets Operating income over Total Assets of the firm in year t-1. 
Return-on-Assets Dummy Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm’s Return-on-Assets is in the bottom 
25% of the industry in the year t-1. The industry classification follows Fama-French 
49 industries. 
Sales Growth The growth of sales of the firm from year t-2 to year t-1. 
Sales Growth Dummy Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm’s Sales Growth is in the bottom 25% 
of the industry in the year t-1. The industry classification follows Fama-French 49 
industries. 
Panel B: Industry Characteristics 
Activity Concentration The total number of deals over the total number of companies in the sample in year t-
1. 
Activity Concentration Change The year-on-year change of the Activity Concentration variable from year t-2 to year 
t-1. 
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Activity Value The total value of deals over the total market capitalisation in the sample in year t-1. 
Activity Value Change The year-on-year change of the Activity Value variable from year t-2 to year t-1. 
Capital Liquidity The average Cash and Cash Equivalents over Total Assets in the company’s industry 
in the year t-1. The industry classification follows Fama-French 49 industries. 
Capital Liquidity Change The year-on-year change of the Capital Liquidity variable from year t-2 to year t-1. 
HHI The industry-specific Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in the year t-1. The index is 
calculated as the sum of all companies’ squared market shares. The index has a 
maximum value of 1, for a full monopolistic industry. The closer the value of the 
index is to 0, the more fragmented the market.  
HHI Change The year-on-year change of the HHI variable from year t-2 to year t-1. 
Industry Synergies The sum of all synergistic gains on deal announcements in an industry in the year t-1. 
The synergistic gains are calculated as the Market Capitalisation weighted CAR (-1, 
+1). The Market Capitalisation weights are retrieved at the end of the month before 
the acquisition announcement. The industry classification follows Fama-French 49 
industries. 
Industry Synergies Change The year-on-year change of the Industry Synergies variable from year t-2 to year t-1. 
Serial Acquirer Serial acquirers are defined as firms that have acquired at least two companies in the 
last three years. The dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a serial 
acquirer which has acquired at least 1 firms in the prospective target or non-target’s 
industry and 0 otherwise. The industry classification follows Fama-French 49 
industries. 
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Appendix 2. Variable Definitions for Chapter 4. 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Acquisition Performance 
CAR (-1,+1) Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns over the 3 days around the announcement day. 
The model parameters are estimated over the window (-255, -46) relative to the 
announcement. 
CAR (-5,+5) Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns over the 11 days around the announcement day. 
The model parameters are estimated over the window (-255, -46) relative to the 
announcement. 
CAR (-20,+1) Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns over the 22 days around the announcement day. 
The model parameters are estimated over the window (-255, -46) relative to the 
announcement. 
CAR (-30,+1) Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns over the 32 days around the announcement day. 
The model parameters are estimated over the window (-255, -46) relative to the 
announcement. 
CAR (-30,+30) Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns over the 61 days around the announcement day. 
The model parameters are estimated over the window (-255, -46) relative to the 
announcement. 
BHAR (25 Size – B/M) 1-year Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns starting at the month of the announcement. 
The calculation involves monthly returns adjusted for the return of the corresponding 
25 value-weighted Fama and French Size-B/M portfolios (information retrieved by 
Kenneth French’s website). 
Panel B: Acquirer Characteristics 
Capital Expenditure Capital expenditure of the firm in the fiscal year t-1. The values are denominated in 
2015 dollar terms. 
Cash and Cash Equivalents Cash and cash equivalents of the firm in the fiscal year t-1. The values are 
denominated in 2015 dollar terms. 
Leverage Acquirer long- and short-term debt divided by total assets at the year-end of the fiscal 
year t-1. 
Market Capitalisation ($mil) Acquirer market capitalisation in 2015 dollar terms 30 days prior to the deal 
announcement. For missing values, we retrieve information from next available day, 
up to 10 days before the announcement. 
Market-to-Book Acquirer market cap over the total book value of equity. The latter is calculated as the 
sum of stockholders’ equity, deferred taxed and investment tax credit (if available), 
and preferred stock, all denominated in 2015 dollar terms and taken at year-end of the 
fiscal year t-1. We use redemption, liquidation, or par value for the preferred stock 
estimation, depending on data availability. Stockholders’ equity is as reported by 
Compustat; the sum of book value of common equity and preferred stock par value, or 
the book value of assets minus total liabilities, depending on data availability. 
Net Income Net income of the firm in the fiscal year t-1. The values are denominated in 2015 
dollar terms. 
Net Margin Net income over sales of the firm in the fiscal year t-1. 
ROA Operating income over total assets of the firm in the fiscal year t-1. 
ROE Net income over common equity of the firm in the fiscal year t-1. 
Sales Total sales of the firm in the fiscal year t-1. The values are denominated in 2015 dollar 
terms. 
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Total Assets ($mil) Acquirer total asset value at the year-end of the fiscal year t-1. The values are 
denominated in 2015 dollar terms. 
Total Debt Total short- and long-term debt of the firm in the fiscal year t-1. The values are 
denominated in 2015 dollar terms. 
Panel C: CEO Characteristics 
Age The age of the CEO at the time of the deal announcement. 
Bonus Cash bonus of the CEO for the fiscal year t-1. The values are denominated in 2015 
dollar terms. 
Deal Experience The number of deals performed during the decade before the appointment of the CEO 
in the current firm while holding CEO positions. 
Deal Experience - Any Similarity The number of deals performed with either the same target industry, public status, 
target nation, or similar deal value to the deal at hand, during the decade before the 
appointment of the CEO in the current firm while holding CEO positions. 
Deal Experience - Industry The number of deals performed with the same target industry to the deal at hand, 
during the decade before the appointment of the CEO in the current firm while 
holding CEO positions. 
Deal Experience - Status The number of deals performed with the same target public status to the deal at hand, 
during the decade before the appointment of the CEO in the current firm while 
holding CEO positions. 
Deal Experience - Target Nation The number of deals performed with the same target nation to the deal at hand, during 
the decade before the appointment of the CEO in the current firm while holding CEO 
positions. 
Deal Experience - Value The number of deals performed with similar deal value (+/- 20%) to the deal at hand, 
during the decade before the appointment of the CEO in the current firm while 
holding CEO positions. 
Equity-based compensation The sum of stock and option awards of the CEO for the fiscal year t-1. The values are 
denominated in 2015 dollar terms. 
First year CEO Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is during her first year on the 
CEO position in the new firm and 0 otherwise. 
Hubristic CEO Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Acquirer CEO has not exercised 67% in-the-
money options twice during her tenure and 0 otherwise based on Malmendier and Tate 
(2005). 
Insider Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has been an executive, director 
or chairman in the decade before her appointment as CEO in the current firm. 
Position Experience The number of years the CEO held CEO positions in the decade prior to her 
appointment in the current firm. 
Public Position Experience The number of years the CEO held public company CEO positions in the decade prior 
to her appointment in the current firm. 
Salary Salary of the CEO for the fiscal year t-1. The values are denominated in 2015 dollar 
terms. 
Tenure   The number of years in the CEO position in the current firm at the time of the deal 
announcement. 
Total Pay Total compensation of the CEO for the fiscal year t-1. The values are denominated in 
2015 dollar terms. 
  
Panel D: Deal Characteristics 
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All Cash  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the consideration was 100% in cash and 0 
otherwise. 
All Stock  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the consideration was 100% in stock and 
0 otherwise. 
Cross Border Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target’s country is not the U.S. and 0 
otherwise. 
Deal Value The deal value in 2015 dollar terms. 
Diversification Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the Fama-French 10-industry 
classification of the acquirer and target are different and 0 otherwise. 
Hostile Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal is labelled as hostile and 0 
otherwise. 
Premium 4-week % The 4-week premium paid for the target company as given by SDC. 
Public target Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target is a public firm and 0 otherwise. 
Relative Size The ratio of deal value over the acquirer market capitalisation one month prior to the 
acquisition announcement. 
Serial Acquirer  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company has performed 3 deals within 
5 years from the announcement and 0 otherwise. 
Tender offer Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal is labelled as a tender offer and 0 
otherwise. 
Time to completion The number of days between deal announcement and completion. 
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Appendix 3. Variable Definitions for Chapter 5. 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Acquisition Performance 
ACAR3 Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns over the 3 days around the announcement day. 
The model parameters are estimated over the window (-255, -46) relative to the 
announcement. 
BHAR (25 Size – B/M) 1-year Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns starting at the month of the announcement. 
The calculation involves monthly returns adjusted for the return of the corresponding 
25 value-weighted Fama and French Size-B/M portfolios (information retrieved by 
Kenneth French’s website). 
Δ$GAIN3 The difference in dollar gains ($GAIN3) between the target and bidder scaled by the 
sum of their market value 30 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
$GAIN3 Acquirer cumulative abnormal dollar value creation (destruction) over the 3 days 
around the announcement day. The value is the product of ACAR (-1,+1) and the 
market capitalisation of the acquirer one month prior to the acquisition announcement.   
Large Loss $1 bil  Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the variable “Dollar Gain (-1,+1)” indicates a 
loss equal to or greater than $1 bill., following Moeller et al. (2005). 
SYNRGY3 The market value-weighted 3-day cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer and 
target combined where the value weights are measured one month prior to the 
acquisition announcement.  
$SYNERGY3 The synergy gain (SYNRGY3) multiplied by the sum of the market capitalisation of 
the acquirer and target firm 30 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
TCAR3 Target cumulative abnormal returns over the 3 days around the acquisition 
announcement day. The returns model parameters are estimated over the window (-
255, -46) relative to the announcement. 
$VALUE+ The ratio of total market capitalisation change for the acquirer and target around the 
acquisition announcement adjusted for market movements and scaled by the deal 
value. 
WINNERS3 Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the ACAR (-1,+1) is positive and 0 otherwise. 
Panel B: Acquirer Characteristics 
Acquirer Assets ($mil) Acquirer total asset value at the year-end of the fiscal year t-1. The values are 
denominated in 2015 dollar terms. 
Acquirer FCF-to-Assets The ratio of cash flow from operations over the book value of assets at the year-end of 
the fiscal year t-1. 
Acquirer Hubris Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Acquirer CEO has not exercised 67% in-the-
money options twice during her tenure and 0 otherwise based on Malmendier and Tate 
(2005).  
Acquirer Leverage Acquirer long- and short-term debt divided by total assets at the year-end of the fiscal 
year t-1. 
Acquirer Market Cap ($mil) Acquirer market capitalisation in 2015 dollar terms 30 days prior to the deal 
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announcement. For missing values, we retrieve information from next available day, 
up to 10 days from the announcement. 
Acquirer Market-to-Book Acquirer market cap over the total book value of equity. The latter is calculated as the 
sum of stockholders’ equity, deferred taxed and investment tax credit (if available), 
and preferred stock, all denominated in 2015 dollar terms and taken at year-end of the 
fiscal year t-1. We use redemption, liquidation, or par value for the preferred stock 
estimation, depending on data availability. Stockholders’ equity is as reported by 
Compustat; the sum of book value of common equity and preferred stock par value, or 
the book value of assets minus total liabilities, depending on data availability. 
BCF Antitakeover Index The number of antitakeover provisions available at the firm’s disposal in the year of 
the acquisition as reported in IRRC. It has a minimum value of 1 and a maximum 
value of 6 (Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
Board Independence The percentage of outside directors in the Board of Directors in the year of the 
acquisition as reported in ISS. 
Independent Board  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of outside directors is 
higher than 50% in the Board of Directors of the acquirer and 0 otherwise (Masulis et 
al., 2007). 
Equity Compensation %  The sum of stock- and option-based compensation as a percentage of total 
compensation in the fiscal year t-1. The construction is based on Chauvin and Shenoy 
(2001). 
Ind. Directors Ownership % The ownership % of all outside directors combined in the fiscal year t-1. 
Serial Acquirer  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company has performed 3 deals within 
5 years from the announcement and 0 otherwise. 
Panel C: Target Characteristics 
Target Assets ($mil) Target total asset value at the year-end of the fiscal year t-1, denominated in 2015 
dollar terms. 
Target Market Cap ($mil) Target market capitalisation in 2015 dollar terms 30 days prior to the deal 
announcement. For missing values, we retrieve information from the next available 
day up to 10 days from the announcement. 
Target Market-to-Book Target share price 4 weeks before the announcement over the book value per share as 
reported in SDC. 
Panel D: Deal Characteristics 
All Cash  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the consideration was 100% in cash and 0 
otherwise. 
All Stock  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the consideration was 100% in stock and 
0 otherwise. 
Cash Consideration % The percentage of deal consideration paid in cash. 
Competition  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there were more than one bids for the 
target firm and 0 otherwise. 
Cross Border Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target’s country is not the U.S. 
Deal Value The deal value in 2015 dollar terms. 
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Diversified Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 2-digit SIC codes of the acquirer and 
target are different and 0 otherwise. 
High Market Valuation month Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if deal announcement month is classified as 
a high market valuation period and 0 otherwise. The classification is based on a de-
trended P/E ratio as in Bouwman et al. (2009). 
Hostile Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal is labelled as hostile and 0 
otherwise. 
Premium 4-week % The 4-week premium paid for the target company as given by SDC. 
Premium TCAR (-63,+126) The long-run abnormal return based premium attributed to target shareholders as 
estimated by Schwert (2000). 
Public Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target is a public firm and 0 otherwise. 
Relative Size The ratio of deal value over the acquirer market capitalisation one month prior to the 
acquisition announcement.  
Stock Consideration % The percentage of deal consideration paid in stock. 
Synergy Motive  Dummy that takes the value of 1 if SDC indicates synergistic gains (SYN) within the 
purpose code as stated by acquiring firm management, and 0 otherwise. 
Time to completion The number of days between deal announcement and completion.  
Toehold   Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer owned more than 5% at deal 
announcement and 0 otherwise. 
Withdrawn Dummy takes the value of 1 if the deal was withdrawn and 0 otherwise. 
Panel E: Investment Inefficiency Regression 
Age The logarithmic transformation of the difference between the year t-1 and the year of 
the incorporation. 
Cash The logarithmic transformation of 1 plus the ratio of company cash and cash 
equivalents over total assets in year t-1. 
Leverage The ratio of company total debt over the book value of common stock in year t-1. 
Q The company book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the 
market value of equity, all divided by the book value of total assets in year t-1. 
Size The logarithmic transformation of the company’s total assets in year t-1 . 
Stock Returns The company year-on-year difference of year-end market capitalisation for the year t-
1. 
Total New Investment The sum of company’s capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and acquisitions 
minus sales of PPE and necessary maintenance for assets in place scaled by total 
assets. The estimation of the variable is based on both year t and t-1. 
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Appendix 4. Top Mega-Deals by Decade for Chapter 5. 
Period # Year Announced Year Completed Acquiring Company  Target Company Deal Value $ bil CAR % (-1, 1) CAR % (-20, 1) 
1
9
9
0
-1
9
9
9
 
1 1999 2000 Pfizer Inc Warner-Lambert Co 126.87 -11.49 -14.77 
2 1998 1999 Exxon Corp Mobil Corp 114.80 -3.08 -5.00 
3 1998 1998 Travelers Group Inc Citicorp 105.51 14.76 13.61 
4 1998 1999 SBC Communications Inc Ameritech Corp 91.02 -8.00 -5.84 
5 1998 1998 NationsBank Corp BankAmerica Corp 89.63 6.94 9.77 
6 1999 2000 Qwest Commun Intl Inc US WEST Inc 80.11 -18.87 -13.37 
7 1998 1999 AT&T Corp Tele-Communications Inc 77.93 -9.67 -6.68 
8 1998 2000 Bell Atlantic Corp GTE Corp 77.68 2.52 1.55 
9 1999 2000 AT&T Corp MediaOne Group Inc 70.11 -6.65 -5.40 
10 1997 1998 WorldCom Inc MCI Communications Corp 61.89 3.13 15.73 
2
0
0
0
-2
0
0
9
 
1 2001 2002 Comcast Corp AT&T Broadband & Internet Svcs 96.42 -6.55 1.09 
2 2006 2006 AT&T Inc BellSouth Corp 85.44 -5.35 0.56 
3 2002 2003 Pfizer Inc Pharmacia Corp 78.43 -11.31 -13.64 
4 2009 2009 Pfizer Inc Wyeth 74.34 -9.93 -7.20 
5 2005 2005 Procter & Gamble Co Gillette Co 66.64 -4.51 -2.27 
6 2000 2001 Chevron Corp Texaco Inc 59.01 -5.25 -6.48 
7 2000 2001 JDS Uniphase Corp SDL Inc 56.63 -21.01 -32.54 
8 2008 2009 Bank of America Corp Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 53.69 -3.77 18.06 
9 2000 2000 Chase Manhattan Corp,NY JP Morgan & Co Inc 46.19 -12.62 -4.10 
10 2009 2010 Exxon Mobil Corp XTO Energy Inc 44.52 -5.06 -5.31 
2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
5
 
1 2014 2015 AT&T Inc DirecTV Inc 48.14 -2.62 0.26 
2 2014 2015 Medtronic Inc Covidien PLC 42.78 0.51 -1.92 
3 2011 2012 Express Scripts Inc Medco Health Solutions Inc 30.95 9.12 0.95 
4 2011 2012 Duke Energy Corp Progress Energy Inc 27.21 -0.80 -1.55 
5 2011 2012 Kinder Morgan Inc El Paso Corp 25.29 2.77 9.66 
6 2014 2015 Reynolds American Inc Lorillard Inc 25.08 0.70 3.93 
7 2010 2011 CenturyLink Inc Qwest Commun Intl Inc 24.22 -6.95 -6.92 
8 2011 2012 Johnson & Johnson Synthes Inc 21.18 4.64 6.53 
9 2014 2014 Facebook Inc WhatsApp Inc 19.49 2.94 18.40 
10 2011 2012 United Technologies Corp Goodrich Corp 17.05 -3.05 0.91 
 
 
 
